



# THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN

As part of the Programme:

**Building Resilience through Asset  
Creation and Enhancement (BRACE)**

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## SUMMARY

On December 2013, military violence occurred between factions of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), the military body of the ruling Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM). Violence is acknowledged to be resulting from political opposition between South Sudan's President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar. Deflecting parties quickly spread over the country and local conflicts erupted on an ethnic basis, with a majority of deflecting soldiers rallying to Nuer Riek Machar against the Dinka tribe of President's Kiir.

With the conflict reaching Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States, up to 1.5 million people became internally displaced, 835,000 people sought refuge in neighbouring countries and tens of thousands were killed. Although stressed on major ethnic lines at the beginning of the year, the conflict has shown now blurred lines around what appears as an elite fight for power. Conflict has had a major influence and impact on the populations living in the most affected states, Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei with, as mentioned, high numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States have been indirectly affected and experienced mainly strong displacement of population and food supply chain disruption. Tensions are however growing over political disputes along with proliferation of small arms and troops defection from the SPLA in the western states where political and criminal violence are still dominant.

All four states in South Sudan targeted by the United Kingdom Department For International Development (DFID) programme "Building Resilience Through Asset Creation and Enhancement" (BRACE - [www.southsudan-braceproject.org](http://www.southsudan-braceproject.org)), namely Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Upper Nile States, have been either directly or indirectly impacted by the conflict in terms of their food security situation and resilience of communities. Since 2012, IMPACT Initiatives has been conducting an impact evaluation of World Food Program (WFP) Food for Assets (FFA) activities in those states. This report specifically aims at evaluating the potential impact of the conflict on the food security and resilience of the populations targeted by BRACE.

Indeed, the overall market system has been disrupted due to widespread violence. Movement restrictions have impacted trade and business as well as daily lives of the population (fetching water, bringing cattle to grazing areas or simply collecting firewood have become perilous activities). This resulted in an important loss of income opportunities and an increase of food prices in the most affected states, which spread as well to indirectly affected states. The conflict and insecurity restricted transportation opportunities and services providers, which also contributed to market and stocks disruption. Because of violence and displacement; work force availability has been lacking as well, both at the community level to rebuild village infrastructures, and at the household level to sustain past households' income sources.

In August and September 2014, normal rains contributed to a strong green harvest and to the availability of plenty of natural resources. The food security situation overall the country is therefore expected to improve up to December 2014. However, because stocks have been depleted during the last lean season that saw the conflict spread across the country, supplies have not been kept and the food security situation has been projected to worsen from January to March 2015.

Due to the conflict's impact and its inter-relationship with food security at the community and household levels, the BRACE project, implemented by WFP and its partners, is likely to be affected. Specifically, the attribution of the project to community's resilience will need to be considered in light of the fact that some displacements of people and food supply chains have occurred in some of the projects target areas. To better understand the relevance, effectiveness and impact of BRACE, it is essential that the drivers and impacts of the conflict are incorporated into the results-based monitoring and evaluation framework. A relatively important number of BRACE indicators will be impacted by the conflict (i.e. income sources) but new ones have also been included in the data collection tools in order to better measure the potential impact of the conflict at both community and household levels. Specific recommendations on the evaluation are also included in this report.

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## ACRONYMS

<b>BRACE</b>	Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>EMOP</b>	Emergency Operations
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>FCS</b>	Food Consumption Score
<b>FFA</b>	Food for Assets
<b>GFD</b>	Global Food Distribution
<b>HEA</b>	Household Economic Analysis
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>SPLA</b>	Sudan People Liberation Army
<b>SPLA-IO</b>	Sudan People liberation Army In Opposition
<b>SPLM</b>	Sudan People Liberation Movement
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Program

## GEOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION

<b>Boma</b>	Lowest level of local government administration
<b>Payam</b>	Intermediate administrative level including several Bomas
<b>County</b>	Primary administrative level below the State including several Payams
<b>State</b>	Administration of local government including several Counties

This conflict analysis was led by IMPACT Initiatives in partnership with ACTED – as part of their collaboration in the REACH Initiative

### About REACH Initiative

REACH is a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organizations - ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives - and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted within the framework of inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms.

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## INTRODUCTION

IMPACT Initiatives is currently carrying out an evaluation of the impact of FFA programming from the BRACE<sup>1</sup> project in Warrap, Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile States of South Sudan, funded by DFID. Since its beginning in 2012, the BRACE program has targeted up to 50,000 rural households in four states – Northern and Western Bahr-el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Warrap States – and aims at building up a stronger resilience to climate hazard and human made disasters and improving food insecurity. South Sudan is regularly affected by shocks and stresses due to climatic events such as flooding and drought and is slowly reaching out of civil war period. This report seeks to summarise the impact of the internal conflict that erupted on the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 2013 on food security in the BRACE program area, as well as provide recommendations on how this can be captured within the results based monitoring and evaluation framework. This report complements a conflict analysis<sup>2</sup> that was released by REACH in August 2014, with a greater focus on the relationship to food security.

Since 15 December 2013, former Vice-President Riek Machar and parts of the SPLA troops have defected from the authority of President Salva Kiir and placed themselves in opposition with the South Sudanese Government. The internal conflict that resulted from such separation has seen loyal troops and armed groups of the Sudan People Liberation Army In Opposition (SPLA-IO) scattered all over the country, concentrating their forces on the main communication axes and urban centres. Moving according to military offensives, they often clash with armed groups, which results in massive insecurity incidents and fear perceptions from the civilian populations.<sup>3</sup> Successive attacks and counter-attacks from both sides on Bor and Malakal have pushed populations away from urban centres with more than 1.1 million individuals displaced within South Sudan, and an additional 440,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. 97,178 IDPs have sought refuge in the United Nations peacekeeping bases around the country, in particular in towns where fighting has been intense, such as Juba, Bentiu, Bor and Malakal. Large groups of people have fled from either towns or rural areas to places where they have family or other connections. While this shows that some communities have effective mechanisms to cope with temporary displacement, it also has potential for increasing local tensions, as the scarce resources of already poor communities become over-stretched as the crisis becomes protracted. Host communities – some of the same being covered by the BRACE program – could potentially swell beyond their carrying capacity due to increased hosting of IDPs. The crisis has negatively affected markets across the country that supplied food and livelihoods assistance to rural areas, especially in Greater Upper Nile. For the majority of the population who engage in agro-pastoralist activities, the recent fighting and associated displacement has disrupted their ability to plant or to move their cattle, resulting in further economic loss, less stable food security and disruption of their traditional coping mechanisms.<sup>4</sup>

This secondary review therefore aims at presenting the current situation, and to pin-point elements that could have an impact on the BRACE project mainly because of the impact the conflict had on food security and livelihoods. This will be used to inform the data collection tools that will be modified in the mid-term review of BRACE to include conflict-related indicators, while also providing an informative report on the conflict based on existing data. First, the methodology of the BRACE project will be presented as well as the methodology used for this report. Second, the report reviews the main drivers of the conflict, their consequences and their impact on the resilience of South Sudanese communities, followed by an analysis of the impact of the conflict itself on the resilience of the populations and on food security in South Sudan. The report includes a series of

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this impact evaluation, the following definition of resilience is used: A household's ability to rely on a variety of coping measures through increased assets and skills to, at a minimum, maintain their living standards despite shocks and stresses

<sup>2</sup> REACH, Conflict Analysis: Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States – South Sudan, August 2014: <http://goo.gl/WAK2KI>

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR, South Sudan Situation, UNHCR regional update 33, 15-19 September 2014, p. 2

<sup>4</sup> REACH, Conflict Analysis: Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States – South Sudan, August 2014, p. 7



recommendations for the conduct of the current wet season data collection and the future implementation of the project.

## METHODOLOGY

### BRACE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

The methodology of the impact evaluation has been well documented, and therefore this will provide a brief overview. For further information, see relevant project documentation from IMPACT Initiatives<sup>5</sup>.

The impact evaluation combines a mixed-methods approach including Household Economic Analysis (HEA) and quasi-experimental approach, collecting data from both communities and households actors. The analysis is undertaken using statistically robust methods, supported by qualitative data collection tools, and is disaggregated across livelihood zones defined by dominant livelihood patterns, and wealth groups that rank households within livelihood zones based on their assets and income.

The aim of the HEA assessment is to assess the impact of the FFA intervention on household food and income access, and expenditure patterns to enable a comparison of pre-project and post-project status against food and livelihood security thresholds. Whereas the aim of the sampling methodology for the quasi-experimental approach is to enable comparison of impacts on various food security indicators between households undertaking FFA project activities; those participating in General Food Distributions (GFD); and those that have not taken part in any food support programs.

The baseline for both wet and dry seasons was undertaken in 2013. The mid-term review will further develop the analysis of the baseline, and will include:

- Secondary data review of the impact of the recent conflict on food security (this report)
- Review of indicators and data collection tools based on lessons learned in the baseline and the aforementioned secondary data review
- Household surveys and focus group discussions across the two states of Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal only, including all relevant livelihood and wealth groups in those areas

### SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

A wealth of documents and information in relation to the recent South Sudan conflict is available. A snowballing technique has been employed, whereby a list of starting documents was reviewed and any others that were referenced in those documents were subsequently reviewed. The complete list can be found in Annexe I.

The secondary data review aims at providing an overview of the conflict and its effects on the communities engaged through BRACE. First, it will tackle the main drivers of the conflict, its effects (i.e. military incursions, displacement or assets' damage) and the different sort of impact on the communities involved with BRACE program across all four states. Second, it will provide an understanding of the BRACE report and the effects of the conflict on population's resilience, mainly through analysis of the impact of the conflict on the food supply chain and the coping mechanisms used by the populations. This also included an analysis of the indicators used in BRACE and their accuracy in light of the new political and social situation.

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<sup>5</sup> Impact Initiatives, Evaluating Food Security and the Impact of Food for Assets Activities, Dry Season Baseline Report, June 2014, [http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/BRACEPhaseIIBaselineReport\\_2013\\_Final1.pdf](http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/BRACEPhaseIIBaselineReport_2013_Final1.pdf)

## IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON COMMUNITIES

### DRIVERS OF THE CONFLICT

Since the outbreak of violence in Juba on 15 December 2013, a significant number of the South Sudanese population has been displaced, especially in the Upper Nile region, which covers the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. What initially started as a political dispute within the SPLM, the ruling party, soon took a brutal ethnic dimension, placing the country's two largest communities against each other. On the one hand, the current South Sudanese President Salva Kiir's Dinka tribe, the largest in South Sudan, and on the other, the Nuer tribe of Mr Riek Machar, the former Vice President of South Sudan. Defection from the SPLA, national army and armed wing of the SPLM, in different areas led to a widespread conflict. Within weeks, thousands of people had been killed or wounded in the violence, and hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes. Despite the signing of a "cessation of hostilities" agreement on 23 January 2014 and a recommitment to the peace process on 9 May 2014, fighting between government and opposition forces has continued, especially in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states as shown in map 1.

On the political side, it is widely recognized that the violence, although fragmented along ethnic lines, reflects a political fight among the country's elites. As pointed out by the Sudd Institute, not only have members of the political class reached for the ethnic card as a way to galvanize support but it is this same behaviour of the elites in the construction of the new state, coupled with deplorable economic and social conditions, that catalyzed the spread of violence.<sup>6</sup> Even if they were not directly targeted, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal states show indicators of tensions and internal dynamics that may result in their direct inclusion in the broader conflict. There have been key defections and an increase of general desertions in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal related to the SPLA, including due to soldiers not being paid, of Nuer who wish to leave their posts and Equatorians who do not wish to be affiliated by what they perceive to be a Dinka and Nuer conflict.<sup>7</sup> Until military desertions and defections began to rise in April and May, the area was fairly peaceful with respect to the national conflict.<sup>8</sup> Of particular note is the prominent defection of General Dau Aturjong Nyuol (one of the founding members of the SPLA) in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, due to opposition to Paul Malong the current General Chief of Staff of the SPLA. There is an increased political and social disaffection with the three Governors, either stemming from what some term 'dictatorial tendencies' (Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal and Lakes) as well as accusations that the 2010 elections were partially rigged.<sup>9</sup> Such issue provides a strong example of how past events and grievances tend to be reignited through the persistence of the current conflict. The deliberate use of ethnicity and identity to mobilise communities against each other could result in a strong divide that would destroy relationships and networks that exist across communities.<sup>10</sup> Such division between communities would have a strong impact on trade networks, thus impacting the potential livelihoods of communities isolated by the conflict.

Map 1: BRACE states and the South Sudan conflict (next page)

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<sup>6</sup> The Sudd Institute, Special Report, South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-conflict Prospects, Aug 3, 2014, p.2


<sup>7</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p.19

<sup>8</sup> Sudan Tribune, "Another Army General Defects in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State," May 2, 2014, [www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50844](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50844)

<sup>9</sup> Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p.19

<sup>10</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p.11

# Upper Nile, Warrap, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States in the South Sudan conflict



This map displays information presented in the DFID funded BRACE Report. It shows the Integrated Food Security Phases (IPC) by county, highlighting the BRACE states, as well as the location and size of IDP sites and settlements and information on conflict and displacement.

warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH partners, associated donors mentioned on this map.

Note: IDP sites data is from IOM DTM assessment round 5, last updated September 2014. IPC data is from FAO and reflects the current situation (September 2014). Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not

Data Sources: Conflict and displacement: OCHA, April 2014; IOM; IPC Working Group; WFP, September 2014; Administrative boundaries, settlements: OCHA  
Service Layer Credits: Copyright © 2013 Esri  
Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984  
File: REACH\_SSD\_BRACE\_30Sept2014\_A4\_EN  
Contact: reach.mapping@impact-initiatives.org



Upper Nile state has been the most affected by the conflict as armed hostilities between the Government of South Sudan and the SPLA-IO have been constant, with control of major towns passing from one actor to another. The existence of proxy armed groups such as the Mabanese Defence Forces or White Army soldiers tend to blur the current context in Upper Nile State. Targeted killings of Nuer individuals by the Mabanese Defence Forces escalated existing tensions between the Mabanese host community, Sudanese refugees from Blue Nile and South Kordofan and IDPs.<sup>11</sup> Moving populations are therefore put at risk in their daily struggle to search for food, flee from flooding areas and seek safety.<sup>12</sup> Such diverse environment is the result of a loose institutional control over the entire country and the spread of small arms, which has escalated the existing tensions in many places and increased proxy fighting, as armed individuals capitalize on cattle-raiding culture and rely on autonomous armed groups.<sup>13</sup> In the same way, in Warrap State, minor clashes erupted, particularly near the border with Unity State, with many IDPs having crossed the border and settled in the western and northern part of Warrap State. Historically, Warrap has been prone to cattle-raiding incidents but their occurrence and severity has increased as a result of small arms proliferation, greater population density and loose security forces.<sup>14</sup>

Economic factors also have an implication in the development of the conflict. Pervasive corruption and poor infrastructure create tensions by stifling economic growth, particularly in areas outside the capital. In fact, many political elites with alleged corruption cases against them were removed from the government and therefore lost access to their financial resources prior to the outbreak of the conflict.<sup>15</sup> The lack of diversification in South Sudan's economy is also major. The over-reliance on oil has led much of the fighting to occur in regions of the country where oil is found, particularly in Upper Nile and Unity states, which has spilled over into neighbouring areas.<sup>16</sup>

#### EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT AND IMPACTS ON COMMUNITIES RESILIENCE TO FOOD INSECURITY

Effects of the conflict	Impact on communities, resilience and food security
Continuous fighting and military offensives	Movement restrictions and disruption of daily activities
Environment of fear and insecurity	Massive displacement of people and assets
Increased gender-based violence, child recruitment and domestic violence	Collusion of host and displaced communities
	Market and supply lines disruptions
	Increased competition for resources
	Loss of income opportunities
	Fewer assets due to loss, damage, sale or other
	Lost agricultural productivity and missed seasons

The violations committed during the conflict against the civilian population, which particularly affected the most vulnerable groups within communities (razing and destruction of civilian property, rape, torture, execution style

<sup>11</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, p. 20

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 17

<sup>13</sup> REACH, Conflict Analysis: Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States – South Sudan, August 2014, p. 8

<sup>14</sup> Spittaels, Steven and Yannick Weyns, International Peace Information Service, Mapping Conflict Motives: the Sudan – South Sudan border, January 2014

<sup>15</sup> AllAfrica, "South Sudan: Rebel Leader Should Face Corruption Charges – Kiir," July 19, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201407211186.html>

<sup>16</sup> REACH, Conflict Analysis: Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States – South Sudan, August 2014, p. 8

killings, and forced disappearances<sup>17</sup>), created an environment of fear and insecurity in the major part of the country, producing massive displacement.

With over 1.1 million IDPs having moved from their homes since December 2013, access to farming and grazing land has been limited in the most affected states such as Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states. The situation has however been dire for neighbouring states such as Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Eastern Equatoria that have welcome most of the fleeing populations. Freedom of movement has been strongly limited because of military offensive as well as curfew measures but mainly because of high levels of insecurity and direct physical targeting of civilians (often based on perceptions of loyalties to conflict parties based on ethnicity and other affiliations).<sup>18</sup>

Restrictions are less wide-spread nowadays even if some populations avoid areas where they could be in danger, depending on the military forces occupying the region. Indeed, abduction of children to become soldiers and gender-based acts of violence have both been widely spread in the affected areas, disrupting the ability of targeted populations to move. The humanitarian community advocated for “days of tranquillity” to be observed by armed actors to enable delivery of humanitarian assistance and to allow populations to move freely and without fear to markets, safe areas away from frontlines, and access to critical livelihoods zones. Such measures have however not yet been observed<sup>19</sup> and official signed ceasefire failed to prevail.

At the community level, the fighting have driven ever larger numbers of people and livestock onto farming communities’ lands and exacerbated tensions that existed for at least two decades between Dinka pastoralists and other groups. This means that access to grazing land and drinking water has been reduced. Host communities also have to share existing resources such as fire wood, wild fruits and game, drinking water, fish stocks, farming land and settlements. Competition for such resources has been increased in an environment already prone to conflict. Other secondary effects, such as recruitment of child soldiers, cannot be ignored, as not only does it open the door to the loss of an entire generation, but will engender longer-term concerns for the community who will have to go through disarmament and reintegration processes at a further stage.

At the individual and household levels, it is reverberated through acts of brutality, gender-based violence and domestic violence that has already become the norm in some communities due to the cyclical violence of the current conflict, with increasing inter- and intra-communal tensions.<sup>20</sup> Movement restrictions have put a strong burden on households. Some had to flee their villages, leaving their belongings behind, with few tools to cultivate plots on the grounds they had been displaced to. Most of the support in remote places was first provided by host communities themselves. Such burden on both host and displaced population has put their resilience on hold as they have to deal with a situation that was not expected and therefore need to find coping mechanisms on a daily basis (such as consuming grain stocks or slaughter livestock<sup>21</sup>) that do not constitute durable solutions and place households in an insecure situation.

The conflict had also been an obstacle to provide a safe and secure environment for children, to continue providing continuous education, which could help families to achieve safer and durable income sources. Populations’ displacement hence did not procure an increase in trade and business as resources were already scarce, especially during the lean season. Furthermore, as noted above in regards to market disruption, income generation opportunities have decreased. The impact of the conflict goes as well further with disruption of salaried work opportunities. In Mapel, Jur County, Western Bahr el Ghazal, the presence of major military barracks had a strong impact on people’s livelihoods as a lot of income sources were coming from military

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<sup>17</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p.12

<sup>18</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p. 9

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 9

<sup>20</sup> Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p.13

<sup>21</sup> IPC, Republic of South Sudan Communication Summary, September 2014, p. 1

wages, which also generated service-based income sources. However, the mobilisation of these troops on military fronts or strategic areas might disrupt the livelihoods of the communities left in Mapel.

## CONFLICT AND FOOD SECURITY

After decades of protracted conflict, which limited market growth and infrastructure development, the South Sudanese population is particularly vulnerable to violence, drought, and famine. The most recent conflict upsurge came after a year of relative improvement to better food security in the country with abundant harvests and no negative major climatic or disease-related problems.<sup>22</sup> Fighting and displacement have had disastrous effects on food security, with around up to 7.3 million people being food insecure and 3.9 million people facing acute food insecurity.<sup>23</sup> The livelihoods of millions of people have been disrupted: farmers' activities have been reduced by displacement, livestock have been dislocated and traders have seen their movement capacity reduced to nothing, but populations have been mainly struck by the combined losses of access and availability of food. This section aims at summarising the potential impact that the conflict had on food security and on resilience for the populations targeted through BRACE.

### IMPACT ON FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN

The potential impact on the food supply chain will be analysed through different lenses such as accessibility to land, water and markets, the existence of transportation means or simply the ability for harvest and growing in terms of displacements and labour needs.

As noted above, the conflict created a major restriction of movement for the entire population that did not limit to accessing markets and urban centres but had an impact on the day-to-day lives of the populations, disrupting farming and grazing activities by limiting access to water points and grazing areas for self-reliant households, as well as trade and market supplies. Not only have access to markets been disrupted, but the infrastructures themselves have been destroyed. Since the beginning of the conflict in December 2013, local market infrastructure in Rubkhona (Unity), Malakal (Upper Nile) and Bor (Jonglei) were burnt to the ground, businesses shut down, hence suspending salaries and sources of income for many providers of basic services such as health care and education. Less income generating opportunities impacts as well the purchasing power of individuals as fewer customers are available for traders and businesses that continue to operate.<sup>24</sup>

Disrupted market systems go along with limitation of transportation opportunities and a lack of service providers for individuals, local traders and international organisations and implementing partners. The cost of services has increased sharply since the outbreak of the conflict, in particular the price of locally contracted transport and cargo handling services has increased.<sup>25</sup> Major markets in Juba, Bor, Malakal and Rumbek are fragile and understocked which affects remote markets on which food security in rural areas depends, as they heavily rely on supplies and traders coming from such major markets.<sup>26</sup> A recent report from Mercy Corps found that although the usual market equilibrium has been broken, new dynamics have been created. In order to resume trade and revive local markets, local Nuer chiefs from Unity State negotiated with neighbouring Dinka chiefs in Jonglei to

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<sup>22</sup> FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop And Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan, 20 February 2014, p.6-7

<sup>23</sup> UNOCHA South Sudan, South Sudan Revised Crisis Response Plan 2014, p. 13

<sup>24</sup> Joint Agency Food Security Briefing Note, Loaded Guns and Empty Stomachs: Fixing a food crisis and preventing a catastrophe in South Sudan, April 2014, p.3

<sup>25</sup> UNOCHA South Sudan, South Sudan Revised Crisis Response Plan 2014, p. 45

<sup>26</sup> Mercy Corps, Beyond Band-Aids: Rebuilding Market Systems Amidst Catastrophe in South Sudan, September 2014, p. 6

enable traders to move around the area and maintain business and trade networks.<sup>27</sup> If not all these elements may apply to the past and current situation in both Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, it however presents the overall situation on which markets in such states depend anyway.

Market destruction mainly affected conflict related areas of the conflict but this also had a strong influence on supply chains as well stocks availability in other regions of the country driving up prices. According to Integrated Food Security Phase Classification<sup>28</sup> (IPC), markets in Northern Bahr el Ghazal have been functioning normally. Their counterparts in Western Bahr el Ghazal however experienced disruption and a reduced activity. In Upper Nile State, markets experienced strong significant disruptions, increase in staples and food prices as well as depletion of stocks in New Fangak and Canal counties for example.<sup>29</sup> This results in an overall worse functioning of the market system and some increase in commodity prices mainly experienced in the most affected areas of the country. Indeed, Sorghum grain prices have been fairly stables in Western Bahr el Ghazal, when they have known a normal increase in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. In Malakal town however, prices have close to double their 2013 value.<sup>30</sup> In Unity in July 2014, nominal prices for white sorghum were 285% higher than their 5-year (2009-2013) average and up to 175% higher than prices in June 2013. Price of beans also doubled compared to June 2013, going from 200SSP for 50kg to 400SSP for the same quantity.<sup>31</sup>

The situation is however slightly different in states that have not been directly affected by the conflict. In Aweil, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, sorghum prices have exceeded the 2013 prices. Sorghum prices in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, are however lower than last year, showing that Northern Bahr el Ghazal might actually have suffered more from the conflict than its western cousin. Prices for wheat flour are however lower in both Wau and Aweil, compared to last year, which minimizes as well the potential impact on the conflict, for the current season (a conclusion that does not mean that repercussion of the conflict will be lowered as well during the dry season).<sup>32</sup>

Most importantly, it is the ability of people to harvest and farm their land that matters. As noted above, accessibility and supplies have strongly decreased. The majority of IDPs have settled on host communities' grounds, which stretches the portions of land available for growing vegetables and maintain livestock. In order to mitigate the depletion of seeds and stocks, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) distributed crop kits and vegetable kits to numerous implementing partners to distribute in host communities.<sup>33</sup> Central to the crisis is that agriculture in South Sudan is watered only by rainfall, on small, hand-cultivated plots. The planting season, which nationally runs from mid-March to mid-June, is the critical window for South Sudanese farmers to sow seeds for the year. With so much population displacement, the majority of this planting has not occurred in the conflict-affected states.<sup>34</sup> IPC's most recent study has however shown that the quasi normal rains actually enabled a period of improvement in the food security situation in the overall country, for the October to December period only.<sup>35</sup> The main concern of the overall relief community is that with an increased pressure put on host communities and a delay in the planting of crops, the typical lean season, which usually goes from May to August, should experience an early start for 2015.<sup>36</sup>

Available work force also appears as an important issue when considering farming and grazing activities. Large-scale military mobilization has rendered many households reliant on those left behind to do the heavy work of

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>28</sup> The IPC was originally developed for use in Somalia by FAO's Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU). This evidence-based approach provides a set of standardized tools to measure and evaluate food crisis. More info can be found on <http://www.ipcinfo.org/>

<sup>29</sup> IPC, Overview of Food Security Situation in South Sudan, September 2014

<sup>30</sup> IPC, Overview of Food Security Situation in South Sudan, September 2014

<sup>31</sup> South Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p. 13

<sup>32</sup> Famine Early Warning System Network, South Sudan Price Bulletin, August 2014, p. 3

<sup>33</sup> FAO, "South Sudan Update, Appeal and Outlook", Sue Lautzer presentation to FAO North America, September 15<sup>th</sup> 2014

<sup>34</sup> Passarelli, Ricky, South Sudan's Impending Crisis, World Policy Blog, 8 July 2014, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/07/08/south-sudans-impending-food-crisis>

<sup>35</sup> IPC, Republic of South Sudan Communication Summary, September 2014, p. 1

<sup>36</sup> FAO, "South Sudan Update, Appeal and Outlook", Sue Lautzer's presentation to FAO North America, 15 September 2014



preparing fields for cultivation, finding pasture, water and protection for livestock. As noted by the South Sudan Protection Cluster, mass recruitment is occurring in other community groups, not simply within the Dinka and Nuer, both on request from the government and SPLA IO and of their own evolution. Several communities tend to develop their own defence forces based on ethnic lines.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, as cattle hold a major part in South Sudanese households' resilience, such matter needs to be considered as well. Due to displacement and traditional rainy season herding patterns, migrant animal herds are now intermingling with displaced human populations and their livestock. These unvaccinated animals have potential to transmit disease and cause further complications for public health and food safety initiatives.<sup>38</sup> The risk of disease being so high, and the importance of livestock in south Sudanese population's livelihoods being so important, the humanitarian community provided Livestock vaccination in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and vaccination kits were also distributed in the Greater Bahr el Ghazals and Western Equatoria with the capacity to vaccinate one million animals and support cattle farming as a durable strategy.<sup>39</sup>

### IMPACT ON FOOD CONSUMPTION CALCULATION

As mentioned in the Methodology section, the BRACE data collection includes both community and household data whose collection indicators will be affected by the potential impact of the conflict. At the household level, several indicators of food security could be impacted by the conflict. The Food Consumption Score (FCS) indicator, which is comprised of the origin of the food eaten by household members and its variety, will enable to analyze if people relied more or less on their own production, if they turned to potential markets or shops or if they had to borrow to kin to feed household members.

However, too much emphasis should not be put on this indicator in isolation. Because the Wet Season BRACE data collection matches the harvest period, and as the IPC indicated a good harvest for August and September 2014, figures might actually not be impacted that much when reviewing the food consumption indicators. Households might indeed have consumed well enough this wet season to score an acceptable food consumption score when they actually lived on seeds stocks and cattle, which means they will have less food available to face the dry and lean seasons from January to July 2015.

Nonetheless, the food origins will constitute a strong indicator to measure the impact of the conflict. If the analysis goes along with the IPC findings, individuals should get their food mainly from their own gardens or from wild fruit collection. If a majority of food items originate from markets, this might mean that the conflict did not impact the area that much. Food borrowed or given as gifts from kin or non-kin will be as well of interest in the analysis. Comparison with former data collected will be crucial to understand the potential impact of the conflict through indicators as well as integration of other external factors that might have impacted the area analysed.

### COPING MECHANISMS

The mid-term data collection of the BRACE impact assessment will truly enable researchers to determine to what extent households have increased their reliance on specific coping strategies. It is however uncertain whether these are short term food security strategies (i.e. eating less preferred and less expensive food than usual, limit portion sizes at meals, reduce number of meals eaten in a day, etc) or long-term livelihoods strategies (i.e. sending household members to live away to earn and income or sending them away to live with relatives). In this perspective, displacement appears as a coping mechanism itself as some people (not all of them) have sought

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<sup>37</sup> Sudan Protection Cluster, Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2014, p. 12

<sup>38</sup> Bhatt, Sunny, The Borgen Project Blog, South Sudan Food Crisis Grows, 24 February 2014, <http://borgenproject.org/south-sudan-food-crisis-grows/>

<sup>39</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Crisis, Situation Report No. 54, 18 September 2014, p. 4

refuge with relatives in order to survive. Elements on coping mechanisms collected in this document represent secondary and indirect information that will be reviewed at the end of the Midterm data collection of BRACE evaluation which will be carried out in 2015.

There is a significant difference between coping mechanisms of urban and rural displaced.<sup>40</sup> Urban displaced will rarely have a community leader, are often day-labourers, and often have very little coping mechanisms because of their separation with their initial social networks (friends and kin). Individuals fleeing from urban centres will often be ill-equipped to survive and adapt to rural settings and make use of certain coping mechanisms (i.e. fishing more than usual or hunt more animals). Displaced populations from rural areas often have tighter community structures and some form of coping mechanism in place. When they have the resources, they are able to set up their own camps, have a leadership mechanism in place, collect their own firewood and water, and create fenced areas to divide the families in the camp.

According to the IPC study from September 2014, coping mechanisms most commonly used were borrowing from kin and relying on them for survival through displacement to their community, as well a greater consumption of seeds stocks or livestock.<sup>41</sup> Being part of the BRACE household questionnaire, these coping mechanisms will allow corroboration of IPC findings or not, including more information on their geographic repartition.

## FOOD SECURITY PREVISIONS FOR 2015

As the September IPC study showed and despite the ongoing conflict, the food security across the overall country has begun improving in August and September. Such improvement is expected to continue on a positive trend through to December 2014 as a result of positive harvest and according to seasonal patterns, particularly in areas not affected by conflict. According to the study, “normal rainfall, good crop planting and performance, and the start of the green harvest in late August have had a positive effect on the seasonal availability of crops, livestock products, fish, and wild foods”.<sup>42</sup> However, due to displacement, planting in Greater Upper Nile has been reduced, which will impact overall cereal production and lead to faster stock depletion in the upcoming months.

Currently, populations in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal are still categorised as being in a stressed phase, whereas the population of Upper Nile State are categorised as in a crisis situation with only an average of 13% of the population of both former states being in a crisis situation.<sup>43</sup> At the same period last year, populations of Northern Bahr el Ghazal states were classified by the IPC as in a none or minimal food insecurity phase.<sup>44</sup>

As noted previously, projection from October to December 2014 categorises Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap as in a minimal food security phase, showing an improvement in the food security situation of both states, whereas Northern Bahr el Ghazal remains categorised as in a stressed phase (with a 1% increase in the part of the state’s population placed in a crisis situation, when this proportion dropped to 3.9% in Western Bahr el Ghazal).<sup>45</sup> As the rainy season and harvest ends, Northern Bahr el Ghazal is projected to enter a crisis phase from January to March 2015. The western part of Western Bahr el Ghazal as well as the major part of Warrap is projected to enter a stressed phase for the same period.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> ACAPS, Disaster Needs Analysis –Update South Sudan - Upper Nile, Unity And Jonglei, 3 May 2014

<sup>41</sup> IPC, Republic of South Sudan Communication Summary, September 2014, p. 1

<sup>42</sup> IPC, Republic of South Sudan Communication Summary; September 2014, p. 1

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>44</sup> Famine Early Warning Systems Network; South Sudan Food Security Outlook, September 2013, p. 1

<sup>45</sup> IPC, Republic of South Sudan Communication Summary; September 2014, p. 3

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 4

In the meantime, most of directly affected states in the Greater Upper Nile region are projected to enter a stressed to crisis phase between October 2014 and 2015. However, it does not mean that, because the overall food security of the population increased in August and September 2014, the population nutrition's level has increased. Food access instability, which often means coping mechanisms entering the equation rather than durable solution, could actually have a reverse effect on nutrition levels. Nutrition programmes in many states were largely suspended when violence broke out, due to insecurity, stock-outs and looting of supplies. Indeed, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap have historically high rates of malnutrition during the lean season and, despite the rather fructuous wet season harvest, it is anticipated that these will remain high or increase in 2014.<sup>47</sup> It is estimated that 910,400 children aged 6-59 months will suffer from severe and acute malnutrition in 2014. As many as 50,000 children may not survive unless they receive urgent treatment. The situation is most dire in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states and in parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap states.<sup>48</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRACE EVALUATION

This report has summarised the impacts of the conflict on food security. In relation to the BRACE project, it is important that the project itself remains adaptive to the changing context, and that the results based monitoring and evaluation framework is able to capture these new dynamics. A certain number of indicators should be included in the methodology to account for the potential impact of the conflict in the evaluation, such as:

### AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

- Population fluctuation
- Changes in the number of markets open or accessible
- Prices of food items in the closest market
- Availability of food items
- Number of available labourers within the community
- Availability of services such as education, health, transport and communication
- In cases of evolution of the situation compared to the previous year, include an indicator of the reason for such changes

### AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL

- Changes or shocks to livestock farming activities (to account for possible sales of livestock during the lean season) such as cattle raiding, difficulty to access cattle fodder/markets
- Changes to harvest activities such as difficulties to access seeds or labour for households having mentioned relying on crop sales as a source of income

Practically, FFA activities have been put on hold in December 2013 by WFP because of insecurity and started again in March 2014 in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal. These states comprise of Dinka majority and have remained under control of the SPLA since the outbreak of the conflict. With the exception of some isolated incidents of violence reported in Warrap State<sup>49</sup> and Northern Bahr el Ghazal,<sup>50</sup> the states in which BRACE

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<sup>47</sup> UNOCHA South Sudan, South Sudan Revised Crisis Response Plan 2014, p. 65

<sup>48</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Crisis, Situation Report No. 54, 18 September 2014, p. 13

<sup>49</sup> Sudan Tribune, "Fighting Spreads to Warrap State, Killing 2," January 17, 2014, [www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49591](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49591)

<sup>50</sup> Sudan Tribune, "Over 60 killed as South Sudan Rivals Clash in Northern Bahr el Ghazal," July 18, 2014, [www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51726](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51726)

activities were implemented have not experienced direct fighting related to the conflict. Nonetheless, this does not mean that they have been unaffected by conflict. On the one hand, the relative stability of these areas makes them attractive to IDPs fleeing food and physical insecurity and the large influx of persons is not without consequences. It does mean that during the implementation phase, WFP teams will have to deal with communities with significant different number of individuals that might not stay in the longer-term in the chosen communities. Therefore, selection process, distribution of food and monitoring of activities will be complicated.

**Map 2: BRACE FFA Locations in 2013 (next page)**

Furthermore, and as mentioned in the methodology, the BRACE project targets households that have been participating in FFA, GFD and those who have not. As the conflict drove thousands of IDPs in areas that are not directly targeted by fighting, humanitarian actors conducted numerous food distributions and nutrition programs in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal as well as in Warrap. In July 2014, as part of Emergency Operations (EMOP), WFP provided GFD for 8,350 individuals in Western Bahr el Ghazal, 46,058 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 28,500 in Warrap State.<sup>51</sup> Such occurrence will need to be strictly looked upon when analysing data collected in such States. Proportions of individuals having participated in GFD might indeed be higher than in previous exercises. Furthermore, some areas might have been targeted for assistance provision, but some areas might have been left aside. The Western Bahr el Ghazal Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster reported in October 2014 a lack of implementing partners to conduct food distribution and assistance in Raja County.<sup>52</sup> This means that figures in the analysis might vary depending if the area in focus had been targeted or not by humanitarian assistance.

Attention should also be given to data collection indicators already included in the baseline, such as the source of income or the amount of money spend on livelihood inputs. The former aims at knowing the three major sources of incomes for the household during the current wet season when the latter records the amount of money spent in the last twelve months on livelihood inputs such as the purchase of seeds, tools or livestock purchase. The “access to market” indicator will be compared with previous data collection to search for higher travelling time to access the closest market as well as transportation means used.

It is important to keep in mind that South Sudan states were suffering from recurring external factors (such as floods and cattle raids) before the conflict erupted, that also had a strong impact on the livelihoods and resilience of the populations assessed through BRACE. Therefore it is crucial to avoid attributing all decreases in food security to conflict. The evaluation team could monitor this through two different processes.

First, combining community and household results. Indicators at both levels will enable measurement in changing patterns when comparing with previous data collected in the same area. For example at the community level, the indicator for community priorities will help understand better the situation of the village in its whole. If the most urgent priority is to provide flood control structures, then disruptions or changes in terms of livelihoods might have been the consequence of cyclic climatic events rather than a direct impact of the conflict on the community life. On the other hand, if the result of the consultation is that the main priority is the return of IDPs to their original village, this will constitute an indication that the community had indeed been indirectly impacted by the conflict.

Second, taking into account external factors and contextual elements will help understand better local dynamics and considerations. Sudden flooding, strong IDP settlements or new military barracks in the area might have an impact on resilience of the populations.

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<sup>51</sup> WFP, South Sudan Situation Report No 39, 15 August 2014, p. 1


<sup>52</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Situation No 56, 2 October 2014, p. 4



**Wet Season**


**171** different locations

For Humanitarian Purposes Only  
Production date : 29 October 2014



**Dry Season**

**264** different locations



- FFA Dry Season Locations
  - FFA Wet Season Locations
  - Conflict affected states
  - State boundary
  - County boundary
- Livelihood Zones**
- Western Flood Plains
  - Ironstone Plateau
  - Eastern Flood Plains
- Greenbelt**
- Hills & Mountains
  - Nile-Sobat Rivers
  - Pastoral

0 50 100 150 km

Data Sources:  
FFA locations: REACH  
Administrative boundaries: OCHA  
Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984  
File: REACH\_SSD\_Map\_Brace\_FFAlocation\_29Oct14\_A4  
Contact: reach.mapping@impact-initiatives.org  
Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH partners, associates, donors or any other stakeholder mentioned on this map.

Concomitantly, the evaluation team should keep in mind that the data collection occurred during the most fertile time of the year, when stocks are usually high and food available. Because of the lean period that occurred before August, harvest came as a strong relief for the population, which might mask the fact that stocks will not be sufficient to sustain totally the population, especially in conflict affected areas, during the dry season. Monitoring the creation of food supply chains will also be key to better understand possible disruption in the data collected. As noted above, humanitarian assistance in some areas might have helped sustain food security standards by creating food supply chains that did not occur previously.

Finally, information sharing mechanisms should be developed with states food security and livelihood clusters and other partners working in the areas of BRACE's implementation. With many organizations relocating out of deep-field locations at the start of the crisis, information on, for example, nutrition and food insecurity in some of the areas worst affected by violence has been scant, especially in the first months of the response. The fast-changing context, including ongoing displacement, also rapidly outdated information. The humanitarian community has so far used "best available" information to prioritize the response.<sup>53</sup> Partners and places of intervention matrices would be useful documents to gather and include in the final analysis to have a stronger understanding of the local reality.

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