

# Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview

17 October to 25 November 2016

## Overview

Total # displaced households **11,906**<sup>1</sup>

Total number individuals: **71,436**<sup>2</sup>

Date of first displacement: **21/10/2016**


<sup>1</sup> IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

## Methodology

This factsheet outlines primary displacement trends from Mosul between 17 October and 25 November 2016, the needs of IDPs and non-displaced, conflict-affected individuals, and related information gaps. A mixed-methodology was used, drawing on previous REACH Rapid assessments with 175 Key Informants (KIs), and other secondary data sources, including IOM DTM, CCCM RASP data, OCHA Situation Reports and UNCHR Protection Updates.

## Location Map



## Summary

Between 17 October - 25 November, conflict in the villages surrounding Mosul and inside Mosul city has led to the displacement of 11,906 families (71,436 individuals) to areas predominantly to the East and South East of Mosul city.<sup>1</sup> Half of these IDPs have fled from Mosul sub-district, (53%) followed by Bashiqa (20%) and Al Shura sub-districts (7%).<sup>2</sup> The majority of displaced persons are being hosted within camps (77%), while smaller numbers are reportedly staying with host community members (16%) or in critical shelter arrangements (6%).<sup>3</sup> Refer to map 2 for detailed information on the key phases of displacement and timelines.

In addition to populations who have already fled Mosul and the surrounding areas, there is a significant caseload of conflict-affected citizens who have chosen, and may choose in the future, to remain in their homes while direct

conflict is ongoing in their village or neighbourhoods. Estimates of the total number of individuals that may be affected by the Mosul offensive, in the worst case scenario, are as high as 1.5 million. While it has not been possible to gain accurate figures on the number of individuals who have remained in villages and neighbourhoods, the areas identified through REACH rapid assessments and secondary data analysis include Abu Jarbro'a, Fadliyah, and Baybakh villages and the Eastern neighbourhoods of Mosul city.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016


<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> OCHA: Expected humanitarian impact of Mosul operations - Figures as of 14 October 2016

<sup>5</sup> It is assumed that many more locations exist, but due to information gaps it is not possible at this stage to report accurately on them.

**Map 1. Population Density of Recently Displaced IDPs from Mosul**



### Displacement Trends (17 October - 25 November)

#### Displaced Population profile

Based on REACH rapid assessment findings<sup>6</sup>, IDPs predominantly reported leaving in two distinct groups: either as whole family units or communities. In some cases entire villages fled together after receiving directions from Kurdish or Iraqi forces to vacate their area of origin.

Available estimates of demographic data indicate high dependency ratios<sup>7</sup>: 50% of the population consists of minors, with one in five below the age of four.<sup>8</sup> Around 5% of the population is above the age of 60.<sup>9</sup> Of the population displaced since November 18<sup>th</sup>, around 20% of families were female headed and 73 unaccompanied and/or separated children were reported.<sup>10</sup>

The area of origin that IDPs fled from had an impact on their ability to bring items with them during their displacement. IDP families who left from villages to the north-east of Mosul, such as Abu Jarbo'A, Umar Qabchi, Tobwaza, Bazwaya, Bawiza, Gura Kheraba and Talyara were often able to leave in their cars, limiting the distance that would otherwise be required to be travelled on foot. Due to the rapid nature of their displacement, IDPs from Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods like Nimrod, Shura sub-district, Gugjali village and Hay al Samah in Mosul City predominantly had to flee on foot and had limited opportunities to gather assets. It is reportedly not possible for IDPs from Eastern Mosul to leave by car due to fear of being identified as suicide bombers and targeted by airstrikes.

The ability of IDPs to bring cash with them also varied by context however, a severe lack of livelihoods over the last two years has meant that many families do not have much cash to bring with them. The majority of IDPs in Hasansham (U3) and 50% of IDPs in Khazer (MODM) were reportedly able to bring cash, however only small amounts. This was especially the case for IDPs from East Mosul. The vast majority of IDPs from Shura that arrived in Qayyarah-Jad'ah camp left without any cash, while those who did, left with very little. Instances of IDPs leaving their area of origin with livestock have been reported, suggesting that some IDPs prepared for a potential lengthy displacement and limited access to livelihoods.

Based on previous REACH rapid assessments, the majority of IDPs were able to bring identification papers with them. This does not include children under the ages of 2-3 as officially recognized birth certificates have not been provided in the last two years<sup>11</sup> Confiscation of ID documents at screening centres or camps was reported at the Qayyarah-Jad'ah, Hasansham (U3), and Khazer (MODM) IDP camps.<sup>12</sup> KIs from Khazer (MODM) and

Hasansham (U3) confirmed on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November that IDs had still not been returned. UNCHR Protection Monitoring reports identified that approximately 57% of IDPs arriving at camps do not have civil identification documents.<sup>13</sup> A lack of documentation can hinder access to humanitarian and legal assistance, as well as access to livelihoods and public services. In addition, KIs in Khazer (MODM) camp reported that IDPs leaving without IDs face difficulties at screening centres and require a sponsor in the camp to vouch for the individual before they are granted access to the camp.

#### Push and Pull Factors

The push factors for displacement for IDPs fleeing the Mosul area were direct conflict in their village or neighbourhood, or the threat of airstrikes. In some cases, the trigger for entire villages to flee came after receiving instructions from the Iraqi forces to leave their homes due to the risk of airstrikes. IDPs from other areas fled while the village or neighbourhood was still under AG control, exposing them to the risk of being captured or injured by Armed Groups (AGs).<sup>15</sup> Mass displacement from Shura sub-district was predominantly triggered by attempts made by AGs to transfer people from the Shura sub-district to Hammam Alil town or Mosul city.<sup>16</sup>

A common trend that has been seen throughout the displacement so far has been the heavy involvement of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in transporting and/or directing IDPs fleeing Mosul to screening centres and camps. Therefore, understanding pull factors to the camps and locations that IDPs have moved to is difficult to ascertain due to the lack of choice that most IDPs face when departing their area of origin. When asked why they chose a particular route or location to flee too, the vast majority of IDPs reported that they had no choice and that it was the only option available to them.

6 See REACH Mosul Rapid Assessments – available on the [REACH Resource Centre](#)

7 Dependency ratio is a measure of the portion of a population which is composed of dependents (people who are too young or too old to work).

8 Based on CCCM RASP data

9 Ibid

10 [UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016](#)

11 [Human Rights Watch, Children of the Caliphate](#), November 23 2016

12 REACH Initiative data collection, and [UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016](#)

13 [UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016](#)

14 UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016; [OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 8](#) (14-20 November 2016); ACF Multi-sectorial Assessment Report Fadliyah, 6 November 2016

15 [REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment: Nimrod Area](#), October 20, 2016; [OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 8](#) (14-20 November 2016)

16 [REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment: Qayyarah Jadah Camp](#), November 3 2016



### Remain Factors

Many families have, either by choice or force<sup>17</sup>, stayed in their homes while direct conflict is ongoing in their village or neighbourhood. Authorities specifically requested that families remain at home where possible, which was partially communicated through the widespread dissemination of leaflets encouraging this message by Iraqi forces.<sup>18</sup> Accurate figures on the locations, population size, and needs of individuals who have chosen to stay at home constitute a major information gap. However, available secondary data does provide some indication of the profiles and intentions of these populations.

Key reported factors for people to remain in their homes during the conflict are to protect assets and/or livelihoods, to avoid the risk of being caught in direct or indirect fire, fear of screening procedures, as well as the living conditions and limited movement in IDP camps.<sup>19</sup> If displacement is inevitable, the same concerns drive families to limit their displacement and remain in hazardous areas near their area of origin, instead of continued displacement towards the camps. A number of remain factors are highly related to perceptions of screening processes and conditions in camps; KIs in camps in Hamdaniya district reported that many IDPs are calling their families and friends who remain in Mosul to encourage them not to leave due to the poor living conditions within the camps. This was also highlighted in Baybohk village and Ibrahim Khalil where the primary reasons given by IDPs for remaining in these locations included not only a desire to return to their

villages of origin as soon as possible, but also to avoid being transported to Khazer (MODM) and Debaga camps due to negative perceptions of the screening process and conditions present in the camp.<sup>20</sup>

In villages where part of the population has left, those who chose not to leave were primarily the ill, elderly and those who stayed to look after their assets, including livestock.<sup>21</sup> Reported factors that would prompt these populations to eventually flee include the risk of airstrikes, increased conflict in their neighbourhoods, or a serious deterioration of living conditions.

### Intentions of IDPs

The vast majority of IDPs expressed a desire to return to their area of origin as soon as it is deemed safe to do so. Primary pre-requisites for returning to their areas of origin included: an announcement by the government that the area is safe, their neighbourhoods being freed, the restoration of public services (healthcare, schools etc), and the ability and means to re-establish their livelihoods.

17 There have been reports that remaining populations are not permitted to leave, often due to security considerations by Iraqi or Kurdish forces. Additional reasons for these dynamics have not been adequately reported.

18 [Reuters "Iraqi army drops leaflets over Mosul in preparation for offensive"](#), 16 October 2016; [RFSAN Mosul: Food Security Summary](#), 16 November 2016

19 Rise Foundation Arbajiyah report, 20 November 2016; [REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment: Nimrod Area](#), October 20, 2016;

20 [REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment: Nimrod Area](#), October 20, 2016; REACH Initiative data collection

21 Ibid

## Needs

### IDP Camps

Overall, 77% of IDPs displaced from Mosul are currently in camps in Al-Hamdaniya and Mosul districts. Nearly half (47%) of the total IDP population displaced from Mosul is currently residing in Khazer (MODM) camp, with the total number of families in Khazer (MODM) camp at 5,700 as of 25 November. Hashansham has the second highest proportion of IDP families in camps (2120), followed by Qaymawa ("Zelikan") (890) and Qayyarah-Jad'ah (733).<sup>22</sup>

In Qaymawa ("Zelikan") and Qayyarah-Jad'ah camps, all new arrivals reported access to Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) assistance<sup>23</sup>, hot meals, and one-off shelter/NFI distributions. The same assistance mechanisms are in place in Khazer (MODM) and Hasansham (U3) however the amounts distributed are reportedly not enough to cover the whole camp.

A trend observed in Hasansham (U3) and Khazer (MODM) is that more recent arrivals reported being less able to access assistance. KIs in Khazer (MODM) and Hasansham (U3) reported that a lack of red document/voucher received once allocated a tent, was a key barrier to receiving assistance.<sup>24</sup> Of particular concern is Khazer (MODM) camp, whose population is growing significantly by the day: recent arrivals to the camp reported and were also observed to lack adequate winterization items, including clothing, footwear and shelter/NFI items to

cope with the current cold conditions. While the situation in Qayyarah-Jad'ah Camp has largely stabilised with roughly 700 families reportedly returning to Shura, a lack of winterisation clothes and kerosene was highlighted as a particular concern.<sup>25</sup>

Primary concerns of recent IDP arrivals vary by location, but a lack of adequate winterization items (such as heaters, stoves, thermal mattresses and jerry cans for kerosene) ahead of the upcoming winter months is a common need across all camp. In particular, a lack of kerosene was reported as a significant need in recently retaken villages in the south.<sup>26</sup> Winter top-up items have reportedly been distributed to 65% of families in camps and to vulnerable out of camp populations, however as highlighted by observations and KI reporting in Hasansham (U3), gaps still remain.<sup>27</sup>

22 [IOM DTM Emergency Tracking](#) Figures 25 November 2016

23 RRM kits include hygiene kits, WFP food rations for 1 week, dignity kits, 2 cases of drinking water, and a bucket

24 According to KIs working with NGOs, no documentation is required to receive distributions, however KIs on a number of different occasions reported the lack of 'red' documentation as a key barrier to assistance.

25 According to a KI interview with camp management

26 Ibid


27 OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 8 (14-20 November 2016)



# Map 2: Overview of IDP Displacement Routes from Mosul

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### Mosul City

Since the beginning of November 2016, direct exposure to conflict in a number of Eastern neighbourhoods of Mosul City (see map 3) have triggered large displacement (5,800 families) East of the city.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, according to data collected by REACH<sup>29</sup> 25% or more of the original civilian population remains in these Eastern neighbourhoods with significant humanitarian needs.<sup>30</sup> Humanitarian needs in Mosul City were severe prior to the Mosul Offensive. Since June 2014, Mosul has been inaccessible to aid with living standards in the city hindered by a severe lack of livelihoods. Needs and vulnerabilities are high across all assessed areas with lack of livelihood opportunities impacting people's ability to access food, healthcare and other services.<sup>31</sup>

The situation in Eastern neighbourhoods with recent or ongoing armed clashes are of particular concern. In these areas, civilians generally have no safe drinking water, are surviving on depleting stored food supplies, and have no access to hospitals or doctors within their neighbourhood.<sup>32</sup> There is also a significant strain on existing trauma centres due to an increase of civilian casualties with gunshot wounds; OCHA reported that at least 200 civilians and military personnel have been treated for gunshot wounds between 14 and 20 November alone.<sup>33</sup>

Many Eastern neighbourhoods have no access to markets or medical care. A number of shops and a medical centre are available in Gugjali Village, but most families in Eastern Mosul either cannot access the village at all or reported that it is too far and too dangerous to make the journey.<sup>34</sup> In addition, increased prices of food render food unaffordable to many who have limited cash available, making families heavily reliant on assistance. It has been reported that a recent WFP food distribution reached 5000 households in Gugjali while the Saudi government distributed 10 trucks of food and NFIs. In addition, Human Relief Foundation (HRF) reportedly distributed food and water in Al Zahraa neighbourhood.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup> IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016

<sup>29</sup> REACH, Humanitarian overview: East Mosul, 27 November 2016

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> REACH, Humanitarian overview: East Mosul, 27 November 2016; REACH Assessment Of Eight Hard-To-Reach Areas In Iraq, 2015-2016


<sup>32</sup> REACH, Humanitarian overview: East Mosul, 27 November 2016

<sup>33</sup> OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 8 (14-20 November 2016)

<sup>34</sup> REACH, Humanitarian overview: East Mosul, 27 November 2016; Rise Foundation, Arbajiya district, 19 November.

<sup>35</sup> HOC Update, 23 Nov 2016

**Map 3. Primary Neighbourhoods in Mosul City with Outward Displacement**



### Recently Retaken Villages

Around a quarter of all known IDPs displaced from Mosul are residing in host communities or critical shelter arrangements, such as abandoned or unfinished buildings. The largest non-camp population are residing with host community members in Al Qayyara centre (753 families), followed by 350 families in Baybokh.<sup>36</sup> However, a significant information gap persists regarding the needs of families who displaced locally in hard to reach areas, as well as those that did not leave and remained in their area of origin throughout the conflict - the specific numbers and needs of these groups are hard to estimate.

The needs in villages to the North, East and South of Mosul city, which have been affected by the military offensive are significant, but remain inadequately understood. The areas have been under the control of AGs since June 2014, and food insecurity, a lack of livelihoods, and limited access to healthcare are particular areas of concern.

Assessments carried out by agencies in recently accessible villages highlight food insecurity as a key concern due to an inability to access markets, price increases and shortages of food.<sup>37</sup> However, a recent market assessment conducted in Qayyara by the Cash Consortium of Iraq (CCI) highlighted that markets in this area have an ability to re-establish functionality relatively quickly and cope with additional demand caused by influxes of IDPs in the area.<sup>38</sup> While this assessment only covered one geographical area, its findings may be relevant for other similar areas.

Limited access to healthcare was also raised in villages by the vast majority of KIs assessed through REACH rapid assessments, who reported that available clinics were

inadequately staffed, only provided basic medicine such as paracetamol, and did not have adequate medical supplies for chronic diseases.<sup>39</sup>

WASH needs in villages vary significantly per location. For example, in Haman Al Ali, residents collect water from a nearby river and do not treat it before drinking.<sup>40</sup> In contrast, Fadliyah village has four boreholes and an underground water network. Due to a lack of electricity only one borehole that is connected to a generator is currently working, causing water shortages across large areas of the village.<sup>41</sup>

Access constraints often limit aid delivery in these villages, but RRM distributions have managed to reach populations including, but not limited to Fadliyah and Baybokh.<sup>42</sup> RRM distributions include weekly family WFP food rations for one week however, based on available secondary data, it is unclear whether additional or regular monthly distributions will be organised. In addition to RRM assistance, MODM (Ministry of Displacement and Migration), Iraqi Red Crescent and ICRC have also reportedly provided assistance in areas such as the Red Valley<sup>43</sup> and Hamam Al Ali.<sup>44</sup>

36 [IOM DTM Emergency Tracking](#) Figures 25 November 2016. Recent reports indicate that the number of families in Baybokh may be as high as 1100 but this is yet to be confirmed.

37 ACTED Fadhiliya Village Rapid Assessment, 2 November 2016; ACF Multi-sectorial Assessment Report Fadliyah, 6 November 2016; [WFP mVAM IRAQ - Flash Update #1: Gogjali — Focus On Mosul](#), 1 November 2016.

38 Cash Consortium Of Iraq: Qayyarah Market Assessment, November 2016

39 These findings were also noted in ACF and ACTED assessments of Fadhiliya Village

40 Rise Foundation report on Hamam Al Ali, 11 November 2016

41 ACF Multi-sectorial Assessment Report Fadliyah, 6 November 2016

42 [OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 5](#) and 8 (14-20 November 2016) and [ACTED Iraq: First international NGO to distribute emergency supplies in Fadliyah](#)

43 [OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 5](#) (29-31 October 2016)

44 Rise Foundation report on Arbajiyah (20 November 2016) and Hamam Al Ali (11 November)

### Information Gaps on Displacement and Needs

- Limited information is available on the needs of non-displaced, conflict-affected populations within and surrounding Mosul City. One-off assessments have been publicized by agencies on the villages of Gugjali, Fadliyah Baybokh, and data has been collected for Eastern areas of Mosul City by REACH on 23 November. However, this only covers a small portion of the non-displaced population, while assessments on these areas remain insufficiently coordinated between agencies.
- Limited information on localised displacement in hard to reach areas near the military front line. Examples include the Kafrij and Fadhiliya villages, and individuals from Kfrok who were stranded in the Red Valley since 24 October,<sup>47</sup> but have recently moved to Baybokh.<sup>48</sup> In addition, there is ongoing displacement between neighbourhoods inside Mosul city, which is inadequately understood.
- Reports of displacement into Mosul city from neighbouring areas on either a forced or voluntary basis have been reported, however accurate data on numbers and the conditions of displacement is difficult to ascertain.<sup>49</sup>
- Displacement to Syria from Iraq constitutes a key information gap. Since 17th October, 1,950 Iraqis have fled to Al Hol camp in Syria,<sup>50</sup> yet limited information on the profile, intentions of these individuals is available.
- Limited information is available on IDPs who stay with host community members. The situation of IDPs staying with host community members in Ibrahim Khalil Village was reported by REACH<sup>51</sup>, while IOM DTM has reported figures ranging from 150 to 750 IDP families residing with host communities in Tubiya, Al-Hood Village, Baybokht, Om Kdor Village, Al-Adla Village and Al Qayara Center.<sup>52</sup>

47 UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016; [OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 8](#) (14-20 November 2016)

48 Recent updates have confirmed that IDPs from the Red Valley arrived in Baybokh between 22-23 November

49 Rise Foundation report on Hamam Al Ali, 11 November 2016; RFSAN Mosul: Food Security Summary, 16 November 2016

50 UNHCR Iraqi Refugee Response in Hassakeh, Syria, 21 November 2016

51 REACH Rapid Displacement Overview: Nimrod, Hamdaniya District

52 IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016