ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter

Quantitative Outcome Evaluation of Gaza Shelter Response

Report

Occupied Palestinian Territory

January 2017

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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We also acknowledge the willingness of all the householders who generously shared their stories with the data collection teams. May this assessment help ensure your shelter needs are fully met.

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Disclaimer

The views and recommendations expressed in this document are those of the evaluation team, they do not necessarily reflect those of the Shelter Cluster Palestine, the GSC or NRC. Responsibility for any omissions or errors of fact or interpretation rests with the authors.

Cover photo: Max Gibson, December 2016

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NRC NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

OCHA

ACTED Agency for technical cooperation and development.

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REACH Informing more effective humanitarian action

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CONTEXT OVERVIEW

From July to August 2014, Gaza witnessed fifty-one days of escalation of hostilities, one of the most destructive intensifications of conflict since 1967. This resulted in an unprecedented scale of destruction, devastation and displacement. At the height of the escalation of hostilities, almost 500,000 people were internally displaced. The concentration of damage was mainly found along the Armistice Line, however multiple districts located beyond this line had a vast majority of structures completely destroyed.

Significant damage to housing and infrastructure as a result of the escalation of hostilities, combined with almost ten years of blockade and three major escalations of hostilities over the past six years, caused large-scale destruction to Gaza's economy and productive assets. In March 2013, Gaza was already facing a housing shortage of around 75,000 homes[1]. Data collected during the final housing damage assessment following the 2014 escalation of hostilities established that 11,000 housing units were totally destroyed, 6,800 had suffered severe damage, 5,700 major damage and 147,500 minor damage. Of these, a total of 17,800 housing units were estimated to be uninhabitable.

Over the past two years, donors and aid actors have made significant efforts to provide humanitarian shelter assistance to the affected population in Gaza, although a number of challenges, gaps and blockages remain. To coincide with preparations for the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), the coordinators of the humanitarian shelter response, Shelter Cluster Palestine and local authorities requested the support of the Global Shelter Cluster and REACH to lead a review and evaluation of the progress of the shelter response since the 2014 hostilities.

METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

The objective of the evaluation was to measure the outcomes of the provision of emergency, temporary and durable shelter assistance, to better understand the key achievements, establish best practices, identify residual response gaps, and draw lessons learned and recommendations.

The evaluation process was divided into two phases: (1) a qualitative participatory evaluation through a secondary data review, a lessons learned workshop, an online survey and purposively sampled semi-structured key informant interviews; (2) a quantitative evaluation through statistically significant primary data collection at household level. This report is the result of the second phase of this evaluation.

The second phase specifically attempted to address three overall research questions: 1) To what extent was each approach appropriate to meet beneficiaries' shelter and NFI needs?; 2) To what extent was each approach cost-effective in aiding household recovery and/or return of the IDP population affected by the 2014 escalation in hostilities?; and 3) To what extent are response gaps and residual shelter needs, at household level, related to the escalation in hostilities, still present in Gaza?

GENERAL FINDINGS

In the two years since the 2014 escalation of hostilities, donors and humanitarian actors made significant efforts to provide shelter assistance to the affected population in Gaza. **Three-quarters of households reporting that their shelter had been damaged or destroyed said they had received assistance: primarily cash for transitional shelter solutions or cash for repair/reconstruction, followed by vouchers, non-food items and sealing materials**. **This assistance had helped more than half of households with damaged shelters to complete**

[1] Overview of the Housing Situation in the Gaza Strip, NRC, March 2013.

repairs, and almost a third of households with destroyed shelters to fully rebuild. Overall, households that received assistance had made greater progress recovering than those that did not.

Cash assistance was received by approximately half of all households, regardless of damage categorization and was used for a variety of purposes.[2]. This cash was primarily used for construction materials, followed by non-food items and tools. Cash assistance was clearly preferred by beneficiaries, with more than three-quarters selecting it as their number one choice. However, many beneficiaries expressed dismay that the cash received was insufficient for all their needs, because they wanted to repair and rebuild their shelters to be better than they were before the crisis.

The damage assessment, although identified during the lessons learned workshop as a main strength of the response, does not seem to have been as successful in terms of communication with householders. **There was significant confusion between household responses and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MoPWH) categorisation of damage.** This may be due to multiple rounds of assessments[3] and change in cost of materials between the time of assessments and purchasing by householders. It may also be because of disagreement by householders regarding the categorisation they were given and confusion caused by the application of a new damage category (severe damage) during damage assessments, which had not been used in assessments following previous escalations of hostilities.[4] The majority (70%) of surveys could be directly matched to the MoPWH database, allowing for correction of damage level categorisation amongst these. **However, potential differences in responses between damage categories and consequently a clear sense of how many people still need assistance, became less apparent as a result.**

In addition to the role of humanitarian assistance, self-recovery capacity clearly exists. Householders were able to borrow money from family and many could purchase construction materials (concrete less so), and a few were able to physically conduct home repairs themselves. Potentially, up to 20% of repair and reconstruction was completed without Shelter Cluster assistance. However, this capacity was nowhere close to sufficient, considering the need, as quite clearly, those who did not receive assistance made less progress towards repair and reconstruction. Furthermore, households often reported engaging in negative coping strategies, including selling belongings and acquiring formal loans or accumulating debt, practices which affect resilience and increases household vulnerability in the long term.

At least half to three-quarters of households reported applying to the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, through which households obtain permission to access materials, that they then go on to purchase with or without cash assistance. Many said that navigating the mechanism had been difficult, with fewer than half managing to purchase the requested materials in full. There were delays on all sides, and materials were often insufficient. Overall, households that received shelter assistance were more likely to have applied to the GRM than those that had not – but more than a third (35%) of assisted households had not yet purchased the materials they applied for at the time of the assessment. Shelter Cluster actors expressed concerns that households may simply have been unaware that applications had been approved and furthermore, that reconstruction applications may have been held up awaiting drawings and construction permits to be submitted by applicant households. Another reason for the delay in purchasing following submission of GRM applications may be due to a lack of alignment between approval on the GRM system and provision of assistance.

[2] Please see table in Annex 3 for a full list of assistance offered by Shelter Cluster partners
[3] Multiple reviews were conducted by shelter cluster actors and homes were sometimes re-categorised.
[4] Homes categorised as severely damaged were considered as Repair assistance beneficiaries but they qualified for TSCA which was otherwise only provided to those with totally destroyed homes, as per previous conflicts.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS: KEY FINDINGS

A summary of findings addressing each of the three research questions is outlined here:

- ***To what extent was each approach appropriate to meet beneficiaries' shelter and NFI needs?***

Overall, households with completely destroyed houses were most likely to rate any type of shelter assistance as appropriate for their needs, while those with minor damage were the least likely to rate any assistance appropriate, perhaps reflecting that non-shelter types of assistance are priorities where shelter needs are mostly met**.** This relationship was strongest for cash, TSCA and sealing materials.

The overwhelming majority of households that reported cash as their 'most preferred' type of assistance and on average higher levels of satisfaction with current shelter conditions were found amongst households that received cash compared to those that did not. However, cash was also seen as the 'least appropriate' type of shelter assistance, which is likely related to numerous complaints that cash assistance was not enough to cover all needs. Shelter Cluster partners felt that beneficiary households often expected assistance to cover not only reconstruction and repair of homes but also replacement or repair of damaged furniture and belongings. Sampled respondents often seemed unclear about the different conditions or purposes of cash assistance – the type, intended purpose, amount, and overall objectives of using cash to support shelter objectives should therefore be carefully reviewed in future response. In addition, the mechanisms to monitor and measure the effectiveness of cash and its impact should be reviewed.

- ***To what extent was each approach cost-effective in aiding household recovery and/or return of the IDP population affected by the conflict?***

Overall households with completed or ongoing repairs or reconstruction were more likely to have received cash/TSCA or vouchers than those that had not. However, the assessment methodology which guided collection of primary and secondary data did not address this research question fully, which restricted analysis of cost-effectiveness and contributed to the challenges faced when untangling the relationship between different shelter assistance approaches and household recovery / return in the data collected through this assessment. The confusion between cash and TSCA amongst beneficiaries mentioned above; coupled with the conflicting damage categories reported by beneficiaries and MoPWH records respectively; along with a limited sample, meant recovery and return could not be attributed to specific assistance approaches.

- ***To what extent are response gaps and residual shelter needs, at household level, related to the escalation in hostilities, still present in Gaza?***

Despite considerable progress in repair and reconstruction, remaining needs still exist. More than a third (35%) of households with completely destroyed homes reported not having started reconstruction at all at the time of this assessment and another 35% were said to have reconstruction ongoing, representing 7,700 homes remaining to be completed.[5] Although these proportions were lower amongst other damage categories (24-29% and 11-23%), an estimated 3,196 households with severely damaged homes; 2,565 with major damage and 52,625 with minor damage had repairs that were ongoing or not yet begun.

Lack of funds were most commonly cited as the primary barrier to full shelter recovery. However, those who have already completed repairs or reconstruction ranked lack of access to materials as a close second. This is likely partly due to a disconnect between the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) and provision of assistance mentioned above and inflated prices of materials at local markets compared to those estimated by the GRM. Finally, it should be noted that there are particular populations that have higher remaining needs than the general population. Among them are households with a higher number of vulnerable individuals (elderly, disabled, chronically ill).[6]

[5] Based on projection of assessment findings on the final housing damage assessment figures as per MoPWH.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Standardize response monitoring. While certain caseloads were closely monitored, agreement amongst Shelter Cluster partners on the regular tracking of the usage of cash and other assistance items across common caseloads will allow for closer examination of the effectiveness of responses. This information gathering should commence as soon as possible after distribution to use findings to refine the ongoing provision of aid. Findings should be shared widely to allow learning exchange.

Standardize response communication. There was considerable confusion amongst households regarding damage categorisation, it is therefore important to clarify the results of the damage assessment early on, because this will prevent future conflict about what level of assistance is deserved by households. This also applies to the intended use of assistance, such as qualified cash like Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance (TSCA). Householders need additional clarification on why and how the use of these types of cash assistance are restricted. If this is not done, the assistance should be called what it really is, unqualified cash assistance. Better communication around the status of GRM applications may help ensure that households are aware that they are permitted to go ahead and procure materials, should they have the resources to do so.

Include socioeconomic status across all damage assessments and subsequent activities. This would enable consistent consideration of socioeconomic vulnerabilities in targeting of assistance and facilitate tracking of recovery depending on socioeconomic status, during subsequent monitoring.

Funding should prioritise projects implementing vulnerability criteria rather than equitable geopolitical distribution. In particular, focus should be on providing assistance to households with vulnerable individuals and those who have not received any assistance so far. These households have the biggest gaps in terms of outstanding repairs and reconstruction, and assistance is proven to help fill those gaps.

Answer particular questions raised by this assessment through further in-house qualitative research. Shelter Cluster members should hold KIIs and FGDs with relevant stakeholders to address information gaps identified during this assessment:

- The challenges faced by households when purchasing materials once their GRM application has been approved.
- The households whose homes were completely destroyed that report rubble remaining on site. Some may be intentionally saving the rubble to sell later but those who would like to demolish and clear their land and face barriers in doing so, may need assistance now that the United Nations Development Programme has ended its demolition and clearing project.
- The nearly two-thirds of displaced households that claim to be living in rented housing. It is unclear whether this rental stock is even available in Gaza, so assessing the workings of the rental market could help untangle what these arrangements entail.[7]
- The households that received a combination of assistance forms that seem to conflict, such as a caravan or t-shelter along with TSCA. Though this represents a very small proportion of beneficiaries, research into their outcomes could provide insight into unique ways householders find uses for assistance, and whether or not this benefits them.
- Uses of cash assistance and whether an increase in levels of cash provided – as often called for by respondents in this assessment – would indeed result in better shelter recovery.

Fill broad information gaps on the technical needs of householders through further quantitative research. Ongoing data collection to track and analyse outcomes needs to be strengthened, as the currently available data is

[6] Several other household characteristics may correlate with needs (e.g. female headed households) but unfortunately proportionally smaller groups such as female headed households necessarily represent a smaller portion of the overall sample and as such a sample size that is too small to disaggregate further with statistical precision.

[7] Families may report living in rented housing where they have moved in with host families, who they support with the TSCA received.

growing outdated. All implementing partners should do this on an ongoing basis, with lots of time focused on questionnaire development. In particular, there is a need for further understanding of how the larger context, including the blockade and unemployment, impacts shelter recovery, because these factors lead to full recovery, not assistance. Additional inter-cluster assessments would help identify gaps between clusters, and could identify hardship cases for greater targeting of vulnerable households. Some of this can be done through further analysis of the dataset generated in this assessment.

ACRONYMS

BoQ	Bill of Quantities
DNA	Detailed Needs Assessment
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
GoI	Government of Israel
GoP	Government of Palestine
GRM	Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism[8]
GRRG	Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Group[9]
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan (new SRP)
IDP	Internally Displaced Population
NORG	National Office for the Reconstruction of Gaza
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
MoPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SC	Shelter Cluster Palestine
SRP	Strategic Response Plan (former HRP)
TDS	Transitional Displacement Sites
TSCA	Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance
TWIG	Technical Working Group
UDOC	Urban Displacement Out of Camp
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOSAT	United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

[8] For further information on the GRM, refer to http://www.unsco.org/ and http://grm.report/#/

[9] The GRRG is a multi-agency platform formed under the Palestine UN Country Team in September 2015 that has two functions. One is to improve coordination and information exchange between agencies on the reconstruction of infrastructure (housing, water, energy, sanitation) livelihoods and economy, social protection, social development (health, education and culture) and governance. The other function is to strengthen the Palestinian Authority institutions to take the lead of the reconstruction. While collaborating closely with the humanitarian interventions, the purpose is to move as fast as possible towards a developmental approach.

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INTRODUCTION

In July and August 2014, Gaza witnessed the most destructive escalation of hostilities since 1967. Fifty-one days of hostilities resulted in an unprecedented scale of destruction, devastation and displacement. At the height of the escalation of hostilities, almost 500,000 people were internally displaced, staying predominantly in schools, both run by the government and by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and in informal shelters.

Concentrations of damage to buildings and infrastructure were found overwhelmingly along the Armistice Line with 74% of destruction within 3 kilometres of the line, according to UNOSAT analysis.[10] Significant damaged buildings located more than 3 kilometres from the line were also identified, with more than 5,900 shelters destroyed or damaged. The UNOSAT analysis indicated that multiple districts such as Shejaiya and Beit Hanon, were almost completely razed with the vast majority of structures, public buildings, residential units and businesses completely destroyed.

Significant damage to housing and infrastructure as a result of the escalation of hostilities, combined with almost ten years of blockade and three major escalations of hostilities over the past six years, caused large-scale destruction to Gaza's economy and productive assets. In March 2013, Gaza was already facing a housing shortage of around 75,000 homes[11].

The detailed housing damage assessment was carried-out between September 2014 and January 2015, by the Ministry of Public Work and Housing (MoPWH) with the support of UNDP for the non-refugee caseload, and by UNRWA for the refugee caseload. The final housing damage figures counted 11,000 totally destroyed housing units, 6,800 with severe damage, 5,700 with major damage and 147,500 with minor damage. Of these, a total of 17,800 housing units (totally destroyed and severely damaged) were estimated to be uninhabitable.

Figure 1: Final Housing Unit Damage Assessment Figures



Shelter remained a key humanitarian concern throughout the response due to the high levels of damage, the unprecedented number of families displaced, restriction on the import of construction materials and limited funding. To overcome the challenges of material restrictions, the Government of Palestine (GOP) and the Government of Israel (GoI) agreed on the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM)[12] in September 2014. The agreement allowed for the controlled entry of restricted construction materials based on the Bills of Quantities (BOQ) generated from the housing damage assessment mentioned above.[13] The reconstruction was delayed by the slow pace in establishing an agreement for entry of materials for the totally destroyed houses and the large amount of materials required. At the

[10] Impact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip – UNOSAT Satellite Derived Geospatial Analysis, UNOSAT 2014.
[11] NRC, *Overview of the Housing Situation in the Gaza Strip,* NRC, March 2013.
[12] Further information http://www.unsco.org/ and http://grm.report/#/
[13] Materials for the reconstruction of totally destroyed units were based on square meters of damaged area

same time, a lack of follow through on donor pledges from the Cairo conference – which stood at only 40% in March 2016 – slowed the pace of the reconstruction and resulted in an increased need for humanitarian assistance.

Map 1: Overall Damage Assessment Map – UNOSAT September 2014[14]

The building and infrastructure damages described here refer to all types of buildings: residential, private and public.



Initially all affected families were targeted with NFIs, whether in collective centres or host families. As such, all damage categories received this assistance. Minor damage was classified as repair cost of less than USD 5,000, such as damage to windows and doors and small holes in external walls. Major damage was repairs of more than USD 5,000 but where some parts were still habitable. Both these categories were targeted with winterization or sealing off kits in order to avoid re-displacement as winter approached. Severe damage resulted the house being rendered un-inhabitable, due to structural damage or destruction of WASH facilities. Totally destroyed units were beyond repair units and required demolition and reconstruction. As those with severe or total damage were displaced, they were targeted with temporary solutions such as TSCA or caravans, while those residing with host families, sheltering in damaged buildings or makeshift shelters were also provided with winterization assistance or sealing off kits. Where damage resulted in loss of goods, a cash grant aimed to restore key items. Material restrictions allowing, those suffering direct damage to their buildings (minor/major/severe) were targeted with cash for repairs and those with totally destroyed buildings with cash for reconstruction to facilitate recovery and return.[15]

In the past two years, donors and aid actors have made significant efforts to provide humanitarian shelter assistance to the affected population in Gaza, although a number of challenges, gaps and blockages remained. While repairs and reconstruction progressed, the implementation of durable solutions was slow notably due to issues related to the import of construction materials and limited funding.

In November 2016, the Shelter Cluster reported that out of the 147,500 housing units with minor damage, 79,926 were repaired and out of the 11,000 totally destroyed housing units, only 2,167 were reconstructed. Two years and two months since the cease-fire, about 61%[16] of households who endured minor or major housing damage had received cash for repairs, with some also benefiting from technical support; while, 67%[17] of households under the severe and totally damage category, most likely those displaced due to the uninhabitability of their housing, had received similar assistance to repair or reconstruct their property. Many of the IDPs still required temporary shelter assistance and the housing shortage in Gaza left the temporarily displaced population with very limited options.

Figure 2: Housing Repaired or Reconstructed by November 2016 (Shelter Cluster Estimates)[18]

	# Housing Units	Completed[19]	In Progress	Remaining Funded	Gap
Totally destroyed	**11,000**	2,167	3,002	1,839	3,992
Severe damage	**6,800**	5,463	1,224	110	3
Major damage	**5,700**	966	1,775	500	2,459
Minor damage:	**147,500**	79,926	11,232	0	56,342
Total:	**171,000**	**88,522**	**17,233**	**2,449**	**62,796**

To coincide with preparations for the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), the coordinators of the humanitarian shelter response, Shelter Cluster Palestine and local authorities, requested the Global Shelter Cluster and REACH to lead a review and evaluation of the progress in the shelter response since the 2014 hostilities, key findings of which are presented in this report. It aimed to assess the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the response, establish best practices, identify residual response gaps and draw lessons learned and recommendations. To carry out this evaluation, key objectives were formulated and a methodology was agreed upon.

[15] Please see Annex 3 for full Shelter Cluster assistance table
[16] Calculated from combining the assistance provided for minor and major damage using the data from Shelter Cluster Factsheet – November 2016: http://www.shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/3fb32cd2-1f85-4170-a7be-7393cc30ee3b.pdf
[17] Calculated from combining the assistance provided for severe and total damage using the data from Shelter Cluster Factsheet – November 2016: http://www.shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/3fb32cd2-1f85-4170-a7be-7393cc30ee3b.pdf
[18] Shelter Cluster Factsheet – November 2016: http://www.shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/3fb32cd2-1f85-4170-a7be-7393cc30ee3b.pdf
[19] According to the Shelter Cluster Factsheet August 2016, "*completed* is defined as a unit repaired or reconstructed"

METHODOLOGY[20]

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this evaluation was to measure the outcomes of the provision of emergency, temporary and durable shelter assistance in response to the 2014 Gaza escalation of hostilities, to better understand the key achievements, best practices, critical gaps and challenges, and to draw out lessons learned and recommendations.

The evaluation process was divided into two phases: (1) a qualitative participatory evaluation through a secondary data review, a lessons learned workshop, an online survey and purposively sampled semi-structured key informant interviews; (2) a quantitative evaluation through statistically significant primary data collection at household level.

This report is the result of the second phase of this evaluation. This quantitative detailed household level data collection has been informed by the outcomes and recommendations of the qualitative participatory evaluation that took place in August 2016

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & QUESTIONS

Based on the second phase described above, this evaluation sought to address the following research objective and questions, as defined and agreed by the Shelter Cluster Palestine and its members:

Objective: Evaluate the outcomes of different types of shelter assistance delivered to affected population following 2014 escalation of hostilities in Gaza.

Questions:

1. To what extent **was each approach appropriate** to meet beneficiaries' shelter and NFIs needs?
2. To what extent **was each approach cost-effective in aiding household recovery and/or return of the IDP population affected by the escalation of hostilities** as per Shelter Cluster response objectives?
3. To what extent **are response gaps and residual shelter needs, at household level, related to the 2014 escalation of hostilities, still present in Gaza?**

DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS 2014 ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES

To conduct this second phase of the evaluation, quantitative primary data collection was undertaken. This was conducted in Gaza through a household level data collection and field visits, which was analysed in conjunction with secondary data from the MoPWH.

Secondary Data

In addition to contact information, the MoPWH data extraction process yielded important secondary data points on each household, such as re-housing status, family size and cost of repairs or reconstruction. These indicators were used in data analysis. Additional internal data from Shelter Cluster partners on the amount of assistance provided was used to test the veracity of survey results.

Sampling

A 95/6 random sample was drawn, stratified by damage categories. This sample was accessed in-person from the Ministry of Public Works and Housing's registry of damaged and destroyed housing. These data were originally sourced from UNRWA and UNDP field assessments, with subsequent updates by NGOs and UN offices working in the area.

[20] Please find full Terms of Reference in the Annex.

In order to develop findings generalizable for each damage response category with a 95% level of confidence and confidence interval of +/-6%, a total of 1,195 household interviews were planned. This included a 15% buffer for respondent non-response (due to refusal, inability to contact, etc.). The sampling strategy agreed with the Shelter Cluster based on available resource and time constraints, prioritised stratification by damage category and as such did not in addition include stratification by governorate. However, some indicative findings related to location can still be generated, which would require further research to be confirmed.

The sample buffer of 15% that was included to mitigate against expected non-response rate was found to be slightly below what would have been needed to achieve the target confidence interval (+/-6%) for two of the strata, while enabling a slightly higher precision than planned for two strata.

The table below outlines the actual number of interviews that were achieved and the resulting widening of the target interval from +/-6% to +/-6.26% (Major damage) and +/-6.27% (Minor damage). In practical terms this means that where a finding of a variable is 50% in the sample amongst Minor damage households (the group with the widest interval), we can be 95% confident that the finding amongst Minor damage households in the population overall is between 43.63% and 56.27% - as opposed to between 44% and 56% should the target interval of +/-6% have been reached.[21]

Figure 3: Estimated and Actual Sample Size by reported Damage Category

Damage Category	Intended # of HH Interviews (including 15% buffer)	Actual # of HH Interviews	Actual Confidence Interval at 95% Confidence
Complete Destruction	299	266	+/-5.94%
Severe Damage	296	292	+/-5.61%
Major Damage	294	235	+/-6.26%
Minor Damage	306	244	+/-6.27%
Total # of HH interviews	**1195**	**1037**	

Data Collection Tool[22]

A list of potential indicators was developed based on topics of interest that arose in Phase I of this assessment. This list was shared with Shelter Cluster staff for prioritization. Survey questions were developed based on this list, along with reference to shelter assessment best practices. These survey questions were vetted by Shelter Cluster staff and member organizations, and their suggestions were integrated into the final data collection tool.

Arabic translation and XML coding were performed by remote deployment team members based in Amman, Jordan. Minor improvements were made to the tool after the second day of data collection in order to improve the ability to merge responses with secondary data.

Deployment Preparations, Logistics, Human Resources and Training

Shelter Cluster staff and member organizations performed coordination with key stakeholders in Gaza in the month prior to data collection, including acquisition of equipment and vehicles and identification of potential field staff.

Field data collection was conducted by 55 enumerators (including five team leaders) that were recommended by OCHA due to their high performance on a prior data collection exercise. They were managed by the REACH Assessment

[21] For further information please find the full Terms of Reference in the Annex.
[22] Please find the data collection tool in the Annex.

Officer, with HR and logistical support provided by ACTED and NRC, as Shelter Cluster member organizations. Data collection occurred between 7 and 19 December 2016.

All field staff participated in a half-day training to gain proficiency in interview techniques, the specific questionnaire and tablet application operations. Team Leaders were also trained on survey scheduling and quality assurance. Because of the robust assessment experience of these staff, most of this training was a review of prior knowledge.

Data Cleaning and Analysis

All data was collected on KoBo Collect Android software, then uploaded to a remote server at the end of each day, allowing for daily review and spot checking. Feedback was sent to each team leader every morning and team leaders also completed daily quality assurance to ensure enumerator reliability.

Primary data was merged with secondary data from the MoPWH database. Two repetitive entries were removed, as it was identified that the same households were interviewed twice.

Initial findings were presented to the Shelter Cluster's Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). Their input helped guide later analysis.

LIMITATIONS

The data collection teams and supporting agencies functioned well under sometimes difficult circumstances, largely minimizing the impact of these challenges. However, some of the following issues did affect the findings.

Security restrictions in Gaza created a number of logistical challenges, including shortened work days and a requirement to double up enumerators on each questionnaire. This contributed to the lower number of completed interviews. Additionally, the inability to collect GPS data at some locations during this assessment severely restricted opportunities for spatial analysis. However, the most severe challenge faced by the assessment team in achieving the target number of interviews, was a higher than expected non-response rate. Because more than two years had passed since the escalation of hostilities at the time of data collection, many of the phone numbers in the database were no longer in use. Other respondents had moved to other Governorates; out of Gaza; or refused to participate in the survey.

Approximately 41% of households provided responses that contradicted official records regarding the categorization of the damage or destruction of their shelter. This may in part be due to differences in perception of damage category definitions amongst households and the assessors conducting the final damage assessment, as the majority of these non-matching responses stated that the damage was worse than that established by MoPWH. However, nearly a quarter stated that they sustained *less* damage than what is documented in the official records. . To correct this, definitive MoPWH categorization was used wherever possible, which covered 70% of the questionnaires.[23] However, this mixing may dull the clarity of certain findings, especially when comparing differences between damage categories.

[23] Where findings in this report are disaggregated by damage category this is in the first instance (70% of cases) based on the MoPWH finial damage assessment categorisation. The final damage assessment category reported by the household at the time of the assessment is used in the remaining cases i.e. where a household could not be matched with the MoPWH database.

KEY FINDINGS ON OUTCOME OF THE GAZA 2014 SHELTER RESPONSE

This report is structured into three primary sections, revolving around the research questions. These include: the shift in shelter conditions from immediately after the war until now, the assistance that has been given and how it has been used, and the various impacts of these different forms of assistance.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The assessed population was spread across all five governorates, with 30% in Gaza, 22% in Khan Younis, 20% in North Gaza, 16% in Middle, and 12% in Rafah. As explained in the Methodology, findings from this sample cannot be stratified by geography.[24]

Most households (88-92%)[25] were headed by men. Women heads of households were typically older, with an average age of 52-56, compared to 43-48 for men heads of households. Family sizes (as reported by the MoPWH database) averaged at seven people per family, and ranged between one person and 20 people. Households with refugee status made up 73% of the population.

Heads of households held a mix of educational levels, with 30-38% having completed primary school, 34-42% secondary school, 18-27% university and a negligible amount having completed advanced degrees. Most reported being unemployed (54-56%), while 25-30% reported full time employment and 13-18% reported some form of part-time employment. At list a fifth across all damage categories (19-28%) reported that someone under the age of 18 in the household was working at the time of the assessment.

SHIFT IN SHELTER CONDITIONS

This section summarizes the condition of shelters immediately after the war, their current condition and the beneficiary profiles that need the most attention moving forward.

Situation after the crisis

In the aftermath of the 2014 escalation of hostilities, MoPWH counted a total of 171,000 damaged or destroyed housing units. Of these, 11,000 were totally destroyed, 6,800 severely damaged, 5,700 with major damage and 147,500 with minor damage.

In general, the type of housing stock that was damaged was evenly split between houses (52%) and apartments (48%). Shelters with complete destruction were slightly more likely to be single unit houses (56%), while shelters with minor damage were slightly more likely to be apartments (53%).

Most shelters were owned by the household (89%-93%), with the remainder living in rented homes or homes owned by extended family. Shelters were reported to be primarily located and legally registered on private land (86%-93%).. A small portion of homes, primarily those with minor damage, were in refugee camps (10%).

There was a relationship between location of apartments on the ground floor of a building and less intense damage categorization. Apartments sustaining minor damage were located on the ground floor 36% of the time, severely or moderately damaged apartments 30% of the time, while completely destroyed units were on the ground floor only 22% of the time.

[24] The full data set is available for further analysis.
[25] Ranges reported throughout are generally referring to the 4 damage categories that were used to stratify the sample, unless otherwise specified.

Current situation

Figure 4: Housing Reconstructed, by reported Level of Damage



According to assessment findings, over half of households that reported having shelters that only require repairs have completed these already (53%-66%), but less than a third of those requiring complete reconstruction reported having done so (30%). The completely destroyed category had the most shelters remaining to be rebuilt (35%), compared to households still remaining for repairs (24%-29%).

These completion estimates for severe and major damage differ considerably from those of the Shelter Cluster's internal tracking. This tracking, which comes from reports by Cluster members on project progress, showed that, as of November, 80% of severely damaged shelters were completely repaired, while only 17% of shelters with major damage had achieved completion. Estimates for repairs of completely destroyed and minor damaged shelters were more closely aligned, at 20% and 54%, respectively. A comparison of estimates is further outlined in the below graphs.

Figure 5: Housing Reconstructed, by reported Level of Damage, Compared with Shelter Cluster Estimates



Overall, these findings on repairs and reconstruction indicate a higher completion and in-progress rate than the internal Shelter Cluster estimates (Figure 2: Housing Repaired or Reconstructed by November 2016 (Shelter Cluster Estimates)**, with 20% more housing reported completed, 28% more housing reported in progress and 35% less housing reported remaining. This likely partly due to self-recovery, as Shelter Cluster members have no mechanism for tracking personally-funded home repairs**. Other potential factors include the normalization of living in damaged shelters after two years and false-positive damage categorization (in which undamaged households received a damage categorization, thus requiring no repair in order to return to normal).[26]

Further underlying reasons for the difference in estimations that should be noted include; the addition of the Severely damaged category which had not been in use following previous escalations of hostilities, which meant that households sometimes self-reported as "Major damage" where SC had categorized them as "Severely damaged", this may explain the inverse relationship seen between the two categories when comparing SC and the present assessment findings. Secondly, Shelter Cluster monitoring is conducted using different methodologies depending on level of damage and level of assistance and does not capture private sector assistance, thereby limiting comparability of data with this assessment.[27]

Vulnerable Populations

In all settings, there are groups of vulnerable individuals who may require special consideration for their particular needs. The individual household member vulnerability characteristics captured in this assessment were old age, chronic illness and disabilities.

Figure 6: Proportion of HHs That Have Completed Repairs/Reconstruction, by Number of Vulnerable Individuals in HH (elderly, chronically ill, disabled)[28]



Households with higher number of vulnerable individuals (elderly, chronically ill, disabled) have not been recovering as quickly as those without these individuals in the home. This relationship is strongly correlated, explaining more than 90% of the variance in repairs and reconstruction completion in the sample. This is despite the

[26] Shelter Cluster partners expressed fears that families that have reconstructed and repaired their homes by taking loans may have accumulated unsustainable levels of debt as a result. Additional findings on self-recovery can be found in the section Self-Recovery below.
[27] According to the Shelter Cluster Monthly Report, October 2016, "the monitoring of repairs is carried out differently depending on the level of damage and amount of cash assistance," and "the Shelter Cluster does not report on private sector activities but only on the assistance provided by actors involved in the Shelter Cluster." As such, these statistics only track the completion of repairs when it is through a project funded by a Shelter Cluster member, and even then the monitoring varies in methodology and reliability
[28] Vulnerable individuals captured through this assessment included elderly, disabled and chronically ill.

fact that that these households overall suffered slightly less damage to their shelters than those without vulnerable individuals, and that they received assistance at the same rate as other households.

No significant difference in recovery rate could be detected with this sample between specific household characteristics, including refugee status, gender of head of household, education level of head of household, employment status of head of household and employment of minors in the household.[29]

ASSISTANCE AND ITS USE

This section describes what was received by households and how this did or did not impact the reconstruction of their homes.

Type and method of assistance provision

Most households have received some form of assistance (62%-85%). It should be noted that data collection staff reported that some of those households claiming to have received no assistance likely had received aid, but do not wish to report it, for a variety of reasons.

Figure 7: Proportion of Households by reported Types of Assistance received



Households with completely destroyed shelters were the most likely to have received Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance (TSCA), vouchers and NFIs, all of which is reasonable considering response intentions.[30] Non-TSCA cash was provided similarly across all categories, which aligns with discussions from Phase I of this assessment; sealing materials was most received by households with severe or major damage, which also makes sense, as they had enough damage to require sealing, without necessarily needing to demolish and rebuild.[31] Findings were not significant for other types of assistance, including t-shelters, accommodation with host families, caravans and summarization/winterization, as well as for trainings or technical assistance.

[29] Several other household characteristics may correlate with needs (e.g. female headed households) but unfortunately proportionally smaller groups such as female headed households necessarily represent a smaller portion of the overall sample and as such a sample size that is too small to disaggregate further with statistical precision.
[30] Please see Annex 3 for a full list of shelter assistance types.
[31] Sealant reported to have been received by households whose shelters were reported to have bene completely destroyed, may have been used for their current shelter.

Households that completed repairs or were currently in progress with them were more likely to have received cash/TSCA or vouchers than those that had not performed any repairs. No significant difference in repair status could be detected with this sample amongst those that received NFIs.

It is important to note that data collection staff reported that difference between TSCA and unqualified cash assistance was largely indistinguishable for respondents. Households with completely destroyed shelters should for instance, generally all have received TSCA.[32] However, a surprisingly high proportion of these households reported not to have received TSCA (44%) at the time of this assessment. Though it is possible that some did not receive TSCA, it seems unlikely that this would be the case for close to a half of these households. Some of the discrepancy may be explained by respondent error or manipulation, but the remainder is likely due to the confusion between TSCA and cash. **As such, TSCA and cash have been merged in some of the subsequent analysis.**

Cash assistance was primarily provided by international NGOs (89%-97%), as was TSCA (71%-93%, with the remainder mostly provided by local NGOs or charities). NFIs were mostly provided by international NGOs as well (67%-85%), while vouchers were provided by a mix of international NGOs (39%- 79%) and local NGOs or charities (18%-61%). The proportion of households reporting assistance from relatives and friends or local governments was statistically insignificant.

Figure 8: Agreement with the Appropriateness of Fit for Each Type of Assistance



A few variations can be seen in the appropriateness of fit of each type of assistance, as rated by householders.

Overall, households with completely destroyed houses were most likely to rate any type of shelter assistance as appropriate for their needs, while those with minor damage were the least likely to rate any assistance appropriate, perhaps reflecting that non-shelter types of assistance are priorities where shelter needs are mostly met**.** This relationship was strongest for cash, TSCA and sealing materials.

Cash was seen as the 'least appropriate' type of shelter assistance, which in this case is likely related to numerous complaints that cash assistance was not enough to cover all needs. Shelter Cluster partners felt that beneficiary households often expected assistance to cover not only reconstruction and repair of homes but also replacement or repair of damaged furniture and belongings. Evidence that cash was in fact appreciated by beneficiaries was provided by the overwhelming majority of households that reported cash as their 'most preferred' type of assistance. Hence it seems likely that it was the level of cash, as opposed to the modality overall, that was seen as less appropriate.

[32] Except for specific cases where a household was deemed ineligible for a particular reason, such as access to an alternative shelter; having left Gaza; having already been assisted with an alternative shelter solution.

Figure 9: Most Preferred Type of Assistance, by reported Damage Category[33]



Despite the lower ranking in terms of perceived appropriateness, cash was still highly preferred over other types of assistance, with 78%-85% of households expressing interest in it. Households with minor damage most commonly expressed interest in sealing materials, summarization/winterization and t-shelters. Neither caravans nor accommodation with host families garnered significant interest from households with any level of damage.

Preferences for certain types of assistance do not dramatically change depending on the current state of the damaged house, except that those who have demolished but not rebuilt their shelters are less interested in sealing materials, which is quite logical.

Use of cash assistance

As the high preference for it belies, cash has served a major role in shelter recovery in the midst of Gaza's unique economic situation.

Figure 10: Proportion of Households Receiving Some Form of Cash Assistance by reported Damage Level



[33] It may be the case that sealing materials received by households that reported having had their home totally destroyed, were in fact used to strengthen their temporary accommodation.

Most households received some form of cash assistance (this includes both TSCA and general cash assistance), especially those with completely destroyed (78%) or severely damaged shelters (73%).

Figure 11: Proportion of Cash Assistance Spent on Key Items by reported Damage Level



Cash assistance was primarily used for construction materials (64%-73%), followed by NFIs (8%-16%) and tools (7%-10%). Other items included education, food, transport and savings (8%-13%), but no single category garnered statistically significant responses. Rent was not listed as a distinct option, but an option of "Other" was available, which was not selected by a statistically significant number of respondents.

Additionally, cash was the only type of assistance correlated with an increased level of satisfaction with the conditions of current housing. On average, respondents rated their current level of satisfaction at 3.03 on a scale from 1 to 5 (very unsatisfied, unsatisfied, neutral, satisfied and very satisfied). Those who received cash had an average score of 3.18, and those who did not, had an average score of 2.76. Although these changes are subtle, they represent a 25% deviation from the norm compared to all answers. While this only represents correlation, not causation, receipt of cash is significantly related to higher satisfaction with current housing conditions.

Relationship between assistance and shelter conditions

Figure 12: Proportion of Households Currently Living in Their Pre-2014 Shelter by reported Damage Level



Except those shelters that were completely destroyed, most households are living in the same house that they were in before 2014 (83%-96%). This includes a mix of households that were never displaced, and those who were displaced and have since returned to their original shelter. Only one-third of those whose shelters were completely destroyed are living in them again. Though some of these shelters have been completely rebuilt, 13% of these households that have remained in or returned to completely destroyed shelters are living in homes that have yet not been completely rebuilt.

Figure 13: Current Housing of Displaced HHs with Completely Destroyed Shelters



Of the 67% of households with completely destroyed shelters that are displaced, most are in rental housing (68%). This seems to hold true for households with other damage categories, but the low number of displaced households means that these findings are not statistically significant. There is some question whether this rental stock is even available in Gaza. It may be possible that many people have a different definition of rental housing, or that some sort of informal renting is taking place. Shelter Cluster partners reported that families often used the cash they received to support themselves and their host families, an arrangement that may have been interpreted in some cases as 'rent'.

Timing

In the lessons learned workshop, the issue of timing was raised by a number of stakeholders. This included delays in assistance provision, and in the transition from emergency response to durable solutions.

Figure 14: Average Number of Months after Damage Assistance Was Provided by reported Damage Level[34]



On average, vouchers were provided most quickly after housing destruction, followed by NFIs and. Cash and sealing materials took the longest to arrive. Overall, households with completely destroyed or minor damage received assistance faster, after 10 months, while those with major and severe damage received it after 12 months. However, completely destroyed households had a wide range, with vouchers and NFIs arriving much quicker than cash and sealing materials.

Figure 15: Number of Months after Damage Assistance Was Provided, by Percentage of Responses per Time Period



[34] As noted above, beneficiaries did not always distinguish between TSCA and other cash assistance.

Looking in more detail at the timing, we see that beneficiaries reported a wide range of when assistance was received. Vouchers and NFIs both took off early, one month after damage, and crested at six months, when 30% and 29% received them, respectively. TSCA began in force at two months, then peaked sharply at 6 months, when 40% received it. Cash and sealing materials both really began at 6 months, with sealing material peaking at 12 months at 44%, and cash continuing to grow its peak of 36% at 24 months. It is possible that some beneficiaries only responded regarding the most recently time they received a type of assistance. Some things, such as sealing materials, have been distributed every year, so the true distribution for timing of assistance may in fact be earlier.

Communication with Affected Population

Communicating was heralded in Phase I of this assessment as a clear success in the recovery process. However, Phase II raised issues regarding the level of communication that occurred with beneficiaries about the results of their damage assessments.

Figure 16: Communication Method for Receiving Damage Assessment Results



The results from damage assessments was primarily communicated by SMS across all damage categories (46%-54%) and phone call (25%-32%). Unofficial results were sometimes given in-person by the assessors themselves, though this categorization was not always definitive and may have caused some of the confusion regarding the final assessment results.

Figure 17: Level of Satisfaction with Damage Assessment Results by reported Damage Level



Households were divided on their satisfaction with results of the damage assessment. Households with shelters categorized as completely destroyed were the only ones more likely to be satisfied (59%), with the level reducing as the categorization became lower.

The primary reported reason for dissatisfaction with damage assessment results was that the amount of assistance provided for that damage category was not enough to cover the necessary repairs for restoring the shelter to its previous condition. Strictly understood, this is not actually a complaint against the damage assessment, but instead against the amount of assistance. However, this reflects the clear understanding householders have of the importance of the damage assessment in determining subsequent assistance.

Though poor communication with beneficiaries is not the expressed issue regarding damage assessments, improved communication may have reduced the confusion and conflict regarding assessment results.

Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism: Factors Leading to Non-completion

As the primary method for acquiring concrete, rebar and other construction materials, the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) is a critical access point, and potential bottleneck, for shelter reconstruction. Examination of progress made in navigating the system, and on specific barriers dealt with along the way, are critical for understanding the process of rebuilding shelters in Gaza.

It is important to note that the damage category declared by beneficiaries during this assessment was often found not to correspond with the category recorded on the GRM system. In 70% of cases the assessed household could be matched with the GRM database and the GRM damage category was thus used throughout the analysis. However, in the remaining cases, where matching was not possible, the damage category reported by the household was used. This discrepancy requires further research and the findings outlined here should be considered as indicative, not definitive.

Figure 18: Proportion of Households Applying to the GRM, by reported Damage Category



Between 52% and 79% of households applied to the GRM. This may be an undercount, especially for those with completely destroyed shelters, as many households were automatically enrolled in the GRM as part of their repair or reconstruction assistance. It is unclear if the discrepancy seen here is due to respondent error or to a genuine failure to enrol these households in the GRM.

Figure 19: Proportion of HHs Receiving Materials through the GRM, of Those Who Applied, by reported Damage Category



Of those households who applied to the GRM, over half did not manage to access the full amount of requested materials (52%-77%). This is most clearly seen in those with completely destroyed shelters, who accessed the full amount only 23% of the time. Of those who did not access the full amount, roughly half obtained some materials and half obtained no materials at all.

Figure 20: Percentage of HHs Experiencing Challenges in Being Allocated GRM Materials, by reported Damage Category



Delays were the primary challenge regarding allocation of GRM materials, particularly in being approved in the system (33%-58%) and in and in being able to purchase materials from vendors (30%-41%). Other top issues included receiving inadequate materials (19%-36%) and MoPWH voucher delays (16%-33%). Only a small proportion reported no challenges in obtaining these construction items (10%-20%). Households with the lowest level of damage reported the least amount of challenges.

Households that were allocated materials through the GRM but did not make the purchases give a variety of reasons for this. The most common reason related to inadequate funds for materials or subsequent repairs, followed by disagreements on quantities and accessing restricted materials elsewhere. Households with minor damage were more likely to have already completed repairs, indicating that they likely accessed materials from other sources. A small number of households reported other reasons, including family problems, legal conflicts and the decision not to reconstruct.

Figure 21: Proportion Purchasing Allocated Building Material through the GRM, by Reception of Assistance



Those households who received any type of shelter assistance were more likely to have applied for materials through the GRM (62%) compared to those with no assistance (53%). However, more than a third (35%) had not yet purchased materials, while only 11% of those without assistance had purchases pending. Shelter actors expressed concerns that many households may be unaware that their applications have been approved and that they can go ahead and make their purchases.

IMPACTS OF ASSISTANCE

This section is intended to understand the impacts of the assistance and to identify the best approach to maximize it.

Figure 22: State of Pre-2014 Shelter, by Receipt of Assistance



Those who received assistance are more likely to have made progress on both starting and completing shelter repairs. Thirty-four percent of those who received no assistance have shelters that are still damaged and not repaired, compared with 20% of those who received something, and only 8% are working on repairs now, compared with 15% of those receiving assistance.

Across all damage categories, householders were more likely to consider their current housing conditions to be good or very good (65%) over poor or very poor (35%). No significant differences could be detected with this sample, between households from different damage categories or types of assistance.[35]

Figure 23: Condition of Current Housing for Non-Displaced Households, by State of Repairs



As to be expected, those who have made more progress towards completing repair or reconstruction see the current condition of the home to be better. This does not include the 24% of households who are currently displaced to other housing, though this pattern seems to apply to them as well.

[35] The sample was designed to allow one disaggregation within each damage category, hence the sample becomes too small to draw statistically significant conclusions when disaggregating by damage category, assistance type and condition of current house at the same time.

Self-Recovery

Self-recovery is difficult to track, but accounts for at least some proportion of the 20% difference in repair completion estimates between this assessment and the Shelter Cluster figures noted above. A number of factors contribute to self-recovery, including the ability to afford and find construction materials and to physically conduct repairs.

Figure 24: Proportion of Households Using Financial Coping Skills by reported Damage Level



In order to cope with shelter damage or destruction, most households borrowed money from family members (64%-80%), while a small percentage sold belongings (14%-22%) or acquired formal loans (8%-12%). Others acquired loans from informal sources or sought additional employment. A portion reported doing nothing (11%-30%). Because some families utilized multiple financial coping skills, totals are above 100%.

Figure 25: Proportion of Households Using Construction Materials Recovered from their Shelter by reported Damage level



Most households did not use any construction materials recovered from their damaged or destroyed house. Those who did primarily used concrete, rebar or bricks. Totals are above 100% because some households recovered multiple types of materials.

Figure 26: Personal Money Spent on Shelter Materials by reported Damage Level[36]



The amount of personal money spent on shelter materials varied widely across damage categories (8,244 NIS-34,380 NIS). This does not include funds or materials provided by government, NGOs or other outside entities. In addition, shelter cluster partners reported that households frequently considered replacement and repair of furniture or other belongings as part of shelter expenditures. **These figures should be used for comparison between damage categories, rather than as empirical fact, as enumerators expressed doubt as to the veracity of many of these responses and these data required heavy cleaning.**

Figure 27: Proportion of Households Acquiring Building Materials at Local Markets by reported Damage Level



Most households with damaged shelters acquired building materials at local markets (75%-80%), while those with completely destroyed shelters utilized markets less (48%).

[36] This ma

Figure 28: Proportion of Reconstruction Performed by Different Actors by reported Damage Level



Repair and reconstruction work was primarily performed by contractors (71%-86%). Household members were more likely to have performed repair work if the overall level of damage to the shelter was lower. Those households that did have family members contributing labour had an average of two family members performing the work.

Barriers to Recovery

Figure 29: Primary Barriers to Full Shelter Recovery by reported Damage Level



Lack of funds was stated definitively as the primary barrier to full shelter recovery (70%-81%). This response clearly outranked that of lack of access to materials. This may be because construction materials are generally available at local markets, although at highly inflated prices due to supply restrictions. Similarily, GRM applications may have been approved and thus materials accessible to purchase, with the only barrier remaining being lack of financial resources. Households who had completed all repairs and reconstruction were more likely to state that access to materials was the biggest barrier (18%-25%) than those who are currently conducting or have not begun repairs (6%-17%). This may indicate that lack of access to materials is a larger barrier than indicated as those who have this experience have insight into the the full cycle of repair and reconstruction. A number of other potential answers to this question did not receive any statistically significant response, including fuel, labour, training, tools and an open-ended option to input other needs. Further analysis by state of current housing does not yield significant differences with this sample.

Figure 30: Proportion of Households Having Trouble Accessing Construction Materials in the Market, by Type



Most households reported trouble accessing concrete in local markets (78%), and many have trouble finding bricks, rebar and other items as well. Few stated that they have had no issues accessing any of these materials in the market (13%).

Response Gaps

Figure 31: Demolition Status of HHs with Completely Destroyed Shelters



Over a third of households with completely destroyed shelters reported rubble remaining on site (35%). The rubble removal project provided by the United Nations Development Programme has ended, so now if these households still want to clear the site of their destroyed shelter, they will have to pay for it themselves. Some may have intentionally chosen to not remove the rubble, in order to sell the rubble but further research is recommended to identify whether rubble remaining onsite presents a barrier for reconstruction.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

When asked where they would seek shelter in case of another emergency, respondents were often at a loss as to how to answer. One middle-aged male exemplified this by responding "*who knows where his legs will take him when fighting begins?*" When pressed, most households said that they would go to an UNRWA designated emergency shelter (58%) or the homes of family members (26%). But overall, the people of Gaza seemed to have staked their hopes on rebuilding and returning to normal, rather than renewed humanitarian crisis and continued displacement.

In the two years since the 2014 escalation of hostilities, donors and humanitarian actors have made significant efforts to provide humanitarian shelter assistance to the affected population in Gaza. **Three-quarters of households with damaged or destroyed shelters received assistance: primarily cash and/or TSCA, followed by vouchers, NFIs and sealing materials.** This assistance has helped more than half of households with damaged shelters to complete repairs, and almost a third of households with destroyed shelters to fully rebuild. **Overall, households that received assistance have made greater progress recovering than those that did not.**

Despite considerable progress in repair and reconstruction, remaining needs still exist. A quarter of households with damaged shelters have not initiated any repairs and over a third of households with completely destroyed shelters reported that reconstruction had not started at all. Households with a higher number of vulnerable individuals (elderly, disabled, chronically ill) were found more likely to have remaining shelter needs. Despite the successes made possible by humanitarian aid, the economic immobility of the territory has limited full recovery. Regardless of the assistance provided, shelter needs will persist until employment and export is again widely available in the Gaza Strip.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Standardize response monitoring. While certain caseloads were closely monitored, agreement amongst Shelter Cluster partners on the regular tracking of the usage of cash and other assistance items across common caseloads will allow for closer examination of the effectiveness of responses. This information gathering should commence as soon as possible after distribution in order to utilize findings to refine the ongoing provision of aid. Findings should be shared widely to allow learning exchange.

Standardize response communication. There was considerable confusion amongst households regarding damage categorisation, it is therefore important to clarify the results of the damage assessment early on, because this will prevent future conflict about what level of assistance is deserved by households.

This also applies to the intended use of assistance, such as qualified cash like Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance (TSCA). Householders need additional clarification on why and how the use of these types of cash assistance are restricted. If this is not done, the assistance should be called what it really is, unqualified cash assistance.

Better communication around the status of GRM applications may help ensure that households are aware that they are permitted to go ahead and procure materials, should they have the resources to do so.

Include socioeconomic status across all damage assessments and subsequent activities. This would enable consistent consideration of socioeconomic vulnerabilities in targeting of assistance and facilitate tracking of recovery depending on socioeconomic status, during subsequent monitoring.

Funding should prioritise projects implementing vulnerability criteria rather than equitable geopolitical distribution. In particular, focus should be on providing assistance to households with vulnerable individuals and those who have not received any assistance so far. These households have the biggest gaps in terms of outstanding repairs and reconstruction, and assistance is proven to help fill those gaps.

Answer particular questions raised by this assessment through further in-house qualitative research. Shelter Cluster members should hold KIIs and FGDs with relevant stakeholders to address information gaps identified during this assessment:

- The challenges faced by households when purchasing materials once their GRM application has been approved.
- The households whose homes were completely destroyed that report rubble remaining on the site of their destroyed house. Some of these households may be intentionally saving the rubble sell it later but those who would like to demolish and clear their land and face barriers in doing so, may need assistance now that the United Nations Development Programme has ended its demolition and clearing project.
- The nearly two-thirds of displaced households that claim to be living in rented housing. It is unclear whether this rental stock is even available in Gaza, so assessing the workings of the rental market could help untangle what these arrangements entail.[37]
- The households that received a combination of assistance forms that seem to conflict, such as a caravan or t-shelter along with TSCA. Though this represents a very small pool of beneficiaries, research into their outcomes could provide insight into unique ways householders find uses for assistance, and whether or not this benefits them.
- Uses of cash assistance and whether an increase in levels of cash provided – as often called for by respondents in this assessment – would indeed result in better shelter recovery.

Fill broad information gaps on the technical needs of householders through further quantitative research. Ongoing data collection to track and analyse outcomes needs to be strengthened, as the currently available data is growing outdated. All implementing partners should do this on an ongoing basis, with plenty of time focused on questionnaire development. In particular, there is a need for further understanding of how the larger context, including the blockade and unemployment, impacts shelter recovery, because these factors lead to full recovery, not assistance. Additional inter-cluster assessments would help identify gaps between clusters, and could identify hardship cases for greater targeting of vulnerable households. Some of this can be done through further analysis of the dataset generated in this assessment.

[37] Families may report living in rented housing where they have moved in with host families, who they support with the TSCA received.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND			
Emergency	Natural Disaster ☐	Conflict ☒	Complex Emergency ☐
Humanitarian Lead Agency	NRC	**Government Lead Agency**	MoSA/MoPWH
Country	Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)		
CLUSTER PARTNER AGENCIES			
Mission Timeframe	Phase I: 25th July – 30th September 2016; Phase II: Oct-Dec 2016		
DESCRIPTION OF CONTEXT	**The blockade and three major escalations of hostilities in the last six years have inflicted large-scale destruction on Gaza's economy, productive assets and infrastructure**. A chronic energy crisis, with power outages reaching 12-16 hours a day, also impairs service delivery, students' educational outcomes, the functioning of hospitals, medical equipment, and the operation of more than 280 water and wastewater facilities. No major new displacement was recorded in Gaza during 2015, **but at the start of 2016 an estimated 95,000 IDPs remain homeless because of the 2014 hostilities (the majority UNRWA registered refugees) of whom 78,000 continue to need temporary support.** Although repairs to moderately-damaged homes and educational and health facilities have progressed, the rate of reconstruction of the approximately 18,000 houses that were completely destroyed or severely damaged in 2014 is very slow. Based on 2016 HRP, Shelter Cluster current strategic priorities are: 1. Ensuring continued access to shelter for 13,000 IDP families and improving standards for those living in inadequate makeshift or temporary accommodation, while promoting accountability and supportive measures that facilitate an end to displacement. 2. Protection from harsh weather for 12,750 vulnerable households and improving conditions in 11,320 damaged, overcrowded or substandard properties through winterization/repairs and upgrading that mitigates against severe weather and ensures minimum shelter standards. 3. Preparedness and response to emergencies. However, the Shelter Cluster is now currently preparing the 2017 HNO and HRP, which will have to be drafted and validated by the end of the year. To do so, Shelter Cluster members as well as local authorities feel that this exercise will benefit from further evaluation and appraisal of the shelter response since the 2014 Gaza escalation of hostilities. Such evaluation will be critical to assess which response strategy, and delivery modalities, proved to be the most effective, efficient and sustainable in the difficult context of OPT operations.		
OBJECTIVES			
Main objective	To evaluate the outcomes of the shelter response to the 2014 conflict events in Gaza.		
Specific objectives[38]	1. Consolidate shelter sector lessons learned related to post-2014 sector response in Gaza 2. Evaluate the outcomes of different types of shelter assistance delivered to conflict affected population following 2014 events in Gaza.		
METHODOLOGIES/DELIVERABLES			
Assessment Type	Shelter Response Evaluation Assessment		

[38] See Data analysis framework below for further detailed breakdown of objectives.

Description	To evaluate the **outcomes of emergency/transitional/permanent shelter assistance** provided by Shelter Cluster members in response to the 2014 conflict in Gaza, through a review of existing data and a complementary primary data collection exercise in-country. The evaluation process will be divided in to a two-phased approach: 1) a **qualitative participatory evaluation** through a secondary data review, one lessons learned workshop and purposive sampled semi-structured Key Informant interviews. 2) A **quantitative** evaluation through a statistically significant primary data collection at household level, stratified by category of shelter damage.
Geographic Representation	Gaza Strip inclusive of all 5 governorates
Data Sources	1. Secondary data analysis (including meta analysis where possible/appropriate): a. All previous datasets and analysis from Shelter Cluster assessments for Gaza response b. All previous datasets, analysis, and reviews from Shelter Cluster partners c. Relevant datasets that can be obtained from OCHA, UNDP, UNRWA, ministries in line and other data holders *i. Satellite imagery may be purchased and analysed should the Secondary Data Review identify a need for this (to identify land use – reconstruction/relocation).* 2. Qualitative Primary Data Collection a. Participatory workshop b. Bi-lateral semi-structured interview with Key Informants 3. Quantitative Primary Data Collection a. Shelter beneficiary households per type of response with wide geographic representation. Sampling framework to be determined based on Secondary data analysis
Expected Results	1. Collection and collation of all used datasets. 2. Quantitative and qualitative analysis including triangulation, of secondary and primary data, to address the objectives of the assessment (with sources).
Expected Deliverables	1. One lessons learned workshop is held in Gaza 2. One lessons learned report at the end of the first phase 3. One evaluation assessment report with static and dynamic analytical maps where applicable at the end of the second phase
RESOURCES	
Resources	Specific Objective 1: SCT- REACH Assessment Officer x 1 for 6 weeks Technical backstopping from GFP Assessments, GFP Information Management. Specific Objective 2 See Annex X - Budget Funding sources: DG ECHO through Global Shelter Cluster (Phase I & II) Contributions from NRC (ECHO Country level) Contributions from Cluster partners

OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

To evaluate the **outcomes and impact of the provision of emergency/transitional/permanent shelter assistance** in response to the 2014 conflict in Gaza, by agencies represented by the Shelter Cluster, through a review of existing data and a complementary primary data collection exercise in-country. It should be noted that what is proposed is a two phases approach:

1. **Phase I** (to be completed by September 2016). A **qualitative participatory evaluation** and data collection methodology through a secondary data review, one workshop and purposive sampled semi-structured Key Informants interviews. Hence findings of the first phase should **not to be considered representative** in terms of caseload or with a specified level of precision to the particular area of interest. However, it will provide a qualitative understanding, from a shelter cluster members' perspective, of the shelter response achievements, best practices, challenges and lessons learned.
2. **Phase II** (to be completed by January 2017). A comprehensive **quantitative evaluation** including primary data collection methodology through a secondary data review and household level interviews. The aim of the second phase will be to produce statistically representative findings in order to quantify 2014 Gaza response outcomes, including where possible self-recovery capacity of the affected population, and eventual residual response gaps. The household level evaluation assessment will be designed based on qualitative findings of the first phase. Research questions will be identified by OPT Shelter Cluster members and a sound methodology will be proposed by REACH. As much as possible, Shelter Cluster members or in-country capacity (e.g. OCHA IDP re-registration capacity) will be contacted to second resources in order to implement the quantitative research and to limit the need for additional funding.

Specific Objectives

The objectives of this assessment will be:

4. **Consolidate shelter sector lessons learned** related to 2014 and 2015 and 2016 sector response in Gaza
    a. Identification of key achievements, best practices, challenges and alternative operational adjustments including on technical standards and key takeaways from a shelter actors' perspective
    b. Identify information gaps and research question for the quantitative research (phase II)
5. **Evaluate the outcomes of different types of shelter assistance** delivered to conflict affected population following 2014 events in Gaza.
    a. To what extent **each approach was appropriate** to meet beneficiaries shelter and NFIs needs.
    b. To what extent **each approach was cost-effective in aiding household recovery and/or return of the IDP population affected by the conflict** as per Shelter Cluster response objectives**.**
    c. To what extent **response gaps and residual shelter needs, at household level, related to the 2014 conflict are still present in Gaza**

These objectives should frame the required methodologies of data collection, the content of inquiry, as well as the subsequent calculation, interpretation, and presentation of the findings.

METHODOLOGY

Two different methods will be used:

1. **(Phase 1) – Qualitative Method**
    a. Secondary data review (SDR) and analysis – conducted primarily through desk research, leveraging the variety of existing assessment and review materials produced including technical designs, standards and specifications over the course of the Gaza response. This review would serve three key purposes:
        i. Inform the development of Lessons Learned Workshop
        ii. Inform the purposive sampling of Key Informants for the primary data collection
        iii. Triangulate findings from Shelter Cluster Lessons Learned workshop
    b. Participatory workshop – conducted in Gaza city with Shelter Cluster members. Its aim is to consolidate aid actors experience and expertise related to the various shelter interventions post-Gaza conflict, including:
        i. Emergency solutions: NFIs; summer- or winterisation assistance; sealing off materials
        ii. Temporary solutions: Rental support/cash assistance; caravans; T-shelters
        iii. Durable solutions: Repair or upgrading support.

The workshop outcomes will allow for a summary of the successes, challenges and outcomes of the shelter assistance provided, recommendations for future response and identification of outstanding information gaps.

c. Semi-structured interviews with Key Informants purposively sampled amongst the shelter actors in Gaza.

2. **(Phase 2) Quantitative primary data collection** – conducted in Gaza through a household level data collection (and eventual complementary other methods such as FGDs) to inform a quantitative study on the effectiveness of shelter assistance to affected families. Shelter Cluster and REACH will identify Research Questions and a specific assessment methodology based on Phase I findings and outputs.

   A 95/5 random sample will be drawn based on damage category of shelter beneficiaries. This sample will be drawn directly from the Ministry of Public Works and Housing's database registry of shelter aid recipients, which includes contact information. This data will be accessed in-person once the team is in Gaza. This will be complemented by UNRWA and UNDP databases. The sampling framework will allow overall aggregation at Gaza strip level as well as comparison between beneficiary groups based on their damage category. Comparison between different type of shelter assistance (cash for rent, cash for assistance, caravans) will be derived from the damage category through data collection tools. Comparison between Governorates will be indicative only. The Shelter Cluster will have to survey 1195 households. If time and funding allows, additional assessment will take place on a group of particular interest: those eligible for construction materials through the General Reconstruction Mechanism, who have not utilized this assistance.

Figure 32: Shelter beneficiaries disaggregated by damage category



Sampling Framework

Beneficiary Category	**Total # of HH interviews**
Destroyed House	299
Severe Damaged House	296
Major Damaged house	294
Minor Damaged House	306
Total # of HH interviews	**1195**

The sample include a buffer of 15%.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

The first phase of the assessment may largely be undertaken remotely, assuming all relevant secondary data can be obtained remotely and just the Lessons Learned workshop and the KI interviews will require a presence in country. The Lessons Learned workshop will be held in Gaza city and it will be a one-day long event including roundtable discussions and plenary restitutions. KIs interviews will be implemented following the workshop and KIs will be sampled based on the desktop review, Shelter Cluster or key stakeholder recommendations and on the workshop findings.

For the second phase (Primary Data Collection), a fully-dedicated REACH Team will be seconded to the Shelter Cluster, with 1 Assessment Officer embedded in-country and 1 GIS Officer working remotely from Amman, Jordan. SC members input will be essential a) for the design of the second phase (in particular on: 1) indicators and 2) categorisation of sample), b) in order to gather resources to conduct the data collection and c) to analyse findings presented by REACH at the end of the data collection. At a minimum, remote input from shelter program experts is needed to facilitate tool development and preparation of training/guidance materials. Ideally, active participation of shelter program experts from the cluster membership during the data collection phase will greatly serve to improve validity of observation results. The finalisation of the final reports and maps may be conducted remotely but shelter actors should conduct final review/discussion/endorsement of the evaluation deliverables.

The REACH Assessment Officer will oversee the data collection teams, reviews and analyses incoming data on a daily basis. The REACH team, under the supervision of the Shelter Cluster Coordinator, will prepare preliminary findings presentation outlining key themes as soon as data collection is completed, which should be reviewed in a one-day workshop with SC partners/local stakeholders to inform the interpretation of findings and subsequent finalisation of the report. Advice from a Shelter Cluster Expert would have a considerable added value during the final analysis/interpretation of findings/report drafting stage. Once a final draft is prepared it will be circulated to SC partners for feedback, which can be provided within a stipulated time-frame. Feedback will be incorporated and a final report released, along with a final presentation for external parties.

LOCATIONS

The assessment evaluation will be implemented in Gaza strip including all five governorates. Specific location will be determined by the final sampling framework for Phase II data collection.

Impact Initiatives staff will be embedded in NRC operations in Gaza City.

PRELIMINARY WORK PLAN

Phase I: from 25 July 2016 to 16 September 2016.

- Lessons Learned workshop on the 16 August 2016
- Field Deployment from 11 August 2016 to 19 August 2016
- Draft lessons learnt report shared with SAG by 12 September and with ECHO
- Feedback from SAG members by 18th September
- Final Report by 26th September the latest

Phase II: (October 2016 to January 2017)

- Research Design completed by 4 December 2016
- Data collection completed by 19 December 2016
- One-day joint analysis workshop on 20 December 2016
- Draft Report by the 2nd of January 2017
- Final Report by the 20th January 2017

DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION

Enumerators: Where possible, data collection should be conducted using staff seconded by Shelter Cluster partners for the purposes of capacity building and inter-agency buy-in. In the event that these resources are unavailable for the assessment, and

pending the availability of additional funds, enumerators will be recruited for the duration of the assessment. Hiring will take place through NRC, using the Impact Initiatives budget.

Logistical Support: As with data collection staff, vehicles and transportation for the purposes of the assessment will be, where possible, sourced from Shelter Cluster partners. In the event that vehicles are not available, and pending the availability of additional funds, drivers and bat transportation will be recruited as appropriate. Hiring will take place through NRC, using the Impact Initiatives budget.

Community Engagement: Upon arrival in selected area, the team leader will be responsible for introducing the local authorities to the objectives of the assessment to ensure acceptance. The data collection team will then proceed with KII with local communities/community leaders and FGDs with all female/male groups.

Data Collection Platform: Qualitative data collection will likely be conducted on paper. A mobile data collection platform may be possible to use for the household level survey, pending finalisation of research question, questionnaire and if it will not represent a security issue for the enumerators. All data will be entered into a user-friendly database (probably Excel) purpose-built for the evaluation.

ANNEX 2: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

A. Introduction
Governorate
Enumerator ID
B. Respondent Information
1- Name
2- Gender
3- Age
3.5- Are you the head of the household?
4- ID Number of Head of Household
C. Other Demographic and Household Information
5- Gender of Head of Household
6- Age of Head of Household
D. Measures of Households' Vulnerability
7- Level of education of head of household
8- In the last 12 months, what has been your typical level of employment?
9- Is anyone under the age 18 in the household currently employed?
10- What is the number of persons with disability/chronic illness/elderly in the household?
11- Do you have refugee status?
E. Displacement
12- Are you currently living in the same shelter as before 2014?
13- Where are you currently living?
14- What is the primary reason that you are not residing in your pre-2014 house?
14- Other
15- Are you currently sharing your house with displaced family, neighbour, others?
16- Are you sharing any household spaces/services with other households?
17- What is the condition of your current shelter
F. Pre-2014 Shelter/House
18- What is the current state of your pre-2014 house?
19- When are you planning to start to repair/rebuild your house?
19- Other
20- What was the tenure of your pre-2014 shelter?
21- What was the legal status of the land on which the shelter is/was located?
22- Type of Housing
23- Was your apartment located on the ground floor of the building?
24- To what extent was your shelter damaged in 2014?
25- Were you satisfied with the Damage Assessment?
26- What is the reason for this level of satisfaction?
G. Registration/Assessment/Assistance
27- How did you get information about registration of damage?
28- How did you get information about assessment results?
29- How did you get information about assistance?
H. Assistance
30- Is the repairing / rebuilding of your shelter completed?
31- Have you received any shelter assistance?
31- other
H_31
H_31_1
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
Other
35- Why not?
H_31_2
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-2 Other
35- Why not?

H_31_3
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-3 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-4
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-4 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-5
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-5 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-6
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-6 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-7
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-7 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-8
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-8 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-9
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-9 Other
35- Why not?
H-31-10
32- Who provided this assistance?
33- When was this assistance provided?
34- Was this assistance appropriate to meet your needs?
H-31-10 Other
35- Why not?
36- What was the cash used for? (% should sum up to 100)
36-1- NFIs (tarps, tents, emergency shelter kits)
36-2- Tools
36-3- Construction materials
36-4- Blanket or Sleeping mats
36-5- Clothes
36-6- Furniture
36-7- Other HH items (Lighting, kitchen sets, stoves)
36-8- Food
36-9- Health Services (also medicine)
36-10- Education
36-11- Transport

36-12- Did not spend/ saving it
36-13- Please insert the other percentage
36-14- Do not know

37- Is there a different type of assistance that would have been more helpful to your specific needs?
37- Other
38- Do you received any technical assistance/training?
38- Have you received any technical assistance/training?
39- Who provided the training?
40- Who did or is currently carrying out housing/shelter repairs?
40- Other

I Level of satisfaction with current housing conditions

41- How would you describe your level of satisfaction with the following aspects of your current shelter:
41-1- Comfort of home
41-2- Quality of shelter provided by home
41-3- Hygiene of home (easily cleaned from dust, debris, sewage, water)
41-4- Health of home
41-5- Privacy of home
41-6- Safety/security of home
41-7- Close relationships with family
41-8- Close relationship with people other than family
41-9- What is the current condition of the home?

J- Self-recovery Capacity

42- Did you do any of the following to help cope with the damage/destruction of your home?
42- Other
43- Which of the following repair/construction activities did/will you do without any external assistance from aid organizations?
44- What type of materials recovered from damaged/destroyed pre-2014 shelter were you able to use to repair/build your current shelter?
44- Other
45- How many adult members of the household have or will contribute unskilled or skilled labour to repair/rebuild the house?
46- How much have you spent on shelter materials (NOT including costs covered by government/NGO assistance you received)?
What has been the biggest barrier to full shelter recovery?
47- What has been the first biggest barrier to full shelter recovery?
48- What has been the second biggest barrier to full shelter recovery?
49- What has been the third biggest barrier to full shelter recovery?
47- Other
48- Other
49- Other

50- What does your household need to ensure full shelter recover?
50- Other

K- Access to building materials

51- Has it been an issue accessing the following materials in the market?
51- Other
52- Did you apply to the GRM for building materials?
53- Did you experience any of the following challenges in getting the allocated materials?
53- Other
54- Did you receive building materials?
55- Why did you not receive the materials?
55- Other
56- Did you access materials from anywhere else?
56- Other

L- Preparedness

57- If there was a new emergency, where would you go?

ANNEX 3: SHELTER ASSISTANCE TYPE PROVIDED BY DAMAGE CATEGORY

Targeting of assistance per damage category		Minor	Major	Severe	Total
Emergency response	NFIs (in-kind)	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Cash/vouchers for NFIs	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Sealing-off materials	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Winterization assistance	✓	✓	✓	✓
Temporary solutions	Temporary shelter (timber)			✓	✓
	Caravan (metal)			✓	✓
	Cash reintegration assistance (for loss of goods)		✓	✓	✓
	Cash for rental assistance/TSCA			✓	✓
Durable solutions	Cash for repairs	✓	✓	✓	
	Cash for reconstruction				✓