# MONITORING THE EXPERIENCES OF PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM UKRAINE

## EUROPE | JULY 2022

## ABOUT

IMPACT Initiatives is conducting a monthly survey with people who fled the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine since February 2022 to understand their mobility patterns, needs, integration trajectories and intentions to return, and how these change over time. First interviewed when respondents crossed the border out of Ukraine starting on 28 February, IMPACT teams conduct monthly phone interviews with the same group of respondents. While results are not statistically representative, triangulation with other data sources suggest that our sample broadly echoes other available data sources on the population of interest, both in terms of geographic distribution and socio-economic background. The sample is composed of 2,972 respondents whose households make up a total of 9,096 people. At the time of interview already 24% of our overall sample had returned to Ukraine. Results on this population group in particular are highlighted accordingly in the report. Data collection took place between 7 July and 4 August 2022.

## KEY RESULTS













**Survey results among Europe-based respondents outside of Ukraine paint a largely positive picture, with most respondents able to access legal protection mechanisms, housing and living support**. At the time of interview, the majority of respondents were still in the same location as the last time they were called (54%). This, coupled with high reporting on intentions to stay in the current location in the next three months (63%), very high rates of submitted temporary protection applications (91%) and high intentions of enrolling children into the local school with the upcoming school year (63%), suggests that mobility within the EU has somewhat stablised. When asked about their most urgent needs, the most cited response was not having any (27%), with respondents stressing the welcoming and generous support received in hosting countries thus far.

**Upcoming key challenges for respondents outside of Ukraine center around integration and economic independence.** While the majority of respondents have completed higher education (57%) and 63% had a profession when they left Ukraine, only 7% of them speak the language of their host country sufficiently well to be able to work in their previous field. Also, while already almost one third of respondents gain at least part of their income from work in the host country (32%), still more than 50% rely at least partially on government support (53%). Reliance on government support and access to employment differ substantially between respondents in different countries, with, for instance, a much higher reliance on government support in Germany, compared to Poland, where a higher proportion of respondents already work.

**Back in Ukraine the situation is challenging for respondents who returned. Already 24% of our initial sample of respondents (2,972) had returned when interviewed in July** (n=700). The majority of them returned to their habitual place of residence, primarily in Volyn, Lviv, Kiev, Zhytomyr and Dnipropetrovsk. These represent relatively more secure areas within Ukraine. Key challenges cited among returnees, beside security, center around access to cash (30%), employment (19%), material and health assistance (each 9%). Only one third of respondents relied on work in Ukraine as their main income source (33%), illustrating that many are in a vulnerable situation, struggling to build a sustainable life back home.

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Partnered with: UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency
IMPACT Shaping practices Influencing policies Impacting lives

## METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

This brief is based on 2,972 phone interviews conducted remotely between 7 July and 4 August 2022 with people displaced out of Ukraine since the escalation of hostilities on 24 February 2022.

Respondents are initially identified through convenience sampling among people who have crossed the border from Ukraine through a data collection initiative ongoing since 28 February 2022 in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova at border crossings, transit sites and reception centres, in partnership with UNHCR. During this data collection process that aims at informing the local humanitarian response, respondents are asked whether they are interested to be contacted again through monthly follow-up interviews. Those who provide their consent are called during the next round of data collection and on a monthly basis thereafter. The tool is designed to be as short and unobtrusive as possible and has been piloted to ensure "Do No Harm" principles are respected.

Respondents are called using Viber, WhatsApp and Telegram messaging platforms by a trained team of enumerators who conduct the interviews in respondents' mother tongue.

Upon completion of data collection, the data is cleaned, validated, analysed and then shared with the enumerator team for feedback and triangulation of reporting to inform final analysis and output production.

The dataset used to produce this report is based on a non-probabilistic sampling method. As such, findings are not statistically representative and should not be generalised to the entire population of people who fled Ukraine as of 24 February 2022. IMPACT is working towards increasing accuracy and robustness of the data in future data collection rounds, as more data sources on the geographic and socio-economic make-up of the population of interest become available. The methodological annex to this brief provides further information on how our data compares to other sources.

## OUR RESPONDENTS

### DEMOGRAPHICS

Survey respondents and their household members make up a total of 9,096 individuals. Of them, 52% are of working age and 43% are children, with elderly (65 years old+) making up a comparably low 5% of the population. The average household size is 3.06.[1]

Respondents traveling alone are predominantly female (94%). Around 40% are 31 to 40 years old, 24% of respondents ages range between 41 to 50 and 18% between 18 and 30.

The majority of respondents (78%) come from nine oblasts only (out of 24). Kyiv is the most common oblast of origin of respondents, followed by Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Lviv, and Kherson oblasts. This aligns with the oblast most affected by the Russian invasion and where the front line stands as of August 2022, as well as the two main cities.

The nationality of almost all survey respondents is Ukrainian (96%).

Figure 1: Age and gender breakdown




[1] A household consists of one or several persons, including both family and non-family members, who share the same dwelling, resources and expenses, and who left Ukraine after the war began on 24 February. It would not include the hosting family.

[2] Unaccompanied children are children who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so. Separated children are those separated from both parents, but not necessarily from other relatives, such as siblings.

Figure 2: Proportion of household sizes




### VULNERABLE GROUPS

Eighty-three children are reportedly unaccompanied and/or separated, making up 2% of the child population covered in this study.[2] It is likely that this figure is underreported, however other secondary sources on the proportion of unaccompanied and separated children fleeing Ukraine is very limited. Five per cent of household members report having a disability (N= 427), and 98 women are reportedly pregnant or breastfeeding.

### EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT STATUS

The sample of respondents is highly educated with the majority employed before leaving Ukraine. More than half of the respondents have completed university (either first or secondary degrees, 57%), with the next largest proportion of respondents having completed a technical or vocational degree (30%).

When the invasion began, 63% of respondents were employed. All respondents were also asked about their general occupation regardless of their employment status at the time. Most represented among respondents are professionals (27%) which refers to the highest skill level, followed by services and sales workers (17%), and managers (13%).[3]

Ten per cent of respondents declared having no occupation, which could partially be a result of a number of them being housewives.

The professionals surveyed were primarily working in business and administration (28%), teaching (28%), health (18%) and the legal, social and cultural sectors (14%). Among respondents employed as sales and services workers, most worked in sales (55%), followed by personal services (37%), personal care and protective services (6% and 3%).

Findings on demographic, educational, and socio-economic background broadly echo other non-probabilistic surveys conducted with people who fled Ukraine since late February 2022 in the EU, reinforcing findings on the predominance of women and children among the population of interest, and where the majority is highly skilled with advanced education levels (see annex 1 for more information).

Figure 3: Top 10 occupations before displacement




Figure 4: Professional sectors




## DISPLACEMENT

Survey results show that at least 50% of respondents were displaced during the first 20 days following the invasion, between 24 February and 15 March. Specifically, there is a high share of respondents displaced on 24 and 25 February and between 2 and 6 March 2022.

**50%** of respondents were displaced in the first 20 days following the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine.

Respondents' main reasons for displacement were active conflict (50%), followed by imminent escalation (39%) and eventual arrival of conflict (28%).

Figure 5: Date of displacement




### MAP 1: RESPONDENTS' LOCATION AT THE TIME OF INTERVIEW




[1] Occupations are categorised according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) established by the International Labor Organisation (ILO). Definitions on the categories and respective subcategories can be found here: https://isco-ilo.netlify.app/en/isco-08/

## FAMILY & FRIENDS ABROAD

Less than half of respondents had family and/or friends abroad when they first left Ukraine (45%). Out of these, most were in Poland (52%), Germany (12%) and Russia (8%). Figures on relatives in Russia are likely underreported due to the sensitivity of the information.

# MOBILITY PATTERNS

## CURRENT LOCATION

As of July 2022, Poland concentrates the highest share of respondents (47%) outside of Ukraine, followed by 14% that are in Germany. Seventy-five per cent of respondents are concentrated in Poland, Slovakia, Germany and Ukraine. At the same time, almost half (44%) have not continued moving beyond bordering countries and already one fourth of respondents are back in Ukraine (24%). This could be explained by the difficulties of moving further, along with maintaining the possibility to easily return back to Ukraine either visiting or permanently.

Figure 6: Top current locations




## OBLAST OF ORIGIN & DESTINATION

Respondents' top three oblasts of origin are Kyiv (17%), Kharkiv (12%) and Dnipropetrovsk (10%). The distribution of respondents outside of Ukraine is homogeneous when considering their oblast of origin.

In contrast, respondents coming from oblasts in the East and South of Ukraine such as Odessa (17%), Luhansk (17%), Mykolaiv (16%), Kherson (14%), Kharkiv (13%), Chernihiv (13%) and Donetsk (12%) have comparatively higher rates going to Germany than others.

MAP 2: RESPONDENTS' OBLAST OF ORIGIN




## CHANGES IN LOCATION

When looking at changes in location in the previous month, 54% of respondents (n=1,610 out of 2,972) remain in the same location where they were interviewed last time. Of those that changed location, 50% did so in order to return to Ukraine, followed by 12% who moved to or within Germany and 8% to or within Poland.

Respondents who were in Germany during the previous interview were less likely to have changed their location, compared to other countries: 94% of Germany-based respondents stayed in the country, with only 4% returning to Ukraine. This applies to a lesser extent to respondents in Switzerland (91%), Czech Republic (79%), Italy (75%), France (75%), and Spain (71%). This may be due to the different profile of people who travelled further compared to those that remained in neighbouring countries. A comparatively much lower 59% of respondents who were previously in Poland reported still being there in July. This was also the case for 54% of respondents in Slovakia, 28% in Moldova and 32% in Romania.

Of respondents who had been in Ukraine when they were called previously 11% have left the country again. Poland is the main destination for this group.

## INTENTIONS TO STAY

When asked whether they plan to remain in their current location for the next three months, 63% of respondents answer affirmatively, 23% say maybe or that it depends, and 10% say they do not plan to stay.

The shares per country confirm the patterns highlighted above based on the changes in country: those in Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Ireland have high levels of intentions to stay averaging 77%. Romania and Moldova-based respondents have a lower intention to stay, with 41% and 54% respectively, with a higher proportion of respondents not knowing whether they want to stay (9% and 10%) or reporting it would depend on other factors (39% and 24%).

Figure 7: Intentions to stay in current country



# NEEDS ABROAD

## MOST URGENT NEEDS

All respondents were asked about their three most urgent needs. Of those interviewed outside of Ukraine (n=2,247), the most reported answers are "don't need anything" (reported by 27%), employment, and cash (each 24%). While some primary needs, such as accommodation and medical treatment items are cited relatively frequently as an urgent need (18% and 16% of respondents, respectively), a comparatively low 5% of respondents report need for food, suggesting that the most basic needs are covered.

Overall, as explained during qualitative triangulation sessions with enumerators, respondents feel grateful to have reached safety and for having received significant support in their host country.

High reporting of the need for employment and accommodation underlines respondents' intention to stay in their current location in the medium term.

Figure 8: Most urgent self-reported needs:




## ACCOMMODATION

Respondents are asked about the type of accommodation arrangements they have. The most reported among those outside of Ukraine is rented accommodation (35%). This is followed by 20% of respondents staying in accommodation provided by volunteers, highlighting the extent of the mobilisation of civil society across Europe in supporting people displaced from Ukraine. A total of 17% of respondents are staying in collective centres or other accommodation provided by authorities, followed by 14% staying at a hotel or hostel and a comparatively low 12% of respondents staying with family or friends.

Figure 9: Accommodation types:




The distribution of types of accommodation is highly dependent on the country, with Poland hosting the highest share of respondents renting accommodation (50%), followed by Romania (30%) and Germany (25%). In contrast, a higher share of respondents stay in accommodation provided by authorities in Germany than in any other country (24%), compared to only 4% of Poland-based respondents. Moldova has the highest share of respondents staying with family and friends (34%) and in collective centres (14%). These are likely a result of the housing support provided by national governments, housing market prices and networks of support in each country.

Looking at variations by respondents' date of displacement, a higher share of respondents displaced during the first month of invasion are renting accommodation (39%) compared to those displaced in April (27%) and June (29%).

Figure 10: Type of accommodation in top countries



Taking into account all types of accommodation, more than half of respondents (56%) do not pay for accommodation in their current location, followed by 31% who do and 13% who pay some part of it, such as utilities.

Figure 11: Share of respondents paying rent




## DOCUMENTATION

Almost all respondents have applied for documentation (91%), most of them for temporary protection (TP, 92%). Those who have not applied for documentation reportedly do not plan to stay in the country (19%) or already have documents allowing them to stay legally in their current location (16%).

# INTEGRATION ABROAD

## SOCIO-CULTURAL

Three out of four respondents report having poor or very poor knowledge of the language of the host country (76%), followed by those who describe their language skills as “fair” (17%). Only 7% of respondents feel their language skills are “good” or “very good”. As overall findings suggest that respondents aim to settle at least for the medium term in their current location, this illustrates a key barrier to integration from both a social and economic perspective.

Figure 12: Language skills in current country




Figure 13: Language skills in top countries




At the same time, reporting reinforces the overall positive reception in host societies of people displaced out of Ukraine: only 9% of respondents feel they had been discriminated against in their host country since they arrived.

## INCOME AND SAVINGS

Monthly income and income sources serve as indicators of individuals’ level of economic integration in the host country, their dependence on external support, and their vulnerability. While the majority of respondents rely at least partially on host government financial support (53%), already one in three earn some income through income-generating activities in their host country (32%).

The third and fourth most cited income sources are NGO assistance (19%) and Ukraine-based social security benefits (18%).

Reliance on host government support is markedly higher for respondents in Germany (76%), compared to those in Poland (55%), with a corresponding higher reliance by Poland-based respondents on income from working in the host country (42%), compared to those in Germany (11%). This may be due to the more limited language barrier for Ukrainians in Poland or due to a higher demand for low-skilled labour (de facto the type of labour mostly accessible to people who fled Ukraine as language barriers and challenges around the recognition of qualifications persist) compared to respondents in Germany.

Only few respondents rely on negative coping mechanisms, such as borrowing money or selling off assets as sources of income (>1%). However, 14% of respondents do rely at least partially on savings, suggesting that their vulnerability is likely to increase should they not find more sustainable income sources and displacement persist. A comparatively low 5% of respondents rely on income from Ukraine-based work, suggesting that remote working arrangements have partially subsided.

In eurozone countries, respondents rely on an average of 770 EUR a month (n=552), with a self-reported disposable income of 280 EUR. Respondents

Figure 14: Respondents' income sources



based in Poland rely on a monthly income of 2,290 zloti (n=704), with a disposable income of 870 zloti (n=80). This is perceived to be a sensitive question, so responses may be under- or over-reporting actual income.

## REMITTANCES

Only a minority of respondents are sending remittances back to Ukraine (16%), the majority of whom are sending cash (11%), compared to in-kind support (5%). Most have sent some sort of support only once since they left (75%, n=360).

## RETURN INTENTIONS

Of the 2,272 respondents who have not already returned to Ukraine when interviewed, 14% have been back to Ukraine at least once since they first left the country. Those based in bordering countries are more likely to have gone to Ukraine at least once (Poland 15% and Slovakia 28%, compared to only 9% among respondents in Germany). Most have visited only once in the past month (95%), with the most reported reasons being the desire to reunify with family and friends (54%), obtaining or retrieving documents (33%) and getting supplies (32%).

The majority of respondents do not intend to return or temporarily go back to Ukraine in the next month (76%). This, together with the findings on mobility patterns above, suggests that overall the population of people who fled Ukraine has become more stable with less movement to be expected than in the first months since the escalation of hostilities. This is likely due to respondents not believing that the situation will drastically change within the near future. Individuals reporting wanting to return, wanting to visit or considering to go (those who reported "depends" or "maybe"; n=525) were asked within which timeframe they intend to go to Ukraine. The most reported timeframes are "when the war is over" (39%), in between one week to one month (12%) and "I don't know" (11%).

**MAP 3: RETURNEES' OBLASTS OF ORIGIN**




## BACK IN UKRAINE

Twenty-four per cent of our initial group of respondents is back in Ukraine with the intention to remain there for the next three months, when interviewed during the follow-up call.

There is currently very limited data to contrast how this relatively high proportion of respondents compares to other data sources. According to IOM, as of 23 August more than six million returnees are in Ukraine, of whom 15% report to have returned from abroad, a total of 901,950 individuals.[2] Noting that this can only serve as a rough approximation, when contrasted to the overall number of people who fled Ukraine and were registered in Europe (7 million) within the same timeline, this would total to 13% of that population. It is possible that returnees in our sample are over-represented compared to the overall population of people who fled Ukraine. The majority of our respondents left the country early on when the situation was very volatile, while, as of July, in some limited locations, the situation has stabilised somewhat, especially in major cities such as Kyiv and Lviv. We will continue to monitor the proportion and background of returnees in future rounds.

## AREAS OF ORIGIN

Respondents whose oblasts of origin are Volyn, Lviv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Dnipropetrovsk have higher rates of return to Ukraine among overall respondents, with less respondents originating from the South-East among returnees.

## NEEDS

Asked about their most urgent needs back in Ukraine, half of respondents say they have no urgent needs, as they have been able to return home. Those who do report urgent needs most commonly cite needs in relation to livelihoods and covering basic necessities, with high reporting of need for cash (28%), employment (19%), material and medical treatment assistance (each 9%). This illustrates that, while respondents want to remain in Ukraine, many are in a vulnerable situation, struggling to build a sustainable life back home.

**33%** of respondents back in Ukraine reported their main income source to be work in Ukraine.

The main income sources relied upon by people who have returned to Ukraine further illustrate this. While the most reported income source is work within Ukraine, this is cited by a relatively low one third of

[2] IOM, "Ukraine internal displacement report. General population survey Round 8", 23 August 2022.

respondents (33%). The second most relied upon source of income are Ukraine-based social security benefits (25%), which may illustrate the vulnerable profile of the population. This is followed by one in five respondents relying on savings (20%), an indicator of respondents' vulnerability as savings deplete over time should income sources not diversify, putting individuals further at risk (in comparison, a lower 14% of respondents outside of Ukraine relied on savings as an income source).

Figure 15: Most urgent self-reported needs in Ukraine




## ACCOMMODATION

Among those that have returned to Ukraine, 76% are back in their place of habitual residence. This indicates that those who return may only do so when they consider it possible to return to their homes. Only 12% are renting their accommodation and a smaller share of 7% are staying with family and friends.

## CONCLUSIONS

## OUTSIDE OF UKRAINE

Six months into the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine, people who fled the country and interviewed for this study outside of Ukraine have largely settled in their current location, with the majority intending to remain at least for the mid-term. This is corroborated by high reporting on submitted applications for documentation to stay (91%, the majority of which for TP), as well as on movement intentions, with 63% reporting wanting to stay where they are for the next three months. This includes the 24% of the original sample who have already returned to Ukraine after leaving at the start of the conflict.

High reporting on access to legal protection, housing solutions and living support, coupled with low reporting on discrimination, the use of negative coping mechanisms and intentions to move onward, paint a largely positive picture of the experiences of respondents outside of Ukraine.

At the same time, the forthcoming months are likely to be pivotal in shaping the experiences of people displaced by the war in Ukraine in Europe for the longer term, especially with regards to access to the labour market and socio-economic integration.

Access to meaningful employment is a priority for respondents outside of Ukraine. When asked about their most urgent need, the most reported response among respondents is that they do not need any support (27%); this is emblematic of the thankfulness many feel for the support received so far, but also of respondents' unwillingness to rely on external help in the longer term. Employment, the second most reported need (24%) - in line with respondents' high education levels (with 57% having completed university and a further 31% vocational or technical training) – will be critical to ensure that people can integrate and contribute to their host society, as many intend to do. However, a major barrier which will need to be tackled is the language gap: while 68% worked in skilled labour before leaving Ukraine, only 7% currently have the language skills to apply their skills in the host country. Recognition of qualifications will also be a priority, however, language skills have to be the first investment.

Hand in hand with access to the labour market (through language training and skills recognition) goes sufficient access to childcare and education for school-aged children, not the least because most respondents are women of working age traveling with children. This makes access to education and appropriate childcare a sine qua non for responding to children's rights, but also for meaningful labour integration. Here, the likely key challenge will be to balance children's integration in the host country with caregivers' wish for children to continue remote schooling in Ukraine: while the majority of respondents intend to remain in their current location, many caregivers want to keep the option open for their children to re-integrate within the Ukrainian school system in the coming year without loosing the school year (should they decide to return). The remote schooling option still available in many Ukrainian municipalities makes this possible, however, the burden on children should be considered when looking at their integration into host countries' school systems in the new school year. Similarly, cultural differences will need to be managed when making childcare available to the youngest: in Ukraine, women are entitled to maternity leave until the child is three years of age with few sending their child to childcare beforehand. This cultural difference will need to be accounted for when looking at the integration of a workforce many of whom have young children in their care.

## BACK IN UKRAINE

While much focus is put on people who are outside of Ukraine, 24% of our initial sample have already returned to Ukraine since they first left. Among the 37% of those not intending to stay in their current location for the next three months, half intend to return to their home country (50%).

Back in Ukraine, the key challenges cited among returnees, beside security, center around access to cash (30%), employment (19%), material and health assistance (each 9%). This suggests that returns, while they are occurring, may not necessarily be sustainable or safe.

Finally, the situation remains highly volatile with sudden changes in the situation on the ground in Ukraine, as well as policy changes in the host and home countries prone to bring about unexpected and potentially drastic changes in people's plans for the future. One issue to monitor are discussions within Ukraine to expand military conscription to women, with women asked to sign up with local military offices in September 2022. Also, the security situation in the country is likely to have a significant bearing on people's plans, as, while for now reporting on wanting to stay is high, most respondents share a strong feeling of connection to their home country with the wish to return as soon as they deem it feasible to do so.

## INSERT: CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO EDUCATION & CHILDCARE

Nearly three-quarters of respondents are with at least one child in their present location (73%). The majority of them intend to enrol their school-aged children in school in their current location with the new school year in September (66%). Among those who are unsure to enrol their children into the local school, or those who reportedly do not intend to do so, the most reported reason is parents' wish for their children to continue remote schooling in Ukraine (59%, n=201). The second most reported reason is respondents' intention to move soon (32%). Only few respondents cited external factors specific to their host country as the determining reason why they do not intend to send their children to school; this includes having no access (cited by only 4% of respondents), and the language barrier (<1%).

As of August 2022, remote schooling in Ukraine is offered on a discretionary basis, determined by the municipality. Several parents reportedly aim to have their children attend both in-person education in their host country, as well as remote schooling in Ukraine. This is because respondents do not know how long they will stay in their host country and, as such, want to avoid their children losing the school year in Ukraine should they be able to return soon.

The majority of children aged 0 to 5 years old did not attend childcare or pre-school in July (76% and 56% respectively). While the majority of parents or caregivers intend to send their pre-school aged children to kindergarten in September in their current location (63%), only slightly more than half of respondents want to send their 0 to 2 year olds to childcare arrangements in September. In Ukraine mothers are entitled to three years of paid maternity leave with most not leaving their children with external childcare facilities until they are three years old. This is likely why intended take-up of care arrangements for younger children is lower among respondents, compared to older age groups.

Access and barriers to schooling, as well as access to remote schooling in Ukraine, and the challenges around children accessing two education systems at once, will be investigated furthering in the August data collection round.

Figure 16: Intention to enrol children in school in host country



## ANNEX: METHODOLOGY DETAILS

### How does the longitudinal research methodology work?

Respondents are interviewed each month on a core module of questions and variable modules that are included in response to emerging information needs and changing contexts. A module for new respondents ensures the same level of baseline information for the entire population.

The sample is based on a fixed panel plus “births” design, whereby newly displaced respondents are added to the sample on a monthly basis. The addition of new respondents to the panel allows for two aims: (1) incorporating people displaced after the beginning of data collection, who are likely to have a different profile of those who left at first; (2) it also allows for an overall larger sample size: while the present data is based on 2,972 respondents, the aim is to eventually interview more than 10,000 respondents on a monthly basis. This way, more disaggregated data can be provided by, for instance, country and specific socio-economic or vulnerability profiles.

Each round of data collection takes place on a fixed monthly schedule and new respondents are included in the panel and interviewed during the next round of data collection following their consent, together with ongoing respondents.

### How accurately does the sample reflect the actual geographic and socio-economic make-up of people who fled Ukraine?

The analysis herein presented is not statistically significant, meaning that the findings speak to the situation of the people interviewed in the study and not to all people who fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022. This is because the initial sampling method, by which respondents were selected into participating in the study (approached for interview at border crossing points, transit sites and accommodation centres in Ukraine’s neighbouring countries) was non-probabilistic, meaning that not every person who fled Ukraine had the same likelihood of being selected for interview. Further, upon being initially interviewed, not all respondents agreed to be contacted again via phone, and not all of those who did, picked up the phone for interview when called. As such, it is possible that bias is introduced in first, how and who was approached, second, who consented to be interviewed by phone, and, third, who finally was reachable over phone.

What renders an accurate assessment of the representativeness of our sample further difficult, is that there is currently no complete reliable data available on the profile of people who fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022, which would enable us to assess our data, and, if necessary, adjust our analysis through weighting. Having said that, there are already some (incomplete) data sources against which we can compare our sample, both in terms of geographic distribution, as well as in terms of demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

Figure 17: Data collection progress per number of respondents




### Geographic distribution

In terms of geographic distribution of people who fled Ukraine and are outside of the country, we can look at three main data sources. First, Temporary Protection (TP) registrations by country, second country-level registrations which include TP but also include applications for other documentation for stay, and Facebook's displacement data which measures the number of Facebook users that have left the country based on their detected home and normal movement patterns.[1]

1. Temporary Protection is provided by the European Union in accordance to the Council of Europe Directive 2001/55/EC of July 2001. It is an exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from non-EU countries unable to return to their country of origin. The directive was triggered for the first time by the Council in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It grants Ukrainians access to residence permit, to the asylum procedure, employment, accommodation or housing, social welfare, medical care, education, banking services, and movement rights within EU countries.

Data for Good at Meta leverages a combination of inputs from the Facebook platform to build Displacement Maps, including estimates of peoples’ home locations and movement patterns before the onset of a crisis. More information on the methodology can be found at https://dataforgood.facebook.com/dfg/docs/methodology-displacement-maps.

As table 1 illustrates, depending on which data source we use for comparison, our sample fares differently in terms of geographic distribution. Overall, there are nine countries which are present in each data source's Top 15 countries (highlighted in bold), with all converging that Poland and Germany are in the Top 3. Compared to Facebook and country-level registration data, respondents in Poland seem over-represented in our current sample (47% compared to 21% in Facebook data, compared to 29% according to country-level registrations as recorded by UNHCR). This difference, however, is less stark when compared to TP registrations (40%). In contrast, all data sources suggest that respondents in the Czech Republic are under-represented in our current sample (- 7% compared to Facebook and country level registration data and -6% compared to TP registrations).

However, it needs to be underscored that each of the presented data sources have limitations and potential biases in their own right: Facebook data can only represent individuals who have a Facebook account and log into it on a somewhat regular basis. While this is a rich data source, not all people have a Facebook account which they access (semi-)regularly. Also, past research has shown that people from middle income backgrounds who are aged 30 or higher tend to be over-represented on Facebook, while younger generations (which we know are highly represented among people who fled Ukraine in recent months) tend to use other social media platforms. In comparison, data on government registrations of people who fled Ukraine, be that those who applied for TP or more

### TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF PRESENT SAMPLE'S GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION WITH ALTERANTIVE DATA SOURCES

| | Longitudinal data (04.08.2022) | N | % | % w/o UKR | TP (31.07.22) | N | % | UNHCR (22.08.22) | N | % | Facebook (15.08.22) | N | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Poland | 1,060 | 36% | 47% | Poland | 1,314,205 | 40% | Poland | 1,338,339 | 29% | Poland | 1,110,000 | 21% |
| 2 | Ukraine | 723 | 24% | - | Germany | 670,000 | 20% | Germany | 971,000 | 21% | Germany | 755,800 | 14% |
| 3 | Germany | 303 | 10% | 14% | Czech Republic | 244,650 | 7% | Czech Republic | 415,859 | 9% | Czech Republic | 458,300 | 9% |
| 4 | Slovakia | 141 | 5% | 6% | Spain | 131,700 | 4% | Italy | 159,968 | 4% | Italy | 190,000 | 4% |
| 5 | Moldova | 59 | 2% | 3% | Bulgaria | 118,755 | 4% | Turkey | 145,000 | 3% | Hungary | 143,800 | 3% |
| 6 | Romania | 56 | 2% | 2% | Slovakia | 83,175 | 3% | Spain | 137,637 | 3% | United Kingdom | 110,600 | 2% |
| 7 | France | 49 | 2% | 2% | France | 63,050 | 2% | United Kingdom | 118,000 | 3% | France | 106,000 | 2% |
| 8 | Netherlands | 48 | 2% | 2% | Switzerland | 57,785 | 2% | France | 96,520 | 2% | Spain | 98,900 | 2% |
| 9 | United Kingdom | 47 | 2% | 2% | Italy | 54,080 | 2% | Moldova | 90,785 | 2% | Netherlands | 86,700 | 2% |
| 10 | Switzerland | 45 | 2% | 2% | Lithuania | 52,620 | 2% | Slovakia | 90,612 | 2% | United States | 85,700 | 2% |
| 11 | Italy | 43 | 1% | 2% | Belgium | 47,945 | 1% | Romania | 87,066 | 2% | Bulgaria | 76,300 | 1% |
| 12 | Spain | 42 | 1% | 2% | Romania | 43,635 | 1% | Bulgaria | 85,281 | 2% | Slovakia | 64,200 | 1% |
| 13 | Czech Republic | 41 | 1% | 2% | Ireland | 41,000 | 1% | Austria | 78,958 | 2% | Turkey | 61,900 | 1% |
| 14 | Ireland | 32 | 1% | 1% | Sweden | 38,725 | 1% | Netherlands | 68,050 | 1% | Belgium | 59,900 | 1% |
| 15 | Austria | 30 | 1% | 1% | Portugal | 37,715 | 1% | Switzerland | 64,053 | 1% | Austria | 54,500 | 1% |

### MAPS 4, 5, 6 & 7: DISTRIBUTION OF TARGET POPULATION ACCORDING TO THIS SURVEY, AND OTHER AVAILABLE SOURCES



broadly registered in the country, tends to be reliable and accurately reflect the profile of those who register. The most obvious limitation, however, is that only those who do register with public authorities are captured in these figures, which means that some vulnerable groups, or more transient populations who choose not to register with government authorities are not included in the dataset. Also, TP data by default represents only individuals who applied for TP: while our data and other data sources suggest that the majority of people who fled Ukraine to the EU indeed did apply for TP (+90%), this data source is by default constrained to this sub-group of the overall population.

Finally, it is worth noting that all data sources, except for country-level registrations recorded by UNHCR, exclude data on the number of people who fled Ukraine to the Russian Federation and Belarus, a sizeable group in its own right (2.3 million in Russia and more than 11.000 in Belarus as of 22 August 2022).

### Demographic & socio-economic background of respondents

To determine the distribution of our current sample in terms of demographic and socio-economic background of our respondents, we look at other already existing data sources which target the same population of interest and capture this information. As of August 2022, the most pertinent publicly availably data include Facebook data, the Spanish Ministry of Interior's dashboard on people who fled Ukraine and registered in Spain, as well as some non-probabilistic surveys which have been conducted with individuals who fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022. Some of the most notable of these are a joint EUAA/OECD online survey (last publicly available data from June 2022) and a survey conducted with people who fled Ukraine in Germany supported by the German Ministry of Interior in March 2022. Table 2 provides an overview of how our sample compares to findings from these alternative data sources.

Comparing key indicators on gender and educational level, we can see that data sources largely converge on the general trend (largely female and highly educated). In contrast, much more variation is visible in recorded oblasts of origin. While none of the data sources presented provide an exhaustive picture (since none are based on a probabilistic/ random sampling method or are a census of the population of interest as a whole), our sample largely echoes findings from the other data sources. All, including our survey results, point in the same direction. This suggests that overall, based on current information available, our dataset captures relatively well the population of interest's demographic and socio-economic background. We expect that in due time more accurate and comprehensive data on the demographic and socio-economic background of people who fled Ukraine in the EU will become available. Once this is the case, more advanced checks of our data will be administered.

#### TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF PRESENT SAMPLE' SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND WITH ALTERANTIVE DATA SOURCES

| | | Our data | | Facebook | | Spanish Ministry of Interior | | EUAA/OECD | | Info GmbH German-based study |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **N** | | 2.976 | | | | 75.936 | | 2.369 | | 1.936 |
| **Date** | | 31.07.2022 | | 24.02.- 15.08. | | 24.02.- 15.08. | | 11.04. - 07.06.22 | | 24.- 29.03.22 |
| **Sampling method** | | Non-probabilistic (in-person) | | Facebook log-ins | | Government registration | | Non-probabilistic online survey | | Non-probabilistic in-person & online survey |
| **Gender (adults)** | F | 94% | | 71% | | 71% | | 82% | | 84% |
| | M | 6% | | 29% | | 29% | | 18% | | 16% |
| **Education level completed** | University | 57% | | NA | | 61% | | 73% | | 73% |
| | Technical school/ vocational training | 30% | | | | 28% | | 10% | | NA |
| | Secondary school | 12% | | | | 9% | | 6% | | 19% |
| | Middle school or lower | 1% | | | | 2% | | 2% | | 7% |
| **Oblast of origin (top 5)** | | Kyiv | 17% | Kyiv | 11% | Kyiv | 28% | Kharkiv | 10% | NA |
| | | Kharkiv | 12% | Kharkiv | 9% | Kharkiv | 9% | Donetsk | 8% | |
| | | Dnipropetrovsk | 10% | Odesa | 6% | Odesa | 8% | Odesa | 8% | |
| | | Mykolaiv | 9% | Dnipropetrovsk | 4% | Lviv | 8% | Kyiv | 8% | |
| | | Odesa | 9% | Zaphorizhzhya | 3% | Ivano-Frankvs'k | 5% | Dnipropetrovsk | 6% | |



IMPACT Shaping practices Influencing policies Impacting lives

### What are the limitations of this approach?

- **Non-probabilistic sampling method of the initial pool of respondents**: The findings herein presented only speak to the situation of those interviewed, and not to the entire population of people who fled Ukraine since 24 February 2022. In future data collection rounds we will increase the outreach to potential respondents to further diversify access to respondents (to reduce the risk of bias- see below), as well as start weighting data and results as more accurate and complete data sources on the profile of the population of interest will become available.
- **Differential field presence in neighbouring countries**: the current dataset is based entirely on respondents first interviewed in person as people fled Ukraine. While data collection teams were present in all countries where people crossed the border (Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova and Hungary, excluding the Russian Federation and Belarus), differently large field teams were collecting data in each country, with Poland-based border-crossings over-represented in the sample. To mitigate the bias which may come from over-reliance on data collected in a specific location, in future data collection rounds we will increase our sample through advertisement of the survey via Facebook and Viber social media platforms, to increase and diversify our outreach to potential respondents.
- **Under-representation of certain population groups**: Some population groups are under-represented in this sample. Most notably, this includes people who fled to the Russian Federation or Belarus (since data collection teams in the field did not collect data there), as well as unaccompanied and separated children who travelled alone, as we only conduct data collection with adults.
- **All responses are based on respondents' self-reporting**: all data presented is based on self-reporting by respondents only. Where available, primary data collected was triangulated with alternative data sources with similarities/ differences outlined in the brief. Still, it is possible that some findings may be under- or over-reported. Based on debriefings with data collection teams, the most sensitive questions (where respondents may have been most prone to over- or under-reporting) were questions on demographics (particularly on presence of male adults within the household, likely due to forced conscription of male adults in Ukraine), and questions around income and remittances.
- **Attrition rate**: During the border monitoring survey, conducted between 28 February and 04 June 2022 across Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova, 18,540 respondents were interviewed. Half of them (9,604 respondents) gave their consent to being called again via phone. During wave 1 of the longitudinal survey (conducted in July) of all phone numbers provided, we were able to reach 3,300 respondents (34%) and completed 2,972 successful interviews. At the end of the interview, 97% of respondents provided their consent to be called again. Those interviewed back in Ukraine had higher attrition rates, accounting for 2% of the total. In future rounds we will explore in greater depth the profiles of respondents who drop out at different points of the interview process, to be able to account for any resulting biases.