



HMG independent monitoring programme

Report for Syria Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) – Improving Human Security and Building Peace Capital

Syria

Reporting period – First Monitoring Round – SRM003

Cover photo: Direct observation session in Eastern Ghouta © IMPACT, 2017

About IMPACT

IMPACT Initiatives (IMPACT) is a leading Geneva-based think-and-do-tank. The organization implements assessment, monitoring & evaluation and organisational capacity-building programmes in direct partnership with aid actors or through its inter-agency initiatives, REACH and AGORA. Headquartered in Geneva, IMPACT has an established field presence in over 19 countries. IMPACT's team is composed of over 400 staff, including 100 full-time international experts, as well as a roster of consultants, who are currently implementing over 50 programmes across Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Central and South-East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean.

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Introduction and Background

Upon request from Her Majesty's Government (HMG) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), IMPACT Initiatives (also referred to as IMPACT) has monitored the HMG-funded project "Pre-positioning Supplies in Eastern Ghouta" (hereby referred to as SRM003) implemented by Adam Smith International (herein, ASI or the implementing partner). The project is conducted under the Stabilisation Response Mechanism¹ (hereby referred to as SRM), and aims to support the Provincial Council of moderate opposition-held Eastern Ghouta (Rif Damascus Governorate) to pre-position fuel and food for the civilian population and enhance its resilience to an eventual siege by the Damascus-based government.

The purpose of IMPACT monitoring was to independently collect and analyse data to verify if the following project outputs had been achieved: purchase, delivery and storage of staple goods and of fuel. This Third Party Monitoring (TPM) activity also sought to verify potential deviations in output delivery and give involved stakeholders (Provincial Council members) an opportunity to provide feedback on the intervention. Based on this, the information gathered can be used to identify potential areas within the project that require re-adjustment .

Due to the Syrian context and its security environment, the monitoring exercise is extremely challenging. The general lack of data, notably concerning population figures, does not allow for representative sampling to be implemented. Therefore contact between field teams and the monitors has to be organised and coordinated by the implementing partner (IP) in order to guarantee a safe environment where participants feel secure and comfortable to share information that supports the monitoring evidence.

Presentation of the project monitored²

SRM003 – Pre-positioning Supplies in Eastern Ghouta

Criteria: Value greater than 100,000 USD³

Between December 2015 and summer 2016, the Damascus-based government regained control of a significant area of the southern section of Eastern Ghouta (Rif Damascus Governorate). The SRM programming team expects Damascus to focus on regaining control of the remaining areas of opposition-held Eastern Ghouta. While no significant new ground offensives have been witnessed since, local activists anticipate the same tactics to be deployed by the Damascus-based government as in Aleppo in 2016. According to local activists, this includes intense shelling and an attempt to starve the local population into submission by closing the network of tunnels used for smuggling. If smuggling tunnels were sealed, the result may be shortages and significant price hikes as observed in besieged western Aleppo, where, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), the disruption of the supply line resulted in an increase in food and fuel prices of up to 200%⁴. Although prices of staple goods over the months of May and June 2017 in Eastern Ghouta were reported to be relatively stable, the cost of the WFP standard food basket in the area was reported to be on average 173% higher than that reported in nearby

¹ The purpose of SRM is to plan and implement short-term stabilisation measures in moderate-opposition held Syrian sub-districts no longer under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Damascus-based government. SRM interventions aim to prevent security and services vacuum through a vast range of activities, including inter alia stipend provision, operational budgets, equipment supply, capacity building and/or technical assistance.

² Main information source: SRM003 project proposal and REACH Syria Community Profiles Updates for Eastern Ghouta.

³ Projects implemented under SRM selected to be covered by IMPACT Third Party Monitoring identified based on the following selection criteria: (i) value greater than 100,000 USD; (ii) high risk project and/or challenging for SRM to monitor; and, strategic significance to SRM/HMG.

⁴ Emergency food assistance to the people affected by unrest in Syria. WFP, February 2016.

communities not considered besieged⁵, thus confirming the vulnerability of Eastern Ghouta's population with regard to food security.

SRM team anticipates that, if Eastern Ghouta were to be resilient to a siege and attempt to negotiate a political settlement to the fighting⁶, staple goods would eventually be exhausted entirely. For this reason, SRM003 aims to support the moderate opposition-led Provincial Council of Rif Damascus (hereby referred to as PC) to pre-position a two-week supply of food items and a one-month supply of fuel for the civilian population, with the purpose of enhancing their resilience to a siege and of increasing their capacity to negotiate a political settlement with greater leverage.

Food quantities were calculated according to the WFP's standard food basket (dry goods) for a five-person household that includes: 37 kg of bread, 19 kg of rice, 19 kg of lentils, 5 kg of sugar, and 7 kg of vegetable oil per month. Based on the assumption of the PC that sources of protein would be locally available in the event of a full siege, and that other local actors would secure the needed flour stock, the project defined the following staple goods to be purchased and stockpiled: rice, sugar, milk and vegetable oil. The amount of fuel to be stockpiled was calculated with the aim of assuring the functioning for a period of one month of five active water desalination stations and 12 bakeries (all private) existing in Eastern Ghouta and currently assisted by the PC in terms of fuel provision. SRM estimated the need to stock on two types of fuel: benzene, for vehicles to transport materials, and diesel, for bakeries and water stations. Total amounts planned to be purchased per item are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Amount of staple goods and fuel to be stockpiled

Staple goods	Amount (Kg)	Fuel	Amount (L)
Rice	75,000	Benzene	25,000
Vegetable oil	75,000 (L)	Diesel	100,000
Sugar	80,000	-	-
Milk	7,000	-	-
Total	237,000	Total	125,000

Nevertheless, due to complications⁷ and increasing prices of fuel, SRM003 did not provide the PC with the amounts indicated in Table 1. Instead, fuel provision amounted to 50,000 litres of diesel and no benzene.

Methodology

This IMPACT monitoring exercise was designed in cooperation with HMG and the ASI team. Its objective is to verify if goods funded by HMG and provided by ASI were delivered as planned, and to obtain feedback from stakeholders at field level on the process of project implementation. Research questions (cf. Box 1 for research questions), indicators and tools were designed, discussed and decided on in close collaboration between HMG, ASI and IMPACT prior to their implementation.

Box 1 – Research Questions

- 1: Were staple goods purchased, delivered and stored adequately?
- 2: Was fuel purchased, delivered and stored adequately?

⁵ The calculation is based on WFP's standard food basket; items included in this basket were listed in the "Presentation of the project monitored" section of this report. Data on price trends were obtained from REACH Syria Community Profiles Updates for Eastern Ghouta for the months of March, April, May and June 2017. Available at: <http://bit.ly/2pFrFZ9> , <http://bit.ly/2q0sJWi>, <http://bit.ly/2sL157g> and <http://bit.ly/2gXIZJH>.

⁶ A political settlement to the fighting is considered by SRM as the best solution for the local population.

⁷ No further explanations were provided to IMPACT.

Please see Annex 1 for more detailed information on research questions and indicators.


Sampling strategy

Monitoring activities covered all eight locations used by the PC for the storage of items provided through SRM003: five warehouses for staple goods and three warehouses for fuel (cf. Annex 2 for full list of warehouses and amount of goods stored in each). Due to the limited accessibility of areas covered by the project, data collection for this monitoring exercise was designed to be complementary to internal monitoring activities conducted by ASI. In this sense, IMPACT and ASI engaged in a joint monitoring of the eight existing storage sites. Warehouse spot-checks were done every two weeks, whereby IMPACT field team visited a set of storage sites one day, and the ASI team visited the remaining storage sites the following day. The set of warehouses to be visited in one day was defined by ASI, based on the geographic proximity of the storage sites for easier movement. IMPACT and ASI alternated visited storage locations every new monitoring round, in order to ensure both parties had access to all existing warehouses. All spot-checks were conducted in the presence of a member of the PC Financial Committee - a unit within the PC responsible for the management of the warehouses. This report relates exclusively to data collected by IMPACT.

Geographic coverage and timeframe

The monitoring exercise was conducted in all four communities in which the warehouses are located – Duma and Misraba (Duma District) and Hammoura and Kafr Batna (Rif Damascus District) – as shown on Map 1.

Map 1. Monitoring activities geographical scope⁸



⁸ For security reasons, this map does not indicate the exact location in which the warehouses are situated within each community. Warehouse icon placement is purely indicative.

The monitoring visits (spot-checks) were conducted from 8 April until 15 July 2017. A total of six monitoring rounds (MR) were conducted during this period, out of which rounds 1 and 4⁹ consisted of a full coverage of all eight warehouses by IMPACT field teams, and rounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 covered a sample of the warehouses each, as agreed upon with ASI. In total, IMPACT field teams conducted four spot-checks of each warehouse. For each warehouse spot-check conducted, one Direct Observation (DO) form was filled and a set of pictures was taken for visual evidence¹⁰.

In addition to the warehouse spot-checks, IMPACT conducted one Key Informant Interview (KII) with the project manager of the PC of Rif Damascus and one DO to verify purchase and delivery invoices. This activity was conducted on 4 April 2017, prior to the beginning of warehouse spot-checks, and data collected was later used to cross-reference information obtained through warehouse DOs. A total of nine monitoring working days were used in this activity (see Table 2 for more information on the monitoring activities implemented).

Table 2. Monitoring activities

Monitoring Round	Date	Communities	Locations visited (#)	Activities conducted
Baseline	04-07-17	Duma	Provincial Council (1)	1 KII 1 DO
MR1	09 and 10-04-2017	Duma, Misraba, Hammura and Kafr Butna	Warehouse (8)	8 DO
MR2	01-05-17	Duma, Misraba	Warehouse (3)	3 DO
MR3 ¹¹	30-05-17	Hammura, Kafer Batna	Warehouse (5)	5 DO
MR4	17 and 18-06-2017	Duma, Misraba, Hammura and Kafr Butna	Warehouse (8)	8 DO
MR5	03-07-17	Duma, Misraba	Warehouse (3)	3 DO
MR6	15-07-17	Hammura, Kafer Batna	Warehouse (5)	5 DO

Due to the highly sensitive nature of this project, warehouses were attributed a code in order to avoid direct mentioning of storage locations. The list of codes used and the respective number used by ASI to identify each individual warehouse as well as quantity of stored goods can be found in Annex 2. All references to warehouses in this report will be made using the attributed codes.

Challenges and Limitations

During the implementation of the monitoring, IMPACT field teams experienced some challenges related to remote management and the conflict in Syria:

- The volatile security situation in Eastern Ghouta during the monitoring activities resulted in delays in monitoring activities, particularly regarding MR3. To compensate the two weeks delay of MR3, the

⁹ Initially, MR1 was planned as the only monitoring round in which IMPACT would cover all eight warehouses, as a baseline to following monitoring rounds. However, in MR4, IMPACT also covered all warehouses to compensate the two weeks delay of MR3 due to security reasons.

¹⁰ Direct observation forms and pictures taken during spot-checks are stored by IMPACT and available upon request.

¹¹ Due to security concerns, this activity was delayed. Consequently, the data collection date falls outside of the bimonthly schedule agreed on with ASI.

following monitoring round covered all eight existing warehouses. Therefore, this had no implications on the number of monitoring days planned or on the data collected.

- Due to the sensible nature of the project, the PC key informant was found to be reluctant to sharing information with IMPACT field teams during the visit conducted to the PC. Despite the fact that the PC had been informed of IMPACT's monitoring activities by the IP, the project manager interviewed refused to share information with IMPACT without being provided a formal document declaring IMPACT's role in the TPM. This document was later provided and the KI was conducted as planned. To avoid this situation to be repeated, IMPACT provided ASI a complete list of field monitors. In following monitoring exercises, IMPACT field monitors will be instructed to present identification and a digital copy of their contract when first approaching KIs.

Findings

Key Findings

Overall, findings revealed that staple goods and fuel provided to the PC by SRM003 were purchased, delivered and stored adequately as indicated below (per type of supplies).

Staple goods: All staple goods items listed in the project proposal had been purchased and adequately documented with invoices seen by IMPACT enumerators in the field¹². IMPACT field teams also verified documents signed by the Provincial Council and members of their internal Financial Committee indicating the amount of goods delivered to each warehouse, later confirmed by direct observations. Warehouses were observed to be in proper sanitary conditions and items observed to be stored adequately. Findings also revealed the existence of a surveillance system in place to ensure warehouses were secure. This was done by locals being paid to act as security focal points, keeping a look out in the area in case of suspicious incidents.

Finally, damaged goods were found in only one out of five warehouses. Vegetable oil containers were the only delivered items observed to have been damaged, and this was said to be due to the lack of handling equipment and manufacturing defects of the metal containers. A total of 11 containers were fully damaged and 12 were partially damaged, representing an estimated loss of 196 litres of vegetable oil equivalent to a monetary value of 362,6 USD in total.

Fuel: The amount of budget provided by the IP to the PC of Rif Damascus for the purchase fuel was reported to be 60% inferior to the amount initially planned. In total, SRM003 provided the PC with 50 000 litres of diesel as opposed to the 100 000 litres initially expected, and no amount of benzene as opposed to the 25 000 litres initially planned. Purchase and delivery of items to three existing warehouses was observed to have been adequately documented. Regarding the storage conditions in fuel warehouses, only one of the three warehouses assessed was underground (as recommended for storing flammable liquids). However, additional measures had been taken in the remaining two warehouses to reduce the risks and impact of unintended combustion. In addition, findings revealed the absence of security equipment within the warehouses, such as smoke alarms and fire extinguishers.

Finally, warehouse surveillance was reported to be ensured through the same system as that for staple goods warehouses, and no goods were reported having been damaged or removed from warehouses.

¹² Photos of invoices are available and will be shared by IMPACT upon request.

Findings by Research Question

Research question 1: Were staple goods purchased, delivered and stored adequately?

Purchase and delivery

Verification of staple goods purchase and delivery was done through triangulation of the following data: (i) project documents provided by the IP; (ii) goods and service receipts observed during a monitoring visit to the Provincial Council, and; (iii) invoices available in visited warehouses. This was later complemented with direct observation done by IMPACT monitors in storage locations to increase the confidence level of overall findings.

Findings indicate that staple goods were purchased and delivered to five different storage warehouses located in the cities of Duma and Hammura as established in SRM003 project documents. A total of 237 000 Kg of staple goods were purchased by the PC for the total amount of 359 250 USD as described in Table 3. Finally, IMPACT monitoring confirmed that, as of the last spot-check conducted on 15 July 2017, no amount of purchased goods had been removed from either one of these five warehouses.

Table 3. Quantity and value of staple goods purchased by the PC

Staple goods	Amount (Kg)	USD/unit	Total cost (USD)
Rice	75,000	1.1	82,500
Vegetable oil	75,000 (L)	1.85	138,750
Sugar	80,000	1.2	96,000
Milk powder	7,000	6.0	42,000
Total	-	-	359,250

Documentation

Purchase and delivery were documented at both the Provincial Council level and the warehouse level. No waybills were available, given that storage locations had not previously been operated as warehouses. Nonetheless, goods delivery was documented through contractual documents signed between the Provincial Council and its internal Financial Committee.

Storage condition

TPM findings confirmed goods were adequately stored in all five warehouses. All warehouses were observed to have sufficient space to adequately store items, and goods were neatly piled. Locations were observed to be well protected from the elements and properly ventilated. Nonetheless, warehouses lacked lighting due to the fact that electricity in that area was only available from 7pm until 5am. In addition, none of the warehouses visited were equipped with handling equipment and goods were therefore handled manually. In terms of logistics, although the warehouses did not have their own transportation equipment, one truck was available within the PC and was used to cover all five storage locations.

In terms of sanitary conditions, direct observations revealed that warehouses were clean, dry and in good sanitary conditions. Three of the five warehouse (#ECCS, #IUN and #IQT) were observed to have mouse traps, which indicated the potential presence of pests although none were spotted during DOs. The mouse traps were not observed during all spot-checks conducted in these warehouses and no additional information was available as to whether the traps were a precautionary or responsive measure.

Warehouses were observed to be secure, each one having the entrance door closed with three padlocks. Surveillance of each warehouses was done by two locals being paid 100 USD a month to act as security focal points, keeping a look out in the area in case of suspicious incidents (please see Annex 3 for additional information on contract terms). These security focal points did not have internal access to the warehouses and all three padlock keys were kept with the Provincial Council's Executive Director, later to be given to the three members of the Financial Committee. To note, no security incident had been reported throughout the time the sport-checks were conducted.

Damaged goods

For the most part, goods had not been damaged, except in one warehouse (#EKTC) where findings revealed an estimated 196 litres of vegetable oil having been damaged – representing a loss of 326.5 USD. In this warehouse, IMPACT monitors observed during MR1 that one container of vegetable oil had been spilled, resulting in 16 litres of damaged goods. This was said to be due to the lack of handling equipment inside the warehouses mentioned above. During MR4 (last visit conducted in the location), IMPACT field team was informed of a further 22 damaged vegetable oil containers, out of which 10 had been completely lost and 12 had been partially damaged¹³. This resulted in a further estimated 180 litres of vegetable oil being wasted. PC members present during the visit informed IMPACT monitor that this was due to manufacturing defects of the metal containers and that measures would be taken to replace damaged containers.

Research question 2: Was fuel purchased, delivered and stored adequately?
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Purchase and delivery

Like for staple goods, the verification of the purchase and delivery of fuel (diesel) was done through triangulation of the IP project documents and invoices, receipts observed during a monitoring visit to the Provincial Council and warehouses – later cross-referenced with information obtained through direct observations. Findings confirm 50 000 litres of diesel were purchased by the PC at the unit price of 3,5 USD/litre, for a total of 175,000 USD.

Due to complications¹⁴ and the increase in fuel prices, the actual amount of fuel delivered was 60% less than the amount initially indicated in the project proposal, i.e. a total of 125,000 litres, of which 25,000 litres of benzene and 100,000 litres of diesel. Instead, SRM provided 50,000 litres of diesel and no amount of benzene.

Documentation

TPM monitoring confirmed that fuel was adequately documented, both by the Provincial Council and by the Financial Committee in charge of the warehouses. Much like staple goods warehouses, fuel storages facilities did not have inventory records or waybills to document goods, however, copies of receipt notes of fuel purchased and delivered were available.

Storage condition

Findings revealed that only one (#ECNC) of the three fuel storage location was fully underground – as recommended security measure for storing flammable liquids – due to the lack of available storage locations adapted for storing fuel. The two remaining warehouses (#NFO and #LCKT) were situated on ground level floors of buildings and their external surroundings had been reinforced with earth walls or sand barrels, in order to attenuate risks and impact of unintended combustion. Findings also indicate the absence of any security equipment

¹³ No additional information was provided on the percentage of vegetable oil preserved out of these 12 partially damaged containers.

¹⁴ In addition to the increase in fuel prices, "complications" were indicated by the IP as a reason why the fuel had not been purchased in its full amount. No further information was provided as to what these entailed.

within the warehouses, such as smoke alarms and fire extinguishers, and PC key informant suggested this component be added to the project.

Although all three fuel warehouses were observed to be located in relatively deserted areas, within a safe distance from residential buildings and civilians, they lacked equipment to handle the fuel. Transportation of these goods was reported to be done using a rented fuel tank. Regarding the security conditions of the warehouses, the same system was in place as for staple goods warehouses, whereby two civilians living around the area were recruited, per warehouse, to look after the location from the outside (these individuals were not given access to warehouse keys). In addition, one warehouse (#LCKT) was observed to have been surrounded by barbed wire for security reinforcement.

Damaged goods

Due to the conditions in which the fuel was stored (within sealed containers) and the technical expertise required for such a task, IMPACT enumerators did not assess if any of the stored fuel was damaged. However, throughout the duration of the monitoring activities no damaged or wasted goods were reported, and no amount fuel was removed from either one of the three fuel warehouses.

Concluding Remarks

Findings revealed that SRM003 has overall successfully supported the Provincial Council of Rif Damascus in purchasing and stockpiling staple goods and fuel, with the purpose of enhancing moderate opposition-held Eastern Ghouta's resilience to an eventual siege by the Damascus-based government's army. Nonetheless, the amount of fuel provided was observed to be 60% less than what had been indicated in the project proposal due to internal (no further information available) and external (fuel price increase) factors.

Findings indicate that staple goods have been adequately stored and a surveillance system was in place to ensure the security of the storage locations. Although observed to be in good sanitary conditions, warehouses lacked equipment to handle goods, which could lead to goods being damaged (as the case of the vegetable oil); however, this was observed to be a minor risk and no mention was made by the KI on the need of acquiring equipment to handle goods. With the exception of the 196 L of vegetable oil wasted mostly due to manufacturing defects in the storage containers, the full amount of goods purchased was observed to have been stored in the warehouses.

Inside the fuel warehouses, efforts were observed to have been made to ensure that goods were stored in adequate security conditions despite the lack of available fuel storage locations within Eastern Ghouta. Nonetheless, all warehouses lacked security equipment, such as smoke alarms and fire extinguishers, and this was suggested by PC key informant as a potential area of improvement to the project.

Annexes

Annex 1. Indicator matrix

Research Questions	Indicator #	Indicator Category	Type	Indicator	Indicator Description	Means of Verification	Data Collection Method	Cross-reference	Respondents
Is food purchased, delivered and documented adequately? Are goods stored adequately?	1.1	Evidence	QUANT	Amount of food delivered	To know amount of staple goods delivered to be stockpiled	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in LC Financial Committee / SRM FO
	1.2	Evidence	QUAL	Food delivery is documented	To know if delivery is adequately tracked	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in LC Financial Committee / SRM FO
	1.3	Evidence	QUANT	Amount of food stored in warehouse	To know if goods is stored in designated warehouse	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in warehouse
	1.4	Evidence	QUAL	Food storage is documented	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in warehouse
	1.5	Evidence	QUAL	Food storage is adequately equipped	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Not applicable	SRM focal point in warehouse
	1.6	Evidence	QUAL	Food storage space is adequate	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Not applicable	SRM focal point in warehouse
	1.7	Evidence	QUAL	Food storage is secured	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	KII data	SRM focal point in warehouse
Is fuel purchased, delivered and document adequately? Is fuel stored adequately?	2.1	Evidence	QUANT	Amount of fuel delivered	To know amount of fuel delivered to be stockpiled	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in LC Financial Committee / SRM FO
	2.2	Evidence	QUAL	Fuel purchase is documented	To know if delivery is adequately tracked	Primary data collection forms / Invoice / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in LC Financial Committee / SRM FO
	2.3	Evidence	QUANT	Amount of fuel stored in warehouse	To know if goods is stored in designated warehouse	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in warehouse
	2.4	Evidence	QUAL	Fuel storage is documented	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Invoice / Delivery documents	SRM focal point in warehouse
	2.5	Evidence	QUAL	Fuel storage is adequately equipped	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Not applicable	SRM focal point in warehouse
	2.6	Evidence	QUAL	Fuel storage space is adequate	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	Not applicable	SRM focal point in warehouse
	2.7	Evidence	QUAL	Fuel storage is secured	To know if goods are adequately stored	Primary data collection forms / Picture	Primary data - direct observation and KII	KII data	SRM focal point in warehouse

Annex 2. List of warehouses and amount of goods stored

IMPACT Code	SRM #	District	Type of goods	Quantity stored
#ECCS	1	Duma	Staple goods	22 Tonnes
#EKTC	2	Duma	Staple goods	40 Tonnes
#IUN	6	Rif Damascus	Staple goods	60 Tonnes
#IQJ	7	Rif Damascus	Staple goods	55 Tonnes
#IUJ	5	Rif Damascus	Staple goods	60 Tonnes
#ECNC	3	Duma	Fuel	20,000 Litres
#NFO	4	Duma	Fuel	20,000 Litres
#LCKT	8	Rif Damascus	Fuel	50,000 Litres

Annex 3. Warehouse security service documents (original and translation)

Syrian Arab Republic
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Eastern Ghota

الجمهورية العربية السورية
مجلس محافظة ريف دمشق
مكتب الغوطة الشرقية

الرقم : ، التاريخ : 1 / 2017 م

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
" عقد استخدام "
" حارس "

- 2 -

الفريق الأول : مكتب محافظة ريف دمشق في الغوطة الشرقية بتمه المهندس نادر دغمل أصالة عن نفسه وبصفته
عضو لجنة إدارة المشروع مخزون ملوازي SRMS003 .

الفريق الثاني : [REDACTED] 1987 وبحمل هوية رقم 03010081339 أمانة دوماخ 48
بتاريخ 2010 .

مقدمة العقد : باعتبار أن الفريق الأول مكتب الغوطة الشرقية ، لديه مشروع مخزون استراتيجي ، لدعم و صمود
اهلي الغوطة و يحتاج إلى حارس ليعمل لديه في هذا المشروع و في مجال الحراسة بالموقع " المستودع " و بصفة
حارس ولفترة مؤقتة فيه ، وباعتبار أن الفريق الثاني يعمل في مجال الحراسة و يرغب بذلك ولا مانع لديه من العمل
بشكل مؤقت و هو على استعداد تام للعمل تحت سلطة وإدارة وإشراف الفريق الأول للفد التفق الفريقان وهما يكامل
الأهلية المعتمدة شرعاً وقلولاً على ما يلي :

- 1 - تعتبر مقدمة هذا العقد جزءاً لا يتجزأ منه .
- 2 - تعهد الفريق الأول بتأمين عمل للفريق الثاني بصفته حارس .
- 3 - تعهد الفريق الثاني بالعمل لدى الفريق الأول في مجال الحراسة ولمدة محددة ، وبالعامل المحدد .
- 4 - مدة العمل شهر قابلة للتجديد .
- 5 - يتم تجديد العقد هذا العقد وتمنيده بإعادة الفريق الأول .
- 6 - تبدأ مدة العقد من تاريخ 2017 / 3 / 5 وتغاية 2017 / 4 / 5 .
- 7 - يدفع الأجر للعامل " الحارس " في نهاية الشهر الثالث وبالمبلغ المتفق عليه \$ 100 مئة دولار فقط لا غير .
- 8 - شروط خاصة بالعقد :
أ- العمل في الموقع المحدد من قبل الفريق الأول .
ب- بصفة حارس وبحمل جميع تبعات عمل الحراسة بشكل كامل .
ج- يحق للفريق الأول إنهاء العقد في أي وقت براء مناسباً ودون الرجوع للفريق الثاني ولاي سبب كان .
- 9 - نظم هذا العقد على نسختين ، كل فريق نسخة موقعة منه أصولاً .

حرر بتاريخ : 2017 / 3 / 5 م

الفريق الثاني [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

الفريق الأول [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Translation:

First Party: provincial council office in Rural Damascus- Eastern Ghouta represented by a member of the stockpiling project committee - SRM003

Second Party: name of security and his ID no.

Contract preamble: Considering that, the first party have a stockpiling strategy project in order to support Ghouta civilians, and this need to a security to work in this project in the field of guarding the site 'warehouse' for a temporary time period. Moreover, considering the second party is working in guarding field, and he desire this job and he does not mind working temporarily, and He is fully prepared to work under the authority, management and supervision of the first party. Both parties agreed on following:

1. The preamble shall form are integral part of this contract and shall be read as a whole.
2. The first party undertakes to secure a security work to the second party.
3. The second party undertakes to work in security field for the first party, for a specific period of time and specific job description.
4. Contract period one month with possibility of renewable.
5. This contract will renew, as first party will.
6. Duration of contract starts from 5/3/2017 to 5/4/2017.
7. First party shall pay the second party 'security' at the end of the 3rd month the agreed amount 100\$ only.
8. Terms of contract:
 - a. Work at the site specified by the first party.
 - b. As a security, should bear all the consequences of guardianship
 - c. The first party has the right to terminate the contract at any time it deems appropriate and without reference to the second party for any reason whatsoever.
9. This contact have two versions, both parties received a duplicate thereof