

Mosul Offensive - Crisis Overview III

26 February - 28 May 2017

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INTRODUCTION

This is the third REACH overview of the Mosul Crisis since operations to reclaim the city and its surrounding areas from armed groups (AG) started on 17 October 2016. In order to highlight the most recent trends in displacement, this situation overview will focus on the humanitarian situation and displacement patterns that have developed as a result of the Mosul crisis between 26 February and 28 May 2017.

Since the first two REACH Mosul Crisis Overviews and the latest West Mosul Displacement and Needs Overview,¹ Iraqi forces have retaken up to 90% of West Mosul, whilst maintaining control of the city's East.² During April, the pace of the conflict slowed down, as Iraqi forces moved North towards Mosul's Old City, the most populous collection of neighbourhoods which are made up of hundreds of narrow streets. On 5 May, a new military front was opened in the city's Northwest, resulting in additional mass displacements.

The West Mosul offensive, which started on 19 February 2017, has resulted in a much higher level of displacement than that of East Mosul. According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) and the Government of Iraq's Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoMD), between 501,270³ and 774,026⁴ individuals have been displaced from Mosul and the surrounding villages cumulatively between 17 October 2016 and 28 May 2017. Of these, between 176,124⁵ and 223,980⁶ were displaced during the East Mosul offensive

(17 October 2016 to 18 February 2017) and a further 277,290⁷ to 597,902⁸ have been displaced during the West Mosul offensive. Although the West Mosul offensive began on 19 February, displacements were not reported until 26 February. During the reporting period of 26 February to 28 May, according to the MoMD, a rough average of 6,570 were displaced daily, more than four times that of the 1,324 displaced daily between 17 October and 25 February.

The pace of IDPs returning to their area of origin has also risen sharply since the retaking of East Mosul in January 2017, with IDPs returning to both East and West Mosul. Improved stability, security, and services in retaken areas are the main reason for this. More recently, high seasonal temperatures combined with conditions in camps are also contributing to the rising numbers. A total of 176,395 IDPs originally displaced from Mosul are reported to have returned so far, with roughly 30,000-40,000 returning to the East of the city and 135,000-145,000 reported to have returned to the West.⁹

Recent needs assessments carried out in East Mosul¹⁰ have outlined that although IDPs are returning and markets are growing, many still lack purchasing power which, limiting their access to available food and water. Situation reports concerning West Mosul have drawn attention to the huge level of displacement and the severe lack of access to sufficient food, water and health care.

Map 1: Camp placement and overall displacement and returnees trends between 26 February and 28 May 2017



DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW

DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

Between the start of the West Mosul offensive on 26 February and 28 May, four distinct phases of displacement can be identified: 1) 26 February - 17 March: offensive in the South of West Mosul led to heavy displacement, overwhelmed capacity of camps and increased movement of IDPs to East Mosul host communities, 2) 17 March - 11 April: reduced fighting decreased IDP outflow, allowing camp construction and overall camp capacity to catch up, 3) 1 April - 4 May: a renewed but limited offensive retook all neighbourhoods West of the Old City, displacing people primarily to newly opened camps in the South and to urban area of East Mosul, while returns from other camps increased and 4) Since 4 May the military offensive significantly escalated due to a new front opening in Northwest

Methodology

This situation overview outlines primarily displacement trends from Mosul and surrounding areas between 26 February 2017 and 28 May 2017, the needs of conflict-affected individuals, and related information gaps. The overview summarises recent assessments conducted by REACH and other humanitarian actors including IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, WHO, AWG Iraq, RISE Foundation and the CCCM, Protection and Education clusters.

Mosul that resulted in heavy displacement to a mixture of both camps and East Mosul.

During the first phase of the West Mosul offensive **between 26 February and 17 March**¹¹ Iraqi forces moved quickly, taking control of 40% of the city's West bank by 12 March. This led to a steep increase in displacement with over 90,000 displaced during this phase, including 43,000 individuals displaced in the first week alone.¹² Since January 2017, IDPs from Mosul had predominantly been transferred by the government to camps to the South of the city - i.e. Hajj Ali, the Qayyarah and Hammam al-Alil camps. As a result, by mid-March, many of these camps were at full capacity.¹³ Due to the lack of space, roughly 21,000 IDPs were transferred from camps located south of Mosul to older¹⁴ emergency¹⁵ camps to the East and Northeast of Mosul, such as Chamakor, Hassansham M2 and Nargizilia 1.¹⁶ In a new development in the Mosul Crisis, roughly 45,000 IDPs were displaced from West Mosul to host communities, mainly in East Mosul.¹⁷ IDPs reported that those who chose to displace to these urban host communities, as opposed to camps, were often families with either some savings, and thus able to rent property, or those with family ties to the East.¹⁸

The second phase **between 17 March and 11 April** was marked by a lull in fighting and subsequent decrease in displacement numbers. During this time the number of IDPs arriving daily at Hammam al-Alil screening

centre dropped to roughly 4,400 per day, from an average of 11,200 per day between 6 March and 16 March. This pause allowed camp construction to catch up with demand, with the new camps, Hammam al-Alil 2 and Qayyarah Jad'ah V's extension receiving their first arrivals in the first week of April. These two camps received roughly 65% of IDPs during this phase, with the rest being displaced to areas of East Mosul.¹⁹ This phase also saw roughly 25,000 IDPs, almost 2.5 times more than during phase one, returning to their place of origin from camps East and Northeast of Mosul.²⁰

Between 11 April and 4 May the offensive into West Mosul was renewed, with ISF forces approaching the Old City from the south, whilst also retaking all neighbourhoods to its immediate West including al-Tnek-Nahrwan, al-Yarmuk and al-Thaura. In total, during this time between 37,000²¹ and 50,000²² individuals were displaced, predominantly to camps South of Mosul and urban areas of East Mosul. Since the end of April, these new arrivals have pushed camps in the south of the city to the limits of their capacity, after which IDPs were largely displaced to East Mosul and camps East of the city.²³ Many of the new arrivals in camps in the East were secondary displacements, having first opted to move to East Mosul before leaving due to fears of shelling and lack of access to food, water and services.²⁴ During this period, large numbers of IDPs - around 17,000 individuals - continued to return to their area of origin.²⁵ Although there


were reports of some IDPs returning to retaken neighbourhoods in Southwest Mosul,²⁶ most IDPs were assumed to be returning to East Mosul, with family reunification and improved security identified as the main reasons.²⁷

During this phase an increased number of IDPs from Tel Afar district, approximately 70km West of Mosul city, are reported to have been displaced. Roughly 6,000 travelled to villages North of Mosul between 21 and 27 April, before being transported to Hammam al-Alil and the onwards to predominantly East Mosul, with smaller number displaced to emergency camps.²⁸

Between 5 and 28 May, the average number of people displaced from West Mosul soared in response to the opening of a new front in Northwest Mosul. During this time, displacements reached their highest numbers yet, with roughly 126,000 displaced during the two weeks from 10 to 24 May, with most choosing to flee to East Mosul.²⁹ IDPs were transported by government busses from Hammam al-Alil screening centre to Gogjali, from where they took taxis onwards to different neighbourhoods in East Mosul.³⁰ It was reported that whilst most went directly from West to East, some IDPs visited camps very briefly (sometimes just two or three days) in order to receive assistance,³² before travelling onwards to East Mosul.

Throughout this phase roughly 200 IDPs displaced daily from Tel Afar to East Mosul,

Map 2: Neighbourhood level phases of displacement from West Mosul between 26 February and 28 May



via villages North of Mosul and Hammam al-Alil. However many reportedly faced lengthy delays and transport complications on route forcing them to seek shelter in insecure areas North of Mosul.³²

On 27 May, the Iraqi military initiated the latest stage of the West Mosul offensive, approaching the Old City of Mosul from three different directions at once.³³ Having dropped leaflets in the days leading up to the offensive advising residents to evacuate, this new phase is likely to cause major further displacement. Based on prior trends and existing camp capacity, most new IDPs are expected to go towards East Mosul, with a smaller proportion being hosted in camps South of Mosul, including the newly opened Hasansham U2 and al-Salamiyah 1 camps. While many of these new arrivals will probably be displaced to host communities in areas in and surrounding Mosul city, up to 13,337 plots³⁴ (80,022 individuals) are currently available to receive IDPs in camps with a further 36,028 (216,168 individuals) planned.³⁵

DISPLACEMENT PROFILE

The gender ratio of IDPs both in camps and informal settlements³⁶ is equal, with roughly half of the assessed population female (50-51%) and half male (49-50%).³⁷ Ten percent of the assessed population in ten emergency camps assessed were reported to be pregnant or lactating mothers, whilst 7% were reported to be widows.³⁸ In line with the previous Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview (February 2017),

available demographic data indicates that the majority of the displaced population from Mosul and its surrounding areas are minors.³⁹ In January, it was reported that in informal sites, 63% of the population were under the age of 17, with more than 50% under the age of 4; in emergency camps, 57% were reported to be under the age of 17.⁴⁰

According to data collected in May in 10 emergency camps, 56% of individuals are 17 years of age or under, whilst 18% are 4 years of age or under.⁴¹ Many neighbourhoods in East Mosul reported the presence of unaccompanied children, who may or may not be IDPs or returnees, almost all of whom were reported to be living with other families in the community, such as neighbours.⁴² In emergency camps recently assessed, 4% of IDPs were reported to be unaccompanied or separated children.⁴³

Due to the rapid nature of their displacement, many IDPs had to leave essentials behind, including non-food items (NFIs) and identification papers.⁴⁴ Interviewed IDPs from two West Mosul neighbourhoods reported missing civil documentation, such as birth certificates, identity documents and marriage certificates, as being a main concern.⁴⁵ This is a protection issue for many people fleeing Mosul, as it limits freedom of movement and access to services, and increases the risk of arbitrary detention. It may also elongate the security screening process, as without a valid ID, an additional person must vouch for the

identity of the concerned individual.⁴⁶

PUSH, PULL, REMAIN, RETURN FACTORS

Up to 28 May an accumulative 152,573 IDPs were reported to have returned to their area of origin or to nearby neighbourhoods, 117,732 to the East and 34,841 to the West of Mosul.⁴⁷ It has been reported that apart from recently arrived IDPs, very few families are currently leaving East Mosul.⁴⁸ In West Mosul, residents interviewed from neighbourhoods recently retaken estimated that only 10-20% of the original population remain in their neighbourhoods and that, even though the area is under the control of Iraqi forces, many continue to leave daily due to damage and lack of access to food, water, electricity and healthcare.⁴⁹

Many who chose to remain in both the East and the West did so in order to protect their property and possessions. IDPs are reported to often travel back and forth between West Mosul and Hammam al-Alil in order to check on their property.⁵⁰ Others, particularly in the West, remained for fear of being killed or injured by indirect fire⁵¹ or fear of execution if caught by AGs trying to escape.⁵² Those who chose to displace to urban areas in Mosul mostly did so because of family ties, their ability to afford rent, or particularly in the case of West Mosul, the proximity to their neighbourhood of origin. Inside camps, IDPs reported that they had displaced there because they were

guaranteed to receive assistance and NFIs, after which they could travel onwards to other areas.⁵³

An increasing number of IDPs were reportedly leaving camps to either return to their area of origin, or voluntarily secondarily displace to East Mosul. Roughly 40-80 families were reported to be leaving emergency camps each day between 10 and 17 May.⁵⁴ In the furthest Eastern neighbourhoods of Mosul, it has been reported that as many as 2,400 IDPs returned during the first two weeks of May.⁵⁵ These groups mentioned restrictions on movement,⁵⁶ unhappiness and difficulty living in camps, and a fear of living in tents through the summer months as the main push factors.⁵⁷ Pull factors for leaving camps and moving elsewhere, particularly to areas of origin, included improved security in Eastern Mosul, family reunification, to enrol children in school, improved livelihoods⁵⁸ and to secure properties from occupation by IDPs.⁵⁹ An increasing number of IDPs were also beginning to return to neighbourhoods in West Mosul at the time of writing, having heard that the situation was improving quickly and that there were ongoing water and food distributions.⁶⁰

IDP INTENTIONS

At the time of writing, the majority of IDPs who had been displaced since the start of the Mosul offensive in October 2016 reportedly did not intend to move within the next seven days.⁶¹ However many reported that their eventual

long-term aim is to return to their area of origin.⁶² Towards the end of April departures began to surpass arrivals in emergency camps to the North and East of Mosul, with the vast majority travelling to areas in the East of Mosul.⁶³ Whether returnees or secondary displacements, these movements have been considered as unsafe or premature returns,⁶⁴ as many neighbourhoods in East Mosul reported a lack of essential resources, and seeing or hearing evidence of unexploded ordnance.⁶⁵ There have been more than 300 sporadic incidents of direct and indirect fire in East Mosul since it was retaken in January, with hospitals, schools, residential neighbourhoods and public gatherings all reported as impacted.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the number of returns continued to rise and the government was, at the time of writing, providing transport for families returning to retaken areas of West Mosul.

Recently interviewed residents of West Mosul, from neighbourhoods both retaken and still occupied, reported that they all aimed to return to their area of origin but only once there is access to water, food, electricity and employment.⁶⁷ However, there were reports that some do not intend to return until the entire West bank is retaken, for fear of being caught in the conflict.⁶⁸

Mukhtars⁶⁹ in East Mosul reported recently that large numbers of IDPs were arriving in their neighbourhoods from West Mosul, some estimating up to 3,000 IDPs during the week

of 12 to 19 May.⁷⁰ Given this continual rise in displacements from West Mosul and the escalating vulnerability of civilians in the area, it can be assumed that many residents intend to displace from West Mosul in the future. Some IDPs that were renting or being hosted in East Mosul reportedly intend to move onwards to camps due to the lack of basic services and income generating opportunities in the city. As such, if livelihood opportunities and services do not improve in areas of Mosul containing returnees and IDPs, secondary displacement towards camps could increase. Within three days alone, from 12 to 14 May, over 3,000 IDPs arrived at emergency camps East of Mosul - all of whom have previously been displaced several times within Mosul city.⁷¹

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

IN MOSUL

In East Mosul nearly four months of relative stability have allowed large numbers of the population to return and have attracted thousands of IDPs. However in the West, where much of the population is extremely vulnerable given their proximity to conflict, much more displacement can be expected in the future. This is particularly true of those areas still under AG control where there are extreme shortages of food, water, basic services and medical needs are particularly severe.

In May, an interagency assessment covering 38 neighbourhoods in East Mosul identified the priority needs as access to clean water (31% of neighbourhoods assessed), food (29%), medical care (17%) and employment (12%).⁷² A lack of income-generating activities was a major cross-cutting concern that reduced access to all these essential household needs.⁷³ Although markets in East Mosul have bounced back quickly, stocking a diverse range of commodities,⁷⁴ the lack of livelihood opportunities was hindering communities' ability to purchase goods and services, leaving them reliant on negative coping strategies, such as borrowing money and buying on credit.⁷⁵ In addition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) was identified as a key need due to damaged water pipes and pumping stations.⁷⁶ In the 38 East Mosul neighbourhoods assessed, communities reported that this left them reliant on unprotected open wells, with many people reportedly suffering from diarrhoea and skin problems (in respectively 31% and 21% of neighbourhoods).⁷⁷ Despite schools slowly beginning to open and register students in East Mosul at the time of writing, teachers were reportedly still not being paid their salaries,⁷⁸ materials were lacking and many schools remained either damaged or occupied by recent IDPs. Many children have not attended school for nearly three years as their parents did not approve of the curriculum imposed by AGs.

In much of West Mosul, vulnerabilities of those who remain in their neighbourhoods were

particularly drastic and it can be assumed that those in areas still occupied by AGs are even worse. Severe physical insecurity, minimal food access, alongside a dependence on unclean water and no access to electricity for up to three months were reported to be the main challenges faced and the main push factors driving families out of retaken neighbourhoods of West Mosul. Inside West Mosul, the most severe needs included access to clean water, food, protection and healthcare. In areas still occupied by AGs, news agencies have reported cases of starvation and malnourishment with many living off of flour and lentils alone.⁷⁹ In newly retaken neighbourhoods, residents reported eating only one meal a day,⁸⁰ markets were non-existent, thus forcing communities to walk distances of over an hour in order to access food.⁸¹ Mosul al-Jadida had reportedly become a trading centre for many recently retaken neighbourhoods surrounding it, however, with badly damaged roads and no transport, people could only buy what they could carry so stockpiling food was not an option.⁸² Livelihood opportunities remained very limited to non-existent, which has left many residents forced to sell their possessions.

IN CAMPS


Around half (55%) of all IDPs - roughly 54,371 families (326,230 IDPs) - from Mosul and its surrounding villages were living in 14 emergency camps and sites at the time of writing.⁸³ IDPs in these camps reported

improved movement, access to documentation, water, electricity and health, reduced heat in tents, reduced waiting time for NFIs and an improved complaints mechanism as priority needs.⁸⁴ In the six months since the Mosul offensive began, service provision and facilities of camps have improved. However since the West Mosul operation gained momentum in February, many of the larger camps to the south have been pushed to capacity, became overcrowded, and continued to receive new arrivals even after reaching full capacity.⁸⁵ This has subsequently affected the quality of available facilities and services.

Some displaced to camps reported feeling trapped, as their IDs, and thus freedom of movement, were taken from them upon arrival and they were reportedly struggling to have them returned.⁸⁶ Others either lost their ID on route or were not able to collect it before they were displaced.⁸⁷ Although roughly two thirds of camps reported that tents had a cement base, for those to the East of Mosul the figure was below a quarter.⁸⁸ During the winter months, many camps were reported as being prone to flooding with IDPs reporting a particular need of improved shelter, winterized NFIs, fuel and kerosene.⁸⁹ With temperatures quickly rising at the time of writing, many residents were concerned with the heat in the tents during the upcoming summer months.^{90 91}

Mosul emergency camps were overwhelmingly dependent upon communal water provision for drinking, washing and cooking. Recent REACH data collection focusing on nine Mosul emergency camps found that just under half of participants reported that the quality of the water provided was inadequate.⁹² When asked about the cleanliness of toilets in their camp, roughly one third of the large camps south of Mosul, including those at Hammam al-Alil and Qayyarah, reported that they were not clean or that they were somewhat unclean. Concerning health needs, more than half of those assessed recently in Mosul emergency camps reported that they had difficulty in accessing healthcare.⁹³

Map 3: Neighbourhood level displacement and return routes between 26 February and 28 May



In addition, with the offensive somewhat reduced throughout April, and many maintaining they will not return to their neighbourhood of origin until it is both retaken from AGs and has improved services, there is a need for humanitarian partners to invest in educational development. At the time of writing, it was reported that there was insufficient educational space in the

new camps designated for West Mosul IDPs.⁹⁴ While so far most IDPs were reported to stay on average between one week and two months before either returning to their area of origin or displacing to somewhere else,⁹⁵ this could become a serious challenge that needs addressing if IDPs were to settle in camps for long periods of time.

Table 1: Summary of key reported sectoral needs across both East and West Mosul city

Sector	East Mosul	West Mosul
Security and Damage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least two schools per neighbourhood were reported as damaged or destroyed in April 2017⁹⁸ • Targeted killings were common within East Mosul neighbourhoods bordering the bank of the Tigris⁹⁷ • Presence of unexploded ordinance (UXO) was perceived as high risk for children, including in open school grounds that had begun registering students⁹⁸ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Over 1,989 sites damaged/destroyed, including 1,147 residential, 387 roads and bridges and 259 commercial and industrial. Damage in West Mosul was 2.5 times worse than in East Mosul⁹⁹ • With 481 residential buildings damaged/destroyed, Al-Rabee accounted for 30% of all residential damage across Mosul¹⁰⁰ • Residents from West Mosul reported that between 50 and 75% of their neighbourhood had sustained some damage with no repairs having started yet¹⁰¹ • Media outlets alleged use of chemical mortar rounds in Yarmouk and Matahin neighbourhoods¹⁰²
Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to food was reported as a crucial need, mostly due to physical/logistical constraints¹⁰³ • Food in East Mosul was reportedly widely available, but residents were reliant upon credit and borrowing money from family/friends to access it¹⁰⁴ • Households in East Mosul were reliant upon food assistance provided by humanitarian organisations in order to meet food needs¹⁰⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile fruit and vegetable sellers were operating in a few neighbourhoods of Southwest Mosul but inhabitants of many retaken neighbourhoods had to walk for over one hour to reach them¹⁰⁶ • Households in newly retaken areas were regularly reducing their meals per day as a coping strategy to deal with depleting food stocks¹⁰⁷ • Growing number of children were showing signs of malnutrition, in particular those under six months, as access to food in West Mosul is extremely limited¹⁰⁸ • In AG occupied areas of Mosul and Tel Afar, people were reported to eat one meal a day and to be reliant upon the few vegetables they can find close to their house. AGs do not let people go outside and food has been missing for more than a month¹⁰⁹
Livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only soldiers and police reportedly received salaries and the elderly a pension¹¹⁰ • Lack of income in East Mosul was limiting people's recovery, leaving them reliant upon negative coping mechanisms¹¹¹ • Although some people worked in markets, few other employment or livelihood opportunities existed in the East of the city¹¹² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Without income generating opportunities, some people sold their eggs, sugar or other types of personal possessions¹¹³ • Some IDPs from West Mosul were reported not wanting to burden families in the East, as they knew they had limited resources and livelihood opportunities¹¹⁴ • In 44 out of 45 assessed neighbourhoods in East and West Mosul, KIs reported that less than a quarter of the population had earned an income in the past 30 days¹¹⁵
NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fuel for generators to gain electricity was needed, but prices had gone very high; 1 litre of fuel could cost as much as 6,000 IQD¹¹⁶ • Neighbourhoods assessed in East Mosul reported that they did not have enough access to household items due to a lack of economic resources¹¹⁷ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The shortage of fuel prevented ambulances from referring trauma cases outside of Mosul City¹¹⁸ • Households required fuel for cooking, and undamaged water pumping stations needed fuel for pumps to work
WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neighbourhoods in both East and West Mosul reported that their drinking water tasted bad, smelled bad or had a bad colour.¹¹⁹ It caused diarrhoea, including to many children,¹²⁰ and constituted a high risk of other water borne diseases¹²¹ • Potable water was the biggest need for most people in East Mosul; functioning of piped water was minimal and 2.3 million litres of water was trucked in daily¹²² • In neighbourhoods assessed in East Mosul, key informants reported the primary need concerning water quality and access was water treatment capacity, including filters and chlorine tablets¹²³ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many in West Mosul were drinking from public/private wells which, even after boiling, were causing people health problems¹²⁴ • Lack of potable water was a major challenge in West Mosul, where some had reportedly been without water for 45 days¹²⁵ • People in some neighbourhoods collected water from unprotected open wells, while others reportedly tried to collect rain water¹²⁶ • There was chronic shortages of clean water in West Mosul, with people regularly drinking untreated water¹²⁷
Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many families lived together in overcrowded houses, abandoned buildings, informal settlements, schools and mosques¹²⁸ • People have not started rebuilding shelters, due to a lack of resources, while the government assistance has not yet begun¹²⁷ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heavy damage was reported from satellite imagery across most of Mosul, particularly in the West. As the images only display heavily damaged and destroyed buildings, real figures are likely to be much higher. Of the 3,197 sites damaged across Mosul city, 62% were residential¹²⁸ • Due to the heavy destruction, many people remaining in the neighbourhood lived either in damaged houses or together in schools or mosques¹²⁹

Sector	East Mosul	West Mosul
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trauma cases were high, between 17 October and 12 April, close to 6,400 hospitals referrals were made from both sides¹³⁰ • KIs from 19 neighbourhoods in East Mosul reported that their neighbourhood had no functioning health facility¹³¹ • There was only very little medicine available on the market, which was expensive and often expired¹³² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since 18 February, 4,000 patients suffering from trauma were reported from West Mosul (86% civilians, 27% children under 15 and 27% women)¹³³ • In four neighbourhoods assessed in West Mosul, it was reported that more than three quarters of the population lacked access to adequate healthcare¹³⁴ • Many hospitals and healthcare facilities were damaged; those not damaged, along with their medicine and doctors, were reserved purely for AG members¹³⁵ • People had to travel to other neighbourhoods to receive healthcare; however, due to bad road conditions, many passed away before reaching the hospital¹³⁶
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A large number of schools were occupied by IDPs¹³⁷ • Children were placed in classes based on their age instead of their skill level; as such, children who had lost nearly three years of schooling studied alongside those who had not¹³⁸ • Due to delays in security screenings procedures, teachers had not received salaries; they started to strike and some looked for alternative work¹³⁹ • Presence of UXO and explosives were perceived as a high risk for children, including in open schools ground that had begun registering students¹⁴⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In seven neighbourhoods assessed in West Mosul, KIs reported that less than one quarter of children were attending school¹⁴¹ • To avoid studying the AG curriculum, most children had not attended school for almost three years¹⁴² • Around 60% of school-aged children recently displaced from Mosul were not going to school¹⁴³
Protection	<p>According to the secondary data review similar protection needs were reported in both the East and West of Mosul city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk of detention and the lack of registration for new-born babies¹⁴⁴ were the main child protection issues reported; the Ninewa Civil Affairs Office and the Health Directorate were due to relocate to southeast Mosul¹⁴⁵ • Thirty-one assessed neighbourhoods reported the presence of children with no mother, father or immediate family member present to take care of them; almost all of them were reported to be staying with other families in the community¹⁴⁶ • The authorities declared that as many as 500 civilians died in airstrikes during one week in March.¹⁴⁷ Also, it is estimated that the operation to clear mines, explosives, booby traps and UXO from Mosul could cost up to 50 million USD and take years¹⁴⁸ • Overcrowding and long stays were reported at the Hammam al-Alil screening area and the reception site did not have proper facilities. Some IDPs have stayed at the site for weeks, waiting for family, or their neighbourhood to be retaken, refusing to transfer to camps¹⁴⁹ 	

KEY INFORMATION GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Information Gap	Recommendation
• Identifying displacement trends and humanitarian needs in areas still occupied by armed groups, including West Mosul and the Tel Afar region;	• Continued, coordinated monitoring of displacement trends and humanitarian needs, harmonized with multisectoral indicators, in areas occupied by AG through accessing recently displaced persons;
• Increased understanding of host and out-of-camp IDP populations, particularly the numbers and the potential variation in needs between out of camp populations across Mosul city;	• Conduct inter-agency assessments at the neighbourhood level across all retaken areas of Mosul that allow for sectoral comparative analysis and programmatic prioritization at the neighbourhood level;
• Further understanding of the decision making process for displacement, including key push and pull factors, concerning intentions to return by area of origin;	• Conduct regular return intentions assessment, accessing both in and out of camp IDP populations of Mosul;
• Displacement trends, returnee patterns and current needs of retaken villages surrounding Mosul.	• Multi-sectoral assessments focussing on villages in close proximity to Mosul

Endnotes:

¹ [REACH – Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview \(17 October to 25 November 2016\)](#)

[REACH – Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview II \(29 December to 13 February 2017\)](#)

[REACH – West Mosul Displacement and Needs Overview \(19 February to 13 March 2017\)](#)

² [Iraqi commanders say that at least 90% of territories in West Mosul are under Iraqi army control](#)

³ IOM, DTM Emergency Tracking Factsheet #30 Mosul Operations from 17 October to 25 May (2017)

⁴ OCHA: Mosul Humanitarian Response Situation Report No. 35 (22 May to 28 May) 2017

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ IOM, DTM Emergency Tracking Factsheet #17 Mosul Operations from 17 October to 23 February (2017)

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ OCHA: Mosul Humanitarian Response Situation Report No. 35 (22 May to 28 May) 2017

⁹ OCHA Humanitarian Data Overview: 25 May (2017)

¹⁰ For more information see: Iraq AWG Mosul Multi-Sector RNA, WFP East Mosul Market Assessment, PIN Rapid Humanitarian Needs and Market Assessment - Eastern Neighbourhoods of East Mosul, ACTED East Mosul Snapshots.

¹¹ [Staff Major-General Maan al-Saadi of Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service told AFP that 17 of 40 Western districts had been retaken from armed groups](#)

¹² IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Mosul Portal as of 6 March and 16 March 2017

¹³ UNHCR - Iraq Situation Flash Update, 14 March (2017)

¹⁴ 'Older' meaning the first camps built specifically to shelter those displaced by the offensive to retake Mosul and surrounding areas

¹⁵ 'Emergency camps' are those built within a short time frame specifically to shelter those displaced by the offensive to retake Mosul and surrounding areas from armed groups, as opposed to camps built to shelter IDPs from previous displacements

¹⁶ UNHCR - Iraq Situation Flash Update, 21 March (2017)

¹⁷ UNHCR - Iraq Situation Flash Update, 19 March (2017)

¹⁸ REACH, FGDs with recent IDPs from Al-Yarmouk, Al-Alzraii and Al-Tnekk neighbourhoods, April 2017

¹⁹ UNHCR, Iraq Situation Flash Update, 10 April and 18 April (2017)

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³⁰ REACH interviews with Mukhtars in 14 East Mosul neighbourhoods

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³⁶ Informal settlements are out-of-camp communal living sites consisting of five families or more

³⁷ CCCM RASP Data and REACH Camp Profiling, April/May (2017)

³⁸ CCCM Cluster Site Profile: Hasansham M2, U3, Qayyarah Jad'ah 1,2,3,4 and Airstrip, Khazer M1, Hammam al Alil 2 and Hajj Ali

³⁹ [REACH – Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview II \(29](#)

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⁴⁰ Quarterly IDP Camp Directory, Iraq Dec 2016 – Jan 2017 (2017)

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⁵⁴ REACH interviews with camp managers (Hajj Ali, Qayyarah Jad'ah, Qayyarah Airstrip)

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⁶⁸ REACH Mosul Offensive – Crisis Overview II, 29 December – 13 February (2017)

⁶⁹ Elected head of village or, in the case of Mosul, individual city neighbourhood

⁷⁰ REACH Key Informant interviews with Mukhtars in 14 East Mosul neighbourhoods covering the week 12-19 May

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⁷⁹ [Al Jazeera – Mosul: Iraqi forces push ahead in Old City Push](#)

⁸⁰ WFP – Mosul mVAM Iraq: Emergency Update #6

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⁸⁵ UNHCR - Iraq Situation Flash Update, 19 March (2017)

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About REACH Initiative

REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms.

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