

Humanitarian Overview: Mosul

Iraq, April 2017



Introduction

Total population in the city: 1,377,000¹
Est. # displaced: 660,000²
Est. # of Returnees: 123,000³
Date of AG arrival: June 2014
Date of AG departure (East): Jan 2017
Humanitarian access: Limited
Month of data collection: April 2017

Overview

Since October 2016 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have been involved in an operation to retake the city of Mosul from AGs, who have held control since mid-2014. By January 2017, the entire Eastern bank of the city was under ISF control. The military operation to retake control of West Mosul remained ongoing at the time of writing.⁴

At the time of assessment, around 660,000 people had been displaced since the operation to retake the city began. In addition to the populations that remained and returned, 97% of neighbourhoods in East Mosul reported hosting IDPs.⁵ The majority of IDPs - an estimated 448,516 individuals - are from West Mosul; the majority of returnees are in East Mosul, with 91,000 individuals returning to the East of the city compared to 32,390 having returned to the West.

While the East had begun to show signs of recovery, fighting and mass displacement continues in the West. In East Mosul, the primary needs are livelihoods, WASH, and healthcare, with some improvements seen in the food security and education sectors since the area was retaken from AGs. In the West, the overall humanitarian situation remained critical. There was a lack of clean water and sufficient food, very limited access to healthcare, widespread damage amid ongoing conflict, no livelihood opportunities and the majority of children are not attending school.⁶


Key findings

Summary of key findings and needs by sector:

The severity ranking below is based on a set of indicators measuring the severity of each sector: 0= No severity to 4 = Extreme severity.

Sector	East Mosul	West Mosul
Livelihoods	4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIs from all neighbourhoods reported that there are no or very few jobs available, while those that worked for the government were usually not receiving their salaries, especially teachers. Many families were relying on negative coping strategies such as spending savings, borrowing money and limiting expenditure. The majority (up to 70%) of families were estimated to have debt. Shops were reportedly open and stocked but people lacked purchasing power due to a lack of livelihood opportunities.⁷ 	4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There were reported to be no jobs available and less than 25% of the population were said to be receiving an income.⁸ Reported coping strategies included people selling their possessions or food items.⁹ While areas close to the Old City were said to be deserted, there were functioning markets in al Risalah and al Amil. However, only an estimated 15% of remaining people could afford to shop in these markets.¹⁰
Healthcare	3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Generally, there were reported to be medical clinics open but people often had to travel to different areas of the city to access them. There was a reported shortage of some medicine – especially for chronic diseases – and available medicine in pharmacies was expensive. Serious cases, including surgery were said to be transferred to Erbil. There was no trauma care available in the city itself; the closest was reportedly a Samaritans Purse facility on the road to Erbil. Private hospitals were reported to be functioning, especially in al Wahda, however these were prohibitively expensive for most.¹¹ 	4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of trauma care was reportedly a major humanitarian concern, with over 6000 people from West Mosul transferred to hospitals outside of the city since October 2016.¹² Mobile health clinics had begun to appear in the South West but there remains a strong need for further clinics. Many neighbourhoods reportedly did not have functioning hospitals or health care facilities, meaning people had to travel, and therefore restricting access. Some KIs reported deaths due to a lack of medicine.¹³
Shelter and Damage	2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> East Mosul had around 1,000 destroyed structures, with a higher concentration in al Zuhur and al Salam.¹⁴ The majority of people were said to be living in houses, but a minority were living in public buildings (such as mosques or schools) or damaged buildings. KIs from a majority of neighbourhoods reported overcrowding with 3-5 families per house due to a lack of housing. Rebuilding or repairs of damaged buildings had generally not started yet.¹⁵ 	3.5 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> West Mosul had over 2,000 destroyed sites reported – damage/destruction in West Mosul was 2.5 times worse than in East Mosul. Al Rabee in North West Mosul was the most damaged area, followed by Mosul al Jadida.¹⁶ KIs reported that given the amount of people displaced, many neighbourhoods were underpopulated. Due to heavy destruction, many individuals who remained in the neighbourhoods were reported to be living in damaged houses, schools or mosques.

Map 5: Reported damage to neighbourhoods, bridges and health facilities, May 2017



Data Source:-
11 May 2017 - UN Habitat damage analysis on Mosul city

¹ Figure from 2014. UN HABITAT, Mosul City Profile (October 2016).

² Number of cumulatively displaced since operation to re-take city from AGs began on 16 October 2016. From West Mosul alone, 448,516 individuals have been displaced: OCHA, Mosul Humanitarian Response (8 May – 14 May 2017).

³ The majority of these are to East Mosul, 91,000: OCHA, Mosul Humanitarian Response: Situation Report (17 – 23 April); OCHA, Mosul Humanitarian Response (8 May – 14 May 2017).

⁴ AWG, Mosul MCNA (April 2017).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ For West Mosul, the findings generally only apply to non-AG areas, however the situation inside AG areas is likely critical across all sectors. Where possible, variations in the humanitarian situation within the West of the city have been captured.

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WASH	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIs reported primarily getting water from wells, water trucks, or buying it from shops. There was generally no public water and the pumps previously used to distribute water are generally not operational. Some people were reportedly using chlorine or boiling water, but skin conditions and diarrhoea were widely reported due to the consumption or use of untreated water.¹⁸ 	3.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Those fleeing West Mosul reported a severe lack of drinking water in their neighbourhoods of origin. Many in West Mosul were reported to be drinking from public/private wells, with individuals regularly drinking untreated water. Many people reportedly did not have cash to be able to buy bottled water.¹⁹
Education	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In general, children were reported to be attending school, but barriers to education, such as a lack of functioning schools (because of damage or usage by IDPs), a lack of teachers, and a shortage of books, presented barriers to the recovery of the educational system. Teachers were reportedly not receiving their salaries. Many children had missed years of schooling, which has complicated their reintegration into the formal educational system. 	3.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In general, children do not attend school, with KIs reporting that less than one quarter of children are currently going to school.²¹ Up to 50% of schools were reported to be damaged. To avoid studying the AG curriculum, many children had not attended school for almost three years.²³
Food Security	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shops were generally reported to be open and stocked but people often lacked the purchasing power to buy food. KIs from Sumer neighbourhood reported that there were no markets or available shops in their area of the city The food was reported to be of a bad-to-medium quality and often expired. Generally, the food was reported to be coming from Erbil and elsewhere in the KRI.²⁴ 	3.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Those fleeing parts of West Mosul near the current fighting reported a severe lack of food in their neighbourhoods of origin. Mobile fruit and vegetable sellers were reportedly operating in Southwest Mosul but many residents were required to walk for over one hour to reach them. Families were highly dependent on pre-positioned food stocks and were reportedly regularly reduced their meals per day as a coping strategy.

Methodology

REACH collected in-depth information from 75 Key Informants (KIs) through community group discussions (CGDs) and Key Informants (KIs), between 8 to 30 April 2017. Participants comprised of returnees living in East Mosul and IDPs from both sides of the city, living in the KRI, who remain in touch with friends and family in East or West Mosul. Given the size of Mosul, many of the KIs could only speak about their neighbourhood rather than the entire city. Where possible the findings have been triangulated by secondary sources. For West Mosul especially, secondary sources were used to provide comparable data on key areas of humanitarian need. The presented findings should be understood as indicative only.

Returnees and IDPs

At the time of assessment, East Mosul had begun to see returnees, while West Mosul had witnessed unprecedented displacement since February. In the East, approximately 91,000 individuals had returned, with KIs citing improved security and a desire to return to property as the main pull factors. Upon return to East Mosul, the main reported challenges faced by returnees were destroyed property, and a lack of cash and job opportunities. In addition to returnees, there were significant reported IDP populations throughout East Mosul, mostly originating from the West but also from Tel Afar, Sinjar and other locations outside of the city. A high IDP presence was reported in the North East and South East of the city.²⁶ For IDPs, push and pull factors centered around safety: the West was reported to be unsafe due to ongoing fighting or AG occupation, while the East was considered safer due to the recent cessation of fighting. It was also reported that IDPs from West Mosul were leaving East Mosul to go to camps outside the city, citing a lack of food, water and basic services.²⁷ IDP KIs reported that they intended to return to the West once the ISF had retaken control from AGs.

Given the ongoing fighting, less displaced people had returned to West Mosul. At the time of assessment, an estimated 32,000 had already returned following the recapture of areas of the West by ISF.²⁸ In the South West of Mosul, there were reports of IDP populations, made up of people who had fled fighting around the old city.

Table 6: Reported prices, April 2017²⁸

Product	Prices April 2017	Product	Prices April 2017
Flour (50kg)	22,667 IQD (19.3 USD)	Tomato (1L)	1,563 IQD (1.3 USD)
Rice (50kg)	62,000 IQD (52.8 USD)	Fresh Meat (1kg)	12,500 IQD (10.6 USD)
Sugar (50kg)	52,333 IQD (44.5 USD)	Fuel (1L)	2,433 IQD (2.1 USD)
Cooking Oil (1L)	1,750 IQD (1.5 USD)	Kerosene (1L)	400 IQD (0.3 USD)

Footnotes:

⁷ For West Mosul, the findings generally only apply to non-AG areas, however the situation inside AG areas is likely critical across all sectors. Where possible, variations in the humanitarian situation within the West of the city have been captured.

⁸ REACH Initiative, East Mosul: FGDs and KIs (April 2017); supported by AWG, MCRNA: Mosul (April 2017).

⁹ Based on seven assessed neighbourhoods. AWG, Mosul Multi-Cluster Rapid Needs Assessment (April 2017)

¹⁰ REACH Initiative, West Mosul: FGDs (April 2017).

¹¹ Rise Foundation, Update On Selected West Mosul Neighbourhoods (April 2017).

¹² REACH Initiative, East Mosul: FGDs and KIs (April 2017).

¹³ OCHA, Iraq Mosul Humanitarian Response (8 May – 14 May 2017).

¹⁴ REACH Initiative, West Mosul: FGDs (April 2017)

¹⁵ UN Habitat, Multi-Sector Damage Assessment (May 2017).

¹⁶ REACH Initiative, East Mosul: FGDs and KIs (April 2017).

¹⁷ UNHCR, Iraq Situation UNHCR Flash Update (28 April 2017).

¹⁸ UN Habitat, Multi-Sector Damage Assessment (May 2017).

¹⁹ REACH Initiative, East Mosul: FGDs and KIs (April 2017); WASH findings supported by AWG, Mosul MCRNA (April 2017).

²⁰ UNHCR, Mosul Flash Update (14 May).

²¹ UNHCR, Mosul Flash Update (14 May); RISE Foundation, Update on selected West Mosul neighbourhoods (20 April 2017); OCHA, Iraq: Mosul Situation Report No. 30 (17 April to 23 April 2017).

²² Iraq AWG, Mosul RNA, (April 2017)

²³ REACH Initiative, West Mosul: FGDs (April 2017).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Supported by WFP, East Mosul Rapid Market Assessment (March 2017); wVam Iraq, Mosul Emergency Update #7 (April 2017).

²⁶ Supported by UNHCR, Flash Update (14 May); RISE Foundation, Displacement, returns and stayees in West Mosul (25 March 2017); wVam Iraq, Mosul Emergency Update #7 (April 2017).

²⁷ UNHCR, Iraq Situation: Flash Update (27 April 2017);²⁸ OCHA, Mosul Humanitarian Response (8 May – 14 May 2017).

²⁸ Based on an exchange rate of 1 USD = 1,175 IQD (as of 30 May 2017) via www.xe.com.