


Humanitarian overview: Hawiga City and surrounding areas

Iraq, 29 November 2016



Introduction

Total population (Hawiga District): Unknown
Pre-AG population (Hawiga District): 228,000¹
Date of armed group arrival: June 2014²
Humanitarian access: None
Date of data collection: 23 Oct. -29 Nov 2016


Overview

Hawiga City and the surrounding Hawiga District have been under the control of armed groups (AGs) since June 2014, after which they became inaccessible to humanitarian aid. As of July 2016, military operations in nearby Shirqat cut the remaining AG trade route between Hawiga and Mosul City,³ after which Hawiga District has remained entirely cut off from the rest of Iraq. The deteriorating humanitarian situation in Hawiga has displaced over 46,000 families between July and November 2016 to surrounding areas such as Makhmur, Kirkuk, Tikrit and Shirqat.⁴

According to interviewed Key Informants (KIs) who recently fled the area, very few civilians⁵ currently remain in Hawiga City, having largely displaced to surrounding villages or out of Hawiga District (See map 2). The most reported reasons for individuals remaining in Hawiga were an inability to displace, the risk of displacing, or to protect assets such as land and livestock.

With an impending military operation to retake Hawiga District, OCHA estimates that up to 114,000 individuals may still displace out of Hawiga.⁶ The renewed military offensive on Hawiga is also likely to worsen an already critical humanitarian situation in the area. Needs and vulnerabilities are severe across all sectors, with a particular lack of food and healthcare leading to the use of extreme coping strategies.

Map 1: Hawiga District, November 2016



¹ OCHA, [Hawiga Humanitarian Crisis](#), 28 November 2016

² [Human Rights Watch](#), 27 October 2016

³ The Huffington Post, [The Islamic State in Defeat](#), 17 July 2016

⁴ Based on: IOM, DMT ET, November 2016 and KIs reports that displacement began towards the end of July 2016

⁵ A number of KIs reported only 500 civilians remain in the city

⁶ OCHA, [Hawiga Humanitarian Crisis](#), 28 November 2016

Key findings

Summary of key findings and needs by sector:

Severity ranking below is based on indicators measuring the severity of each sector: 0= No severity to 4 = Extreme severity.

Sector	Severity	Hawiga City	Surrounding Villages
Healthcare	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">The majority of civilians go without healthcareAccess to the hospital and medication is prioritized for AGsMedical treatment is expensive and unaffordable for most civiliansThere is a shortage of medication and most available medication is expired⁷Ambulances are only used by AGs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">The majority of civilians go without healthcareNo access to hospitals unless people drive to Hawiga City for care. Very few do so as it is expensive and prioritized for AGs.Some villages reported access to a pharmacy, though medication is expensive⁸ and unaffordable to most civilians.Ambulances are only used by AGsReports of deaths due to a lack of healthcare and medication
Hawiga City and Surrounding Villages			
Food Security	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Since July 2016 previously available trade routes from Mosul have been cut and civilians have little to no dry food stocks remaining, and survive largely on wheat and some local, seasonal produce⁹Many dry food are either no longer available or extremely expensive¹⁰ (see next page), and unaffordable to many¹¹Markets are generally closed or damaged, but some butchers remain in the city. Meat is relatively cheap, but most cannot afford it and go withoutAGs have reportedly allowed some women to travel to Shirqat to buy food. However on return to Hawiga, AGs take a proportion of the foodKIs estimated between 50%-90% of the northern villages in Hawiga district have insufficient food, and reported cases of malnourished childrenWidespread use of coping mechanisms was reported, including people skipping meals, borrowing money off those with an income (farmers or retirees), and consuming primarily bread and waterLimited access to electricity and fuel can hinder people's ability to source water from wells¹² and to provide heating	
WASH	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Throughout the district, water is pumped from the Small Zab RiverVillages where no pump is available purchase water from water trucks for 7,000-8,000 IQD per 200 Litres¹²KIs reported that the water was unsafe for drinking purposes and no treatment options were reported, including chlorineChildren are the most vulnerable with reports of water-related diseases such as diarrhea	
Livelihoods	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Very few livelihoods are available in the district, and main reported source of livelihoods are farming (primarily in the villages) and retirement¹³ moneySome Hawalla¹⁴ systems remain operational in the city though these very expensive (50,000 IQD per 1,000,000 IQD)People with cash (e.g. retirees and farmers) support those without cash, and people barter assets and vegetables due to a lack of cash	
Education	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">No children attend school across the assessed neighbourhoods	
Hawiga City			
Shelter	3 ¹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Government buildings and the Industrial and Al Zaraee neighbourhoods are reportedly very damagedCivilians live primarily in Al Askari neighbourhood due to low damage levelsElectricity is only available from private generators, though too expensive for many residents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Some but little damaged was reported in most surrounding villagesElectricity is only available from private generators, though too expensive for many residents

Humanitarian Overview: Hawiga City

Iraq, 29 November 2016



Methodology

REACH, in partnership with Muslim Aid, collected in-depth information from 21 recently displaced Key Informants from Hawiga City and surrounding villages, and 4 NGO staff. Data was collected through Community Group Discussions (CGDs) and KI interviews between 23 October and 29 November.

Displacement

Prior to July 2016 very little displacement from Hawiga District was reported. However from July onwards, following the closure of a vital trade route between Mosul and Hawiga City,¹⁶ 46,000 IDPs have left the district.¹⁷ IDPs have generally left as whole families,¹⁸ and primarily due to a fear of AGs and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, in particular with regards to food and healthcare. IDPs were only able to bring a few essential items while displacing, especially as the majority reportedly displaced on foot.

Very few civilians reportedly remain in the city as of the end of November with KIs estimating that up to 50% of the city left to surrounding villages and out of the district.

Current outward displacement routes from Hawiga District are split between the North and South. Since July 2016, villages in Northern Hawiga District primarily displaced on foot and car to Makhmur, from where they were taken by Kurdish and Iraqi forces to Debaga or Qayarra Jed'ah Camps. The exact number of families who left through the North is unknown. However over 1,250 families from Hawiga are living in Qayarra Jed'ah and Debaga Camps, while large numbers of families have also been transferred from Debaga Camp to Daquq District in Kirkuk governorate, where over 4,200 families from Hawiga are settled.¹⁹ After 27 November, when Qayarra Jed'ah Camp was reportedly at full capacity, IDPs were taken to Al Alam Camp close to Tikrit.²⁰

Most KIs had up to date information on the situation in Hawiga as they remained in contact with friends and relatives who remained in Hawiga. Due to inherent limitations, presented findings should be understood as indicative only.

Villages in the South displace primarily via Southern routes through the Hamreen Mountain and onwards to Al Alam - either the IDP camps or host community - or Shirqat or Tikrit City.²¹ Roughly 100 families from Hawiga are living in Shirqat District and over 2,000 families in Tikrit City.²² A small number of IDPs previously displaced directly from Hawiga to Shirqat; however, due to the high risk of getting caught by AGs, very few currently leave through this route.

Between mid-July and mid-October²³ displacement East towards Kirkuk was reported. Only a limited amount of IDPs reportedly used this route due to a high risk of mines and a need for a sponsor to enter Kirkuk Governorate. However, following increased conflict in Kirkuk City in mid-October, KIs reported that very few to no IDPs now use this route due to further restrictions on entering Kirkuk Governorate.²⁴

Severe challenges across all routes were reported, with KIs reporting deaths and injuries en route due to the presence of mines, lack of water,²⁵ food, and being captured by AGs. The drop in temperature in recent weeks has made the route even more arduous. IDPs also reported that routes that were previously available can no longer be used due to security concerns.

Table 1: Reported prices Hawija City, November 2016

Product	Prices Hawija City (Mid-November 2016)
Flour (50 Kilo)	30,000-50,000 IQD (25-42 USD)
Rice (50 Kilo)	500,000-1,000,000 IQD (423-846 USD)
Sugar (50 Kilo)	1,000,000-3,000,000 IQD (846-2,538 USD)
Cooking oil (1L)	30,000-40,000 IQD (25-33 USD)
Tomato (1L)	5,000-8,000 IQD (4-7 USD)
Meat (1Kilo)	3,000-8,000 IQD (3-8 USD)
Fuel (1L)	650-1,000 IQD (0.5-0.8 USD)
Kerosene (1L)	750-1,000 IQD (0.6-0.8 USD)

Footnotes:

⁷ Also see [Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights](#), November 2016

⁸ At the end of October KIs reported some medication was smuggled in, however extremely expensive. One KI reported paying \$100 for one packet of medication for his mother who suffering from a chronic disease.

⁹ People have access to wheat; 1 kilo of wheat costs 700 IQD, and civilians take it to be ground for 3,000 IQD per 20k

¹⁰ Also see [Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights](#), November 2016

¹¹ KIs estimated between 50%-90% of northern villages have insufficient food

¹² Trucks also source water from the Small Zab River.

¹³ Some KIs reported that the retired have not been paid last month

¹⁴ An informal money transfer system

¹⁵ Despite the majority living in adequate shelter, this is only due to the low number of residents that remain in Hawiga City. Some damage to houses was reported throughout the city

¹⁶ The Huffington Post, [The Islamic State in Defeat](#), 17 July 2016

¹⁷ IOM, DMT ET, 29 November

¹⁸ A few KIs reported a high proportion of woman and children amongst displacement groups.

¹⁹ IOM, DTM ET, 28 November 2016

²⁰ According to Qayarra Jed'ah camp management

²¹ Also see [OCHA, Mosul corridor displacement overview, 24 October](#)

²² People who have been and remain displaced along the Mosul corridor in 2016

²³ IOM, DTM ET, 28 November 2016

²⁴ Mid-October saw a particular increase in conflict in Kirkuk City (INSO, Update 4 Kirkuk, 21 October 2016)

²⁵ KIs believed that entering into Kirkuk Governorate was no longer possible.

²⁶ Save the children, [Children dying of thirst, killed by landmines in flight from Mosul offensive](#), 13 October

Map 2: Displacement routes from Hawiga District, November 2016

