RAPID ASSESSMENT ON RETURNS AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS — July 2021

## Al-Siniya Sub-district - Beygee District - Salah Al-Din Governorate, Iraq

🗎 Situation Overview

In 2021, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their area of origin (AoO) or being re-displaced increased, coupled with persisting challenges in relation to social cohesion, lack of services, infrastructure and - in some cases - security in AoO.[1] Increased returns were driven in part by the ongoing closure and consolidation of IDP camps. As of July 2021, 16 formal camps and informal sites have been closed or reclassified as informal sites since camp closures started in mid-October 2020. For the camps that remain open across Iraq there is an ongoing planning procedure to determine their future.[2] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)'s Returnee Master List recorded that over 5,460 households returned to non-camp locations across the country between January and July 2021.[3]

There were no additional camp closures between January and July, 2021, however IDPs continued returning or secondarily displacing. In light of these dynamics, the need to better understand the sustainability of returns, conditions for the (re)integration of IDPs and returnees, and the impact of their presence on access to services and social cohesion has been identified in the context of humanitarian and development planning.

📍 Coverage Map

🏢 Al-Siniya Sub-district[4]

Al-Siniya is a sub-district of Beygee District in Salah Al-Din Governorate.[5] It is an area that contains a diverse range of people, with a variety of norms, customs, and traditions present. In June 2014, Al-Siniya fell under the control of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), resulting in a second wave of insecurity and associated displacement after the Iraq War in 2003.[6] According to a IOM Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) Round VI, after the ISIL occupation, all households fled the sub-district. In October 2015, the Iraqi forces and their allies retook Al-Siniya from ISIL, however, as of July 2021, households in Al-Siniya were still concerned about possible ISIL operations in the area.[7]

👥 Reported Population Profile[8]

3,819-4,380	**households** were residing in Al-Siniya Sub-district before the events of 2014.
94%-97%	**of households** in Al-Siniya were displaced since 2014.
19%-25%	**households displaced since 2014** have returned to Al-Siniya at the time of data collection.
8-12	**IDP households** (AoO not specified) were displaced in Al-Siniya at the time of data collection.

🗎 Background and Methodology

A number of partners are currently tracking population movements and measuring progress towards durable solutions for displaced populations in Iraq.[9] For example, IOM has collected data on a bi-monthly basis, found in the IOM DTM Returns Index. This tool provides indicative trends on the severity of conditions in areas of return (AoR) nationwide.

To build on this information, REACH Initiative (REACH) has conducted multi-sectoral assessments in AoO or AoR across Iraq assessing the overall condition of affected areas to inform how and to what extent durable solutions have or can be achieved. REACH's Returns and Durable Solutions profiles (ReDS) focus on the study of conditions at sub-district level, providing a localized overview of the perceptions of displaced and host communities on a variety of conditions linked to the (re)integration of IDPs and returnees.

In light of recent return and re-displacement movement dynamics, REACH conducted a ReDS assessment in Al-Siniya Sub-district to provide an in-depth profiling of needs and understanding of social relationships between returnee,[10] and/or IDP populations.[11]

Al-Siniya Sub-district was selected for the assessment as: social cohesion severity[12] was classified as 'high' in seven villages in the sub-district;[13] it was an AoO for IDPs in camps at risk of closure or recently closed;[14] and dynamic population movements to/from this sub-district were reported through the Returns Working Group (RWG). The findings are based on 45 key informant (KI) interviews conducted between 23 June and 11 July 2021, combining qualitative and quantitative data collection methods adapted to the context. Data collection was conducted remotely due to movement restrictions and public health concerns linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings are based on the perceptions of KIs who were purposively sampled; all data should therefore be considered as indicative. The occasionally large variation between perceptions is potentially due to KIs varying profiles and personal interests.[15]

👥 KI Profile — Al-Siniya Sub-district

Community leaders[16]	14 KIs
Subject matter experts (SMEs)[17]	11 KIs
Returnees (less than 3 months ago)	9 KIs
IDPs (displaced from the area)[18]	6 KIs
Returnees (more than 3 months ago)	5 KIs

45 KIs[19]

RWG Iraq — Returns Working Group

REACH — Informing more effective humanitarian action

Key findings

- The situation regarding returns to Al-Siniya remained fluid, with KIs reporting **ongoing returns and more projected in the six months following data collection**, driven primarily by decisions surrounding camp closures or fear of it, followed by family reunification. In general, the majority of KIs believed that **recent returns had positively impacted the community** by reinvigorating the local labour market and public institutions, as returns brought business owners, professionals, and skilled workers back to Al-Siniya.

- In addition to **lack of public services** and **job opportunities** in Al-Siniya, issues related to **access to housing, land and property (HLP)** were reported as the **main barriers to return**. This included heavily damaged or destroyed housing and inability of households to claim HLP due to missing, expired or damaged documentation. Lack of documentation was most commonly reported by IDP KIs from the community displaced elsewhere. Failed returns were also reported by KIs mainly due to damaged or destroyed housing and lack of services and livelihoods. According to a REACH Informal Sites Intentions Survey from December 2020, 57% of IDP households interviewed in an informal site in Salah Al-Din Governorate indicated Al-Siniya Sub-district as their area of origin. Reportedly, all these households intended to remain in the displacement site in the shorter and longer terms (3 and 12 months following data collection respectively). Their intentions to return were mainly affected by the heavy damage or destruction of their houses in the sub-district.

- The majority of KIs believed that **most of the households in Al-Siniya resided in owned houses** and **had ownership documents**. However, a third of **older returnee** KIs (more than 3 months prior to data collection) reported that households in this specific displacement group **resided in unfinished buildings** under **verbal rental agreement**, therefore they had more insecure tenure and were **more at risk of eviction in the longer term**.

- Reportedly, **returnees and IDPs from the community** persistently **faced challenges in accessing housing rehabilitation** and **disadvantaged access to compensation mechanisms**. Returnee and IDP KIs reported a lack of support or outright denial from relevant public departments regarding compensation, delays for their applied compensation claims and a lack of legal support to file their claims, and the inability of many households to rehabilitate their housing using their own financial resources.

- The perceived **lack of public services and job opportunities** in Al-Siniya reportedly prevented further returns, and were identified as **reasons for household failed returns** to their AoO in the sub-district. In addition, **further returns** concerned a minority of KIs due to the **perceived negative impact on access to basic public services and livelihoods** with the increase of households in the sub-district. KIs reported their concerns regarding future returns to also be a result of the lack of general preparedness to cover the potential increased demand for services, due to the high level of infrastructure destruction from military operations and the lack of specialized staff such as doctors, nurses and teachers remaining in displacement.

- KIs from different population groups prioritized community needs differently. **Livelihoods and access to food assistance** were the most commonly reported **primary community needs for returnee KIs** (recent and older returnees). **Community leader and SME KIs** reported the **need for further efforts to develop healthcare infrastructure and housing rehabilitation** as their primary community needs. In general, the majority of KIs reported the presence of humanitarian activities and projects in Al-Siniya mainly implemented by humanitarian actors. The most **needed interventions to encourage returns** were reportedly **access to housing and infrastructure rehabilitation** and to **livelihood programmes**.

- KIs reported an **overall decrease in the availability of job opportunities compared to 2014**. Reportedly, the types of jobs available had also shifted, with governmental jobs (public administration and defence); trade, hotels and restaurants; and transportation less available in 2021, compared to 2014. KIs reported that several sectors were not as affected by the decrease in job opportunities, such as: agriculture, due to the return of skilled workers; the oil industry, with the recapture of the Al-Siniya oil refinery from ISIL in October 2015[20] and subsequent reopening in November 2017;[21] and construction, due to the ongoing repair and rehabilitation work to rebuild the sub-district after the conflict.

- In general, **all returnee KIs** noted that **community members felt safe or very safe in Al-Siniya**. The vast majority of returnee KIs reported that **households interacted with IDPs in the community but mostly within the same group (returnees)**. Additionally, there were **no reported movement restrictions** for women, girls,[22] men and boys during the day or night. However, almost half of the KIs reported the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the sub-district, which may have led to households avoiding certain areas.

- Generally, **local authorities** were reportedly the **most influential bodies in terms of governance**, however over a quarter of community leader and SME KIs reported that **tribal leaders** had a decisive role and **influence in participation of households in decision-making processes**. In addition, the tribal system reportedly influenced acceptance of returnees in the community and affected the decision of IDPs to return. It was exemplified by returnee KIs reporting that some households felt welcome to the area due to their bonds (friendship or kinship ties) to specific tribes in Al-Siniya. At the same time, some displaced households felt less welcome and feared to return due to outstanding inter-communal disputes involving specific tribes and they had concerns of being perceived as ISIL-affiliated which may lead to retaliation incidents in case they decided to return.

- Reported participation in decision-making processes varied with KI profiles. The **majority of IDP KIs from the community** and **older returnee KIs** reported that **most of households were not involved in decision-making processes**. In contrast, **all recent returnee KIs** and a **few older returnee KIs** reported that their **households were involved in decision-making processes**. One possible explanation for this difference could be the connection that each household had with existing tribal systems.

🏃 Recent households return movements

24-36 households returned to Al-Siniya in the six months prior to data collection, as reported by 26 KIs (out of 45). The rest of the KIs reported no returns (16 KIs) or did not know about recent movements (3 KIs).

Returns were reported from camps in Kirkuk (11 KIs), Salah Al-Din (5 KIs), and Erbil (4 KIs) governorates. Other households reportedly returned from non-camp areas in Al-Suleimaniyah (2 KIs), Erbil (1 KI) and Kirkuk (1 KI) governorates; and, Tikri (2 KIs) and Samarra (1 KI) districts.[23]

Reported drivers for returns (out of 26 KIs)[23]

Driver	KIs
Camp closures in area of displacement (AoD)	19 KIs
Following the return of other extended family members	6 KIs
Sense of increased safety and security	2 KIs
Availability of basic public services	1 KI
Nostalgia about previous life	1 KI
Did not know	3 KIs

In addition to the above reported drivers for returns, one SME KI reported that some households returned because they believed that public employees felt obligated to return.

The vast majority of KIs reporting that there had been recent returns reported that these movements were perceived as positive (23 KIs out of 26). The main reasons for this were related to the perceived restoration of the stability in the area (11 KIs) as well as the improved economic situation (8 KIs). Some KIs also reported recent returns leading to a (notable) revitalization of the labour market (7 KIs), mainly attributed to the return of employers (7 KIs) and the rehabilitation of shops and markets (3 KIs). There were additional reports of the return of skilled workers (3 KIs), leading to agricultural developments (1 KI). Many KIs reported that the return of households placed pressure on the government to rebuild houses and rehabilitate damaged public institutions, namely hospitals, schools, roads, and water compounds (9 KIs). KIs reported that this pressure directly led to the government's reconstruction of houses (6 KIs), and together with the return of professionals like medical and educational personnel (5 KIs), facilitated the reopening of basic public service facilities (6 KIs).[23]

While many KIs reported positive impacts relating to recent returns, three KIs reported negative impacts, mainly related to the lack of preparedness of public facilities in the sub-district to provide enough services for the whole population and thereby to absorb the increase in population (2 KIs), as well as the lack of job opportunities immediately available for those returning, coupled with the increased workforce competition (especially for youth), and the increased tensions arising as a result of outstanding inter-communal disputes (1 KI).[23]

Reported recent return movements to Al-Siniya (in the last six months)

- Return movement from camps
- Return movement from non-camp areas
- Sub-district of origin
- Districts

Displacement location
- Governorate
- District
- Camps

🏃→ Recent failed return of households

The majority of KIs reported no attempted returns (26 KIs out of 45), did not know (14 KIs), or refused to answer (1 KI). However, four KIs reported that:

95-133 households attempted to return to Al-Siniya in the six months prior to data collection but did not succeed.

Reportedly, some households attempted to return from Laylan IDP camp in Kirkuk Governorate (1 KI) and other failed returns were reported from non-camp areas in Tikri (1 KI) and Samarra (1 KI) districts; and, Erbil (1 KI) and Kirkuk (1 KI) governorates.[23]

One KI reported that households that attempted to return from the camp were re-displaced to Al-Daour, Tikri, and Samarra districts. Those who unsuccessfully intended to return from Erbil and Kirkuk governorates were re-displaced to Tikri District (2 KIs), and households who failed to return from Tikri and Samarra districts moved back to the same previous locations (2 KIs).[23]

Reported reasons for failed returns (out of 4 KIs)[23]

Destroyed/damaged housing	**4 KIs**
Lack of job opportunities in AoO	**4 KIs**
Lack of basic public services in AoO	**4 KIs**
Absence of specialised medical treatment in AoO	**3 KIs**
Availability of job opportunities in AoD	**1 KI**
Unstable security in AoO	**1 KI**

All of the KIs (4) who reported failed returns believed that these movement had negative impacts in the community. The majority refused to provide additional information about the impact of failed returns in the community (3 KIs), while one IDP KI from the community reported that unsuccessful attempts of return discouraged other households or negatively influenced their decision to return. Households choosing not to return remained in displacement and could experience difficult living conditions, whether they resided in a formal camp or non-camp area.[23]

Reported re-displacement movements after failed returns to Al-Siniya (in the last six months)

- ← Return from camps
- ◄- - - Return from non-camp area
- ← Re-displacement to Tikrit after failed from returns
- ← Re-displacement to Samara after failed from returns
- ← Re-displacement to Al-Duar after failed from returns
- 🔴 Sub-district of origin
- ⬚ Districts

Displacement location
- Governorate
- District
- ⬛ Camps

🏃 Recent IDP household departures

The majority of KIs reported no IDP departures (24 KIs out of 39),[24] did not know (5 KIs), or refused to answer (1 KI). However, nine KIs reported that:

5-8 **IDP households** (originally from other areas outside of Al-Siniya) departed from the sub-district in the six months prior to data collection.

Reportedly, some IDP households secondarily displaced to non-camp areas in Tikri District (5 KIs out of 9) and Kirkuk Governorate (1 KI), mainly due to the lack of job opportunities in Al-Siniya (6 KIs), lack of services (6 KIs), and the perceived availability of jobs in the displacement areas (6 KI).[23]

Other IDP households were reported returning to their AoO in Beygee District (2 KIs out of 9), mainly due to economic factors like the lack of job opportunities in Al-Siniya (1 KI), as well as perceptions around the improved economy and availability of livelihood opportunities in their AoO (1 KI). One KI did not know where the households displaced to.[23]

Overall reported reasons for IDP departures (out of 9 KIs)[23]

Lack of job opportunities	**8 KIs**
Lack of basic public services	**7 KIs**
Availability of job opportunities in new AoD	**7 KIs**
Absence of specialised medical treatment in Al-Siniya	**3 KIs**

Reported IDP movements from Al-Siniya (in the last six months)

- ⟶ IDPs return to their area of origin
- ⟶ IDPs secondary displacement
- 🔴 Sub-district of displacement
- ⬚ Districts

Displacement location
- Governorate
- District
- District of origin

Al-Hamdaniya
Al-Mosul
Al-Shirqat
Erbil Governorate
Erbil
Makhmour
Koysinjaq
Dibis
Kirkuk
Chamchamal
Beygee District
Al-Hawiga
Kirkuk Governorate
Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate
Al-Siniya Sub-district
Daquq
Kalar
Ana
Al-Anbar Governorate
Tooz Khurmato
Tikrit District
Al-Daur
Kifri
Diyala Governorate
Haditha
Salah Al Din Governorate
Al-Khalis
Khanaqin

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👪 Family separation and reunification plans

10 KIs (out of 25)[25] reported that there **were households with immediate family members who remained displaced** at the time of data collection. The rest of the KIs reported no family separation cases (10 KIs) or refused to answer (5 KIs).

Adult sons

All KIs who reported existence of family separation cases in the sub-district (10 KIs), stated that adult sons were the family members who remained in displacement. KIs reporting adult sons remaining in displacement explained this to be because of the lack of job opportunities in their AoO (5 KIs), having existing employment in the AoD (4 KIs), damaged/destroyed housing in AoO (3 KIs), limited resources to return (3 KIs), having children who were already registered for school in AoD (1 KI), and requiring medical treatment available in AoD (1 KI).[23]

Wife, minor sons and daughters

According to two SMEs KIs, some households had wives and children who remained in displacement. The main reasons were the

level of reported damage to housing and its inadequate living standards for residential purposes (2 KIs), and insufficient resources for the entire family to return (2 KIs). These households had children who were reportedly involved at school in AoD (1 KI), which also affected families' decisions to return during the 2020-2021 academic year. In addition, the reported lack of job opportunities in AoO (1 KI) prevented the head of the household to be reunited with the rest of the family members while being unable to ensure dignified living conditions for them to return.[23]

Members of the extended family

According to two KIs, some households had members of the extended family who remained in displacement due to lack of jobs in AoO (2 KIs), damaged housing (2 KIs), limited resources to return (2 KIs) and lack of job opportunities in AoO (1 KI).[23]

Family reunification plans

9 KIs (out of 10) reported that when job opportunities are available in Al-Siniya, families will be reunited. One KI did not know.

🏃 Expected household returns

The majority of KIs reported no expected returns (18 KIs out of 45) or did not know about these movements (15 KIs). However, 12 KIs reported that:

54-103 **households** were expected to return to Al-Siniya in the six months following data collection.

Of those KIs reporting expected returns, they reported these households to be arriving from non-camp areas in Kirkuk (5 KIs) and Erbil (1 KI) governorates, and from Tikri (3 KIs), Samarra (1 KI), and Daour districts (1 KI).[23]

Reported drivers for expected returns (out of 12 KIs)[23]

Following the return of other extended family members	5 KIs	
Camp closures	3 KIs	
Sense of increased safety and security	2 KIs	
Availability of basic public services	2 KIs	
Did not know	1 KI	

Compared to recent movements, expected additional returns were perceived to have positive and negative impacts. Over half of the KIs believed that additional returns might have positive effects in the sub-district and its community (26 KIs out of 45). This was mainly due to the projected restoration of the labour market (14 KIs) with the return of shop owners (4 KIs) and skilled workers (6 KIs), which will also have an impact in agriculture reactivation (2 KIs). This was also reported due to the potential reconstruction of damaged houses (12 KIs) resulting from the pressure on the government to rebuild houses and infrastructure (7 KIs). Other expected impacts, reported by KIs, were the reopening of public and governmental services and institutions (10 KIs); stabilization of the area (12 KIs) by the re-population of the sub-district with its original families (8 KIs) and family reunification (3 KIs), offering new opportunities for social cohesion (3 KIs).[23]

However, slightly less than half of KIs reported that, while further returns might have positive effects in the longer term, these movements may create negative impacts in the shorter terms until contingencies are put in place to absorb the increase in population in the sub-district and their demand for services, housing, and livelihoods (19 out of 45 KIs). The most commonly reported negative effects were the potential reduction of services for all members of the community (8 KIs), an increase of the workforce for limited available job opportunities (7 KIs) and expected occurrence of internal disputes affecting social cohesion (3 KIs). This situation reportedly may lead to unsustainable returns forcing households to re-displace (2 KIs).[23]

Reported barriers for further returns (out of 45 KIs)[23]

Access to housing

Destroyed/damaged housing	45 KIs	
Lack of necessary documentation to claim properties	7 KIs	
Housing rented in AoO	4 KIs	

Access to livelihoods and basic public services

Lack of job opportunities	34 KIs	
Lack of basic public services	28 KIs	

Safety and security

Denial of security clearance[26, 27]	5 KIs	
Concerns about security in AoO	5 KIs	
Fear of being perceived as affiliated with ISIL	5 KIs	
Fear of community discrimination or persecution in AoO	1 KI	

Other barriers

Fear of contracting COVID-19	3 KIs	
Preferred life in AoD	2 KIs	

Reported expected return movements to Al-Siniya (in the next six months)

— ← Return movement from camps
--- ◄- Return movement from non-camp areas
⬤ Sub-district of origin
Districts

Displacement location
Governorate
District
⛺ Camps

🏃→ Expected host community[28] departures

The majority of KIs reported no expected departures (23 KIs out of 39)[24] or did not know about these movements (12 KIs). However, four KIs reported that:

28-34 **host community households** were expected to depart from Al-Siniya in the six months following data collection.

Reportedly, these households were expected to depart to non-camp areas in Tikri District (3 KIs out of 4) and Kirkuk (1 KI) and Erbil (1 KI) governorates.[23]

All KIs who reported expected host community household departure believed that the main drivers for these movements were equally (4 KIs): Lack of job opportunities in Al-Siniya, lack of basic public services, lack of medical treatment in the sub-district, and availability of job opportunities in other areas.

🏃→ Expected IDP household arrivals

The majority of KIs reported no expected IDP arrivals (25 KIs out of 39)[24] or did not know about these movements (13 KIs). However, one KI reported that:

20-30 **IDP households** were expected to secondarily displace to Al-Siniya in the six months following data collection.

Reportedly, these IDP households were expected to arrive from Al-Karama camp in Salah Al-Din Governorate, pushed by its closure. To analyse the reasons for IDP households arrival to Al-Siniya, it is important to consider the proximity of Al-Karama camp to the sub-district boundaries. KIs believed that these households displaced to Al-Siniya encouraged by the presence of other extended family members there. Reportedly, IDP households perceived Al-Siniya as a transition area to stay until they re-displace again to another area or decide to return to their AoO.

Reported expected host community and IDP movements from and to Al-Siniya (in the next six months)

- ⇢ Expected host community departure movement
- ← Expected IDP arrivals from camps
- 🔴 Al-Siniya Sub-district
- Districts

Displacement location
- Governorate
- District
- 🔺 Camps

RWG Iraq — Returns Working Group

REACH Informing more effective humanitarian action

Primary community needs

Primary community needs in AI-Siniya (out of 39 KIs)[23, 24]

	First Need	Second Need	Third Need
Housing rehabilitation	25 KIs	3 KIs	2 KIs
Livelihoods	2 KIs	11 KIs	7 KIs
Healthcare	3 KIs	8 KIs	8 KIs
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)	3 KIs	0 KIs	12 KIs
Education Cash assistance	1 KI	5 KIs	4 KIs
Electricity	2 KIs	3 KIs	2 KIs
Infrastructure rehabilitation	1 KI	4 KIs	2 KIs

Other less reported primary needs were removal of ERWs (3 KIs out of 39),[24] access to food assistance (2 KIs), reconciliation and social cohesion programmes (2 KIs), access to documentation (1 KI), and security (1 KI).

The most commonly reported primary need in the community was **access to housing rehabilitation** (30 KIs out of 39).[24] KIs reported that the high proportion of destroyed or damaged housing (30 KIs), the lack of compensation for rehabilitation (15 KIs), the missing support from the government (5 KIs) and the limited support from humanitarian actors (2 KIs) made housing rehabilitation the main requirement to encourage returns (18 KIs). In addition, the reported lack of compensation offices in the sub-district forced individuals to move to other areas to present their compensation claim files (2 KIs). Lastly, one KI reported that housing reconstruction would ensure job opportunities for youths.[23]

The second most commonly reported primary community need was **access to livelihoods** (20 KIs out of 39).[24] KIs reported that the lack of decent job opportunities[29] (18 KIs) and the incapacity of households to provide and meet their basic needs with dignity (12 KIs) led to an increase in poverty levels in the sub-district (5 KIs). In addition, KIs reported that access to livelihoods was considered a requirement for households to return (10 KIs) and that governmental support to ensure job opportunities in this regard was needed (7 KIs).[23]

The third most commonly reported main community need was **access to healthcare** (19 KIs out of 39)[24] (see section on access to basic public services on page 10).

Most commonly reported primary community needs per KI profile[23, 30]

Community leaders (out of 14 KIs)

WASH	8 KIs
Housing rehabilitation	7 KIs
Healthcare	7 KIs

SMEs (out of 11 KIs)

Housing rehabilitation	11 KIs
Healthcare	6 KIs
Livelihoods	5 KIs

Recent returnees (out of 5 KIs)

Food assistance	5 KIs
Livelihoods	4 KIs
Cash assistance	3 KIs

Older returnees (out of 9 KIs)

Livelihoods	7 KIs
Food	6 KIs
Non-food items	5 KIs

Access to humanitarian aid and impact on returns

31 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that **there were humanitarian activities or projects implemented in AI-Siniya**. The rest of the KIs reported that there were no activities implemented (3 KIs) or did not know (2 KIs).

Reported activities implemented in AI-Siniya (out of 31 KIs)[23]

WASH	13 KIs
Housing and infrastructure rehabilitation	11 KIs
Cash assistance	11 KIs
Livelihoods programmes	9 KIs
Food security programmes	7 KIs
Social cohesion	4 KIs
Non-food items (NFI) distributions	3 KIs
COVID-19 awareness	2 KIs

The majority of KIs reported that these activities or projects were implemented primarily by humanitarian actors (30 KIs out of 39),[24] followed by local authorities (9 KIs). One KI reported that security actors were providing livelihoods services, suggesting a potential recruitment of youth returnee males in armed groups. According to one KI, local community members supported in the implementation of social cohesion activities and access to livelihoods.[23]

Reportedly, returnees (6 KIs out of 14)[31] were less involved than other displacement groups in the implementation cycle for these activities or projects, followed by IDPs in the community (3 KIs). The rest of the KIs believed that all displacement groups were similarly involved in these activities or projects (2 KIs), did not know (2 KIs), or refused to answer (2 KIs).[23]

Regarding vulnerable groups, a small number of KIs reported that female heads of household (2 KIs out of 14)[31] and elderly persons (1 KI) were less involved in these activities or projects than other vulnerable groups.[32] The majority of KIs believed that all vulnerable groups were affected the same way (3 KIs), did not know (3 KIs), or refused to answer (5 KIs).

16 KIs (out of 20)[33] reported that **the availability of humanitarian aid would be a factor encouraging returns to AI-Siniya**. The rest of the KIs believed that it would not affect decisions to return (3 KIs) or did not know (1 KI).

The most needed activities or projects to encourage returns to the sub-district were reported to be (16 KIs out of 20):[33]

Housing rehabilitation	**14 KIs**
Infrastructure rehabilitation	1 KI
Livelihoods	1 KI

Perceptions on access to housing, housing rehabilitation and compensation

35 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that **the majority of households in Al-Siniya resided in houses**. A few KIs reported that some older returnee households resided in unfinished buildings (3 KIs). In addition, one community leader KI reported that few households were accommodated in a community center in Al-Siniya.

Reported types of housing agreement for the majority of households (out of 39 KIs)[24]

Owned tenure	**33 KIs**
Verbal rental agreement	**5 KIs**
Hosted in community center	**1 KI**

Access to HLP documentation

Of those who reported that the majority of households owned housing in Al-Siniya (33 KIs out of 39),[24] the majority (24 KIs) believed that these households had ownership documents.

A small number of KIs reported that some households did not have HLP documentation to prove ownership (9 KIs out of 33), namely:[23]

Heirs deed certificate	**7 KIs**
Housing endorsement certificate	**5 KIs**
Property certificate	**5 KIs**

One SME KI believed that a few households never had ownership documents. The rest of the KIs (3 KIs) did not know about households access to documentation.

Reported reasons for resorting to renting agreements

A few KIs (5 KIs of out 39)[24] reported households residing in rented houses in the sub-district following the destruction or damaging of their owned house. In addition, three of these same KIs reported that some households never owned a house in the sub-district and therefore resided in rented houses.[23]

Evictions

The majority of returnee KIs (9 KIs out of 14),[31] believed that there were no households or families evicted (5 KIs) or did not know about evictions (4 KIs). However, one older returnee KI reported that between 5 and 10 households were evicted in the six months prior to data collection. The reasons behind the eviction of those households were reportedly: the inability of the households to continue paying rent; the rented houses being occupied needed rehabilitation; the landlord planned to use or sell property; and the landlord refused to continue hosting these households.

In the longer term, the majority of KIs did not know about affected groups regarding evictions (4 KIs out of 14),[31] believed that all groups could be at risk of eviction (3 KIs), or refused to answer (2 KIs). However, older returnee households were reportedly more at risk of eviction in the longer term (4 KIs), followed by IDP households in the community (2 KIs). From a vulnerability perspective,[32] the majority of KIs did not know about affected groups (7 KIs) or believed that all groups could be at risk of eviction (4 KIs).[23]

A few KIs reported that female-headed households (2 KIs), large households[34] (1 KI), and families with members with alleged links to ISIL (1 KI) were more at risk of eviction in the longer term.[23]

Access to housing rehabilitation

76%-85% **of houses in Al-Siniya were reportedly destroyed or heavily damaged** during the military operations between 2014 and 2015, according to all KIs who were consulted for this section (39 KIs).[24]

32 KIs (out of 45) reported that households faced challenges in accessing housing rehabilitation in the sub-district.

Reportedly, households lacked financial resources to rehabilitate houses by themselves (15 KIs out of 32) and were affected by the lack of financial support for housing rehabilitation from the government (3 KIs). To overcome those challenges, all KIs (32 KIs) believed that some support could be provided, such as:[23]

Financial support	**28 KIs**
Housing rehabilitation and reconstruction projects	**27 KIs**
Legal support on HLP	**12 KIs**

Regarding affected groups, returnees were reportedly the most affected when attempting to access housing rehabilitation (8 KIs out of 16),[35] followed by IDPs from the community (7 KIs). The rest of the KIs believed that all groups were equally affected (4 KIs), or did not know (2 KIs). While analysing vulnerabilities,[32] the majority of KIs reported that all groups were equally affected (5 KIs out of 16),[35] or did not know (3 KIs), or refused to answer (2 KIs). The rest of the KIs reported that female-headed households (6 KIs), elderly people (4 KIs), people with special needs or disabilities (2 KIs), minor-headed households (1 KI), and families with members with alleged links to ISIL (1 KI) faced more challenges when attempting to access housing rehabilitation compared to other groups.[23]

Access to compensation mechanisms

28 KIs (out of 45) reported that **the majority of households in Al-Siniya had difficulties in accessing the government compensation on damaged properties**. The rest of the KIs reported that households received compensation (17 KIs).

Reportedly, out of 28 KIs, perceptions toward the compensation process included:[23]

Long, complicated and "tedious" process	**18 KIs**
Households will not be compensated at the end	**15 KIs**
Lack of trust in the government capacity to support	**3 KIs**

KIs reported a lack of support from the relevant public department regarding compensation (17 KIs out of 45), delays for applied compensation claims (14 KIs) and a lack of legal assistance to present those files (11 KIs). In addition, the sub-district reportedly lacked specialised judges and a public department to claim compensation (3 KIs), which forced affected households to move to other areas in order to process their claims (3 KIs). This process was reportedly worsened by the presence of intermediaries (1 KI) and the circulation of illegal transactions for compensation (1 KI). This situation was identified by KIs as a potential barrier for further returns (4 KIs).[23]

🏫 Perceptions on access to basic public services

28 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that **households faced challenges in accessing basic public services in the sub-district**. The rest of the KIs reported no challenges in access (4 KIs), did not know (4 KIs), or refused to answer (3 KIs).

Reported affected basic public services (out of 28)[23]

Healthcare	25 KIs
WASH	22 KIs
Education	18 KIs
Electricity	12 KIs

Challenges to access basic public services

Reportedly, these services were mainly affected by the high level of infrastructure destruction from military operations between 2014 and 2015 (20 KIs out of 28), followed by the lack of specialised staff such as doctors, nurses, and teachers who remained in displacement (9 KIs). This situation was also allegedly affected by the lack of financial allocations from the government to rehabilitate infrastructure in the sub-district (8 KIs), the slow progress of ongoing rehabilitation works (8 KIs) and the limited support from humanitarian actors (1 KI), which acted as a barrier to returns (2 KIs). In addition, KIs reported that the limited service hours for electricity and water (7 KIs) negatively affected the operation or opening of some public departments/offices (1 KI).[23]

"Among the services provided to citizens in the sub-district, water is available only from a few water stations, but these lack an emergency power line to be operated continuously. There is no sewage network. The hospital is destroyed, there are healthcare centers which lack capacity for treatments due to the limited presence of medical personnel and necessary equipment. And additionally, schools are mostly destroyed."

- Male recent returnee KI -

Returnees was reportedly the group who faced the largest challenges when attempting to access basic public services (9 KIs out of 12).[36] The rest of the KIs did not know (3 KIs). Regarding vulnerabilities, the majority of KIs did not know about affected groups (5 KIs), believed that all groups were equally affected (3 KIs), or refused to answer (1 KI). However, other KIs reported that female-headed households (3 KIs), people with special needs or disabilities (1 KI), and unaccompanied or separated children (UASC) (1 KI) faced more challenges when attempting to access basic public services compared to other groups.[23]

Access to public healthcare

Reportedly, the health facilities in the sub-district were damaged during the military operations in 2014 (12 KIs out of 28), and the available primary healthcare center (PHC) operation capacity was not enough to cover the health needs in the sub-district (9 KIs). In addition, the reported lack of medical staff (8 KIs) and medications (6 KIs) concluded in a perceived reduced quality of healthcare services (3 KIs). This situation, reportedly forced households to resort to private doctors and hospitals (4 KIs), moving to other areas to receive medical treatment (2 KIs) for elevated prices (1 KI) which negatively affected the expenses of households with lower income (2 KIs).[23]

"There is no hospital in the sub-district. The public health center does not provide full services and has a limited capacity for hospitalization admission. A trend was identified for patients who are not able to take care of themselves. Patients with psychological and psychiatric diseases, malnutrition or elderly tend to stay longer at the medical centers, or to return back after they are discharged. This is increasing the burden on the medical facility and available staff."

- Female older returnee KI -

Access to public water, sanitation, and waste management

When analysing WASH components separately, findings showed that **access to water** was reportedly affected by the destruction or serious damage to the public water network (7 KIs out of 28), which was allegedly worsened by the lack of maintenance of the network and water filters (7 KIs). This situation reportedly forced households to rely on insufficient (7 KIs) and polluted potable water (2 KIs). Consequently, households were compelled to purchase water (3 KIs) for increased prices (1 KI), mainly affecting households with a larger number of members (1 KI).[23]

Access to sanitation: one KI (out of 28) reported concerns around environmental deterioration due to the level of destruction or damage to the sewage network in the sub-district and waste being delivered to a communal open pit without filtering or treatment system in place.

Waste management: the accumulation of waste in the sub-district was identified in residential areas (3 KIs out of 28), mainly due to the lack of waste transportation services (2 KIs), the lack of garbage containers in the area (1 KI), and negligence from relevant authorities and public employees (1 KI). This situation reportedly represented an environmental concern for the population of the sub-district (2 KIs), especially when community members started to burn their waste as a means of disposal (1 KI).[23]

Access to public education

Access to public education was considered affected because most of the schools in the sub-district were destroyed or seriously damaged during the military operations between 2014 and 2015 (5 KIs out of 28). In addition, KIs reported a lack of a free-of-cost provision of curriculum compared to the academic years before 2014 (4 KIs), compelling households to purchase them instead (3 KIs), a lack of educational staff (many remain displaced) (2 KIs), operational schools being overcrowded (1 KI), and a lack of furniture and equipment needed for schools to properly operate (1KI).[23]

Access to public electricity

Access to public electricity was reportedly limited by the deterioration of, or serious damage to, the electrical network as a result of the military operations in 2014 (5 KIs out of 28). Other reasons for the limited access were related to a lack of maintenance for the overall network and transformers (3 KIs), as well as a lack of maintenance for vehicles, equipment, and staff (2 KIs) resulting in limited hours of operational electricity (2 KIs). This situation reportedly affected the provision of water (2 KIs) and forced some households to resort to private generators (1 KI).[23]

"The lack of water, electricity, health and sanitation services is one of the factors that led to families not returning to their AoO."

- Female recent returnee KI -

RWG Iraq
Returns Working Group

REACH Informing more effective humanitarian action

🏚️ Perceptions on access to livelihoods

26 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that **households faced challenges in accessing livelihoods**. The rest of the KIs did not know (6 KIs), refused to answer (4 KIs), or believed that there were no challenges to access livelihoods (3 KIs, representing perceptions of two community leader KIs and one SME KI).

The main challenges reported included: lack of financial support from the government and humanitarian actors for business start-ups (12 KIs out of 26), mostly affecting the private sector (6 KIs); the lack of compensation for those who lost their workshops, business, or shops (1 KI). Reportedly, other conditions also negatively affected access to livelihoods in the sub-district, mainly related to limited construction opportunities (5 KIs), a lack of factories (3 KIs), a damaged agricultural sector (3 KIs) which forced individuals to look for job opportunities outside the sub-district (5 KIs). Looking for jobs was challenging reportedly due to the need for connections to find employment (3 KIs), the high level of competition in the daily labour market (3 KIs), and the requirement of many available jobs to have skilled workers (1 KI). This contrasts with a reported lack of skilled labour available.[23]

"The lack of cash for work projects and the weakness of local authorities to ensure job opportunities, in addition to the lack of financial support, affected IDPs' decision to return and forced us to work outside the sub-district."

- Female recent returnee KI -

Most reported livelihood sectors available in Al-Siniya at the time of data collection (out of 39 KIs)[23, 24]

Sector	KIs
Construction	17 KIs
Oil industry	15 KIs
Agriculture	14 KIs
Healthcare (public and private)	8 KIs
Public education	5 KIs
Manufacturing	2 KIs
Trade, hotels, and restaurants	1 KI
Transportation	1 KI
Finance	1 KI

When the KIs were asked to compare which types of jobs were available in the sub-district before 2014 and at the time of the data collection, the availability had reportedly decreased. The KIs were asked to recall the period before 2014 and the perceived difference is hence to be understood keeping this in mind. In addition, the seasonality aspect of the situation at the time of data collection might have had an impact on the perceived availabilty. The most affected of the available sectors were reportedly trade, hotels, and restaurants; transportation mostly affected by the reported deterioration of roads (2 KIs); public healthcare affected by the reported displacement of professionals (8 KIs) and infrastructure destruction (4 KIs); and manufacturing assumed to the reported destruction of workshops (3 KIs).

In addition, findings suggested that the decrease in the availability of jobs was less significant in construction, the oil industry and agriculture. This can potentially be attributed to the high level of reconstruction of houses and infrastructure (6 KIs), the repossession

of the Al-Siniya oil refinery from ISIL in November 2017[20, 21] and the revitalization of the agricultural sector following the return of skilled workers (3 KIs).

Returnees, mostly older returnees, were reported to face more challenges in accessing livelihoods, compared to other groups (7 KIs out of 10).[36] The rest of the KIs did not know (2 KIs) or believed all groups were equally affected (1 KI). In terms of vulnerabilities,[32] the majority of KIs believed that all vulnerable groups were equally affected (3 KIs), did not know (3 KIs), or refused to answer (1 KI). However, other KIs reported that female heads of household (3 KIs) and elderly people (1 KI) had less access to livelihoods opportunities. Reportedly, minor-headed households were affected by limited access to incomes (1 KI).[23]

Livelihood sectors of interest for returnees[23]

The most commonly reported livelihood sector of interest for recent and older returnee households/individuals was agriculture.

Recent returnees (out of 5 KIs)[23]	Sector	Older returnees (out of 9 KIs)[23]
4 KIs	Agriculture	7 KIs
1 KI	Construction	5 KIs
1 KI	Manufacturing	3 KIs
3 KIs	Healthcare	2 KIs
3 KIs	Education	2 KIs
3 KIs	Oil industry	1 KI

Findings showed that perceptions changed with KIs' gender (see chart below).[37] Male returnee KIs mostly reported households' interest in agriculture, education, and the oil industry, while female returnee KIs reported agriculture, construction, and healthcare as the households' main sectors of interest.

Female returnee KIs (out of 7 KIs)[23]	Sector	Male returnee KIs (out of 7 KIs)[23]
4 KIs	Agriculture	7 KIs
4 KIs	Construction	2 KIs
3 KIs	Healthcare	2 KIs
2 KIs	Education	3 KIs
2 KIs	Manufacturing	2 KIs
2 KIs	Trade, hotels, and restaurants	0 KIs
1 KI	Oil industry	3 KIs

Livelihood sectors with reported growth potential[23]

22 KIs (out of 25),[38] representing community leaders and SMEs, reported that agriculture (13 KIs) and construction (11 KIs), followed by the oil industry (3 KIs) and healthcare (3 KIs), were the sectors which showed higher growth potential in the 12 months following data collection. The rest of the KIs did not know (2 KIs) or refused to answer (1 KI).

🏛 Perceptions on governance[39]

12 KIs (out of 25)[38] believed that **local authorities were the most influential bodies in terms of governance**. The rest of the KIs refused to answer (9 KIs) or did not know (3 KIs).

Reported influential local actors related to governance (out of 13 KIs)[23]

Local authorities	**12 KIs**	
Tribal leaders	**7 KIs**	
Mukhtars[15]	**3 KIs**	

"Tribal leaders have a very important role in solving problems and conflicts. As the security forces do not intervene in some cases, the elders or notables from the tribe are considered important intermediaries for the community in the sub-district."

- Female older returnee KI -

Influential bodies in terms of IDP and returnee affairs

24 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that **there were no bodies or structures in place to influence IDP and returnee affairs**. The rest of the KIs refused to answer (8 KIs) or did not know (7 KIs).

Participation of returnee and IDP households from the community in decision-making processes

11 KIs (out of 20)[33] reported that **returnee and IDP households from the community did not participate in decision-making processes**. One KI did not know.

However, eight KIs - mostly recent returnees - reported households participation in decision-making processes. This was because of the reported kinship ties (4 KIs) and *"old, strong bonds"* (2 KIs) some households had with other families in Al-Siniya.

⚖ Access to public judicial mechanisms

The majority of KIs believed that households did not face challenges in accessing public judicial mechanisms (15 KIs out of 39),[24] refused to answer (6 KIs), or did not know (1 KI).

17 KIs (out of 39)[24] reported that households faced challenges in accessing public judicial mechanisms.

All the 17 KIs, who reported that households faced challenges in accessing public judicial mechanisms, mentioned the reason being the destruction of the court building in Al-Siniya. Moreover, one KI reported a lack of legal authority in the sub-district to process legal files. This situation reportedly forced individuals to travel to other areas, namely to Tikri and Beygee districts, to present their legal files and compensation claims (5 KIs).[23]

Returnees, mostly recent returnees, reportedly faced more challenges in accessing public judicial mechanism compared to other groups (3 KIs out of 7),[36] followed by IDPs (2 KIs). The rest of the KIs did not know (4 KIs), believed all groups were equally affected (1 KI), or refused to answer (1 KI). In terms of vulnerabilities,[32] the majority of KIs did not know (5 KIs), believed that all vulnerable groups were equally affected (1 KI), or refused to answer (1 KI).[23]

Status of public offices or departments

The majority of KIs believed there were **no closed offices or departments** (14 KIs out of 39),[24] refused to answer (4 KIs), or did not know (3 KIs). However, 18 KIs reported that there were public offices or departments closed in Al-Siniya at the time of data collection.

Whereas the majority of returnee and SME KIs seemed to report closed public offices, community leader KIs seemed to have the perception that this was not the case.

Reported closed public offices or departments (out of 18 KIs)[23]

Al-Siniya court	**18 KIs**	
Civil status department	**12 KIs**	
Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD)	**9 KIs**	
Police station	**4 KIs**	

Reported reasons for institutional closure (out of 18 KIs)[23]

Destroyed/damaged public building	**18 KIs**	
Specialised staff remained displaced	**8 KIs**	
Lack of funding for rehabilitation	**3 KIs**	
Lack of funding for operations	**1 KI**	

Presence of missing or expired documentation

14 KIs (out of 20),[32] reported that **there were no households with missing, damaged, or out-of-date personal documentation**. Two KIs did not know.

However, four KIs - representing IDPs from the community and recent returnees - reported that the majority of households in their community had missing, damaged, or expired personal documentation.

Reported missing or expired documentation (out of 4 KIs)[23]

Passport	**3 KIs**	
Birth certificate	**3 KIs**	
National certificate	**3 KIs**	
Civil identification documentation (ID) card	**3 KIs**	
Unified ID	**2 KIs**	

14 KIs (out of 20)[32] reported that access to missing personal documentation - including renewal or replacement - was possible in the departments nearest to them.

However, two IDP KIs from the community believed that a missing or expired passport was the most challenging document to access given that they had to travel to Tikri or Beygee public departments from their AoD to get support. The rest of the KIs did not know (4 KIs).

"The Personal Status and Nationality Department is very far from the area and there are many who need to replace their missing personal documentation."

- Male community leader KI -

Perceptions on safety and security, community disputes, and community inter-relations[39]

Perceptions on safety and security

All KIs (14 KIs)[31] reported that **the majority of returnee households felt safe in Al-Siniya**. This situation was reportedly the same for women, girls,[22] men, and boys.

Freedom of movement

All KIs (14 KIs)[31] reported that **there were no imposed restrictions of movement** in place and that **the majority of returnee households could freely move during the day and at night if they desired**. This situation was reportedly to be the same for women, girls,[22] men, and boys according to the majority of KIs (12 KIs). Two recent returnee KIs refused to answer.

ERW land contamination

Perceptions about land contamination varied with the KI profile. **The majority of KIs** - mostly represented by community leaders - believed **there were no contaminated lands** in the sub-district (19 KIs out of 45) or did not know (5 KIs). However, almost half of KIs - mostly represented by SME, recent returnee and IDP KIs from the community - reported that there were fields contaminated with ERWs in Al-Siniya at the time of data collection (21 KIs).

Returnee KIs who reported land contamination also stated that no incident occurred in last six months (4 KIs), while three community leader KIs reported that a high number of injuries were caused by ERWs explosions. In addition, one community leader KI reported that the main concern around land contamination was the absence of specialised authorities to remove ERWs and the limited - or absence of - support from humanitarian actors within that area of expertise.

Community disputes

All KIs (14 KIs)[31] reported that **there were no disputes within neighbourhoods in Al-Siniya** in the six months prior to data collection. However, a few KIs expected future internal disputes with the return of

13 KIs (out of 14)[31] reported that **there were no disputes between the sub-district and other areas** in the six months prior to data collection. One recent returnee KI refused to answer.

Retaliation incidents

There were no reported retaliation incidents according to all KIs (14 KIs),[31] however four KIs reported that some displaced households fear returning due to outstanding inter-communal disputes with specific tribes.[39] These disputes may lead to retaliation incidents in the future if the households decide to return.

Perceptions on the presence of formal security forces

All returnee KIs and IDP KIs from the community (20 KIs)[32] reported that **the presence of formal security forces contributed positively to a feeling of safety**.

Reportedly, all returnee KIs (14 KIs)[31] perceived that official security forces in Al-Siniya were effective in resolving disputes between the sub-district and other areas. At the same time, the majority of returnee KIs (12 KIs) believed that they were also effective in resolving disputes within the neighbourhoods in the sub-district.

However, according to two KIs, the *"power of tribal system"* played an essential role in ensuring reconciliation in the area, to such an extent that security forces and local authorities could not effectively intervene to solve inter-communal disputes without tribal leaders' involvement.

Community inter-relations

7 KIs (out of 14)[31] reported that **returnee households felt welcome or very welcome in Al-Siniya**.

Household welcome levels as reported by KIs (out of 14 KIs)

Very welcome	**3 KIs**
Welcome	**4 KIs**
Somewhat welcome	**3 KIs**
Did not know	**3 KIs**
Refused to answer	**1 KI**

Reportedly, returnee households felt welcome or very welcome due to previous relations with other families in the sub-district (7 KIs out of 14),[31] as well as existing kinship ties between members of the community. These ties created strong inter-family bonds (3 KIs) and friendship between households (1 KI). In addition, KIs reported that the acceptance of returnee households may be attributed to the impact of social cohesion initiatives implemented in Al-Siniya (3 KIs), and - from a security perspective - that the community believed that these returning households were not affiliated with ISIL (1 KI). For those who reported that households felt somewhat welcome there were several reasons which seemed to have an impact on the level of welcoming. KIs reported community perceptions that some family members had alleged links to ISIL (3 KIs), and/or that they had outstanding inter-communal disputes (2 KIs), and/or that some members of the household had committed crimes and were awaiting judicial resolution (1 KI).[23]

Interaction between displacement groups

All returnee KIs (14 KIs)[31] reported that **returnee households mainly interacted with other returnee households**, and - in minority - with IDPs in the community (5 KIs) mainly linked by kinship ties (13 KIs).

Reported types of interaction (out of 14 KIs)[23]

Kinship ties	**13 KIs**
Work relationships (employment)	**7 KIs**
Friendship	**2 KIs**
Common business operation[40]	**2 KIs**
Attending to shops and public places	**2 KIs**

11 KIs (out of 14)[31] reported that **there were no challenges for interaction between groups**. Three KIs reported that the main barrier was the lack of trust in other groups (2 KIs) and lack of interest, specifically for older returnee households, to interact with other groups (1 KI). The rest of the KIs did not know (1 KI) or refused to answer (1 KI).

1. IOM DTM Return Index
2. A total of 16 IDP camps and informal sites have now been closed or reclassified since mid-October 2020 (12 formal camps closed, including Salamiyah, two informal sites closed, and two formal camps were reclassified to informal sites). However, as per July 2021, 2 camps in federal Iraq and additional 26 in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) (mostly in Dohuk) remained open. The Ministry of Migration and Displacement in Iraq (MoMD) announces from time to time their attempts to find solutions for the remaining in-camp IDPs in federal Iraq in the way to close the remaining two camps accordingly, while no plans have been set in place to support the IDPs who settled in the informal sites nationwide - RTONLINE, Iraq discusses the situation of the displaced with the IOM, October 2021
3. IOM DTM, Returnees rounds 120 and 122, January-February 2021 and June-July 2021
4. The name of the assessed sub-district was harmonized with Iraq IOM DTM to facilitate actors access to information on areas of displacement and return, noting that REACH uses Iraq OCHA administrative boundaries for all products, therefore Al-Siniya is DTM name and Al-Synia according to OCHA boundaries.
5. Considered as a district in some official governmental documents according to the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center-JCMC, Risk and Recovery in Iraq, 29 August 2019
6. Amnesty International, New Order, Same Abuses, Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq, 2010
7. IOM DTM, Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) Round VI, May, June and July 2021
8. The ReDS questionnaire is tailored to ask questions related to demographics only to community leader and SME KIs based on their knowledge about the sub-district and population groups. In the case of Al-Siniya there were 14 community leader and 11 SME respondents. Population figures for returns and IDP populations in Al-Siniya are based on their estimates at the time of data collection.
9. To date, IOM DTM's bi-monthly tracking of returnees and IDPs provides an overview of numbers and trends in movement and returns. Simultaneously, since 2018, the Returns Index was run as a joint initiative of DTM, Social Inquiry and the Returns Working Group (RWG), collecting data bi-monthly to provide indicative trends in the severity of conditions in areas of return (AoR) nationwide. Similarly, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, IOM DTM, Protection Working Group (PWG), and RWG have conducted assessments with IDPs that have left camps following or in anticipation of closures to better understand and map AoR and secondary displacement.
10. For the purpose of this research, returnees are categorized as an IDP returning to their AoO, where AoO is defined as the stated original sub-district of origin for the IDP as per the IOM returnee index. Given the complexity of (re)integration, this could mean that returnees still face challenges to their sustainable return to their AoO.
11. As clarified by the Iraq Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) in 2018, secondary displacement covers multiple scenarios: 1) IDPs who are voluntarily or forcibly displaced to another displacement location; 2) IDPs who voluntarily or forcibly return to their AoO but are unable to achieve sustainable solutions and are consequently re-displaced to their first place of displacement or to a new location of displacement; and 3) IDPs who voluntarily or forcibly, return to their AoO but are unable to occupy in their former habitual residence and cannot achieve sustainable solutions and are consequently re-displaced to a new location within their AoO.
12. "To measure the severity of conditions in each location of return, the Return Index is based on 16 indicators grouped into two scales: (i) livelihoods and basic services, and (ii) social cohesion and safety perceptions. To compute an overall severity index, the scores of two scales are combined. The severity index ranges from 0 (all essential conditions for return are met) to 100 (no essential conditions for return are met). Higher scores denote more severe living conditions for returnees. The scores of the severity index can be grouped into three categories: 'low' severity conditions, 'medium', and 'high' (which also includes the identified 'very high' locations)." - IOM DTM Methodology
13. The most severe areas in Al-Siniya were reportedly Al-Khalfa, Al-Farouk neighbourhood, Farabee neighbourhood, Al-Dahash neighbourhood, Al-Saad neighbourhood, Al-Resala neighbourhood and Al-Mthana neighbourhood: IOM DTM, Return Index Round 12, March and April 2021
14. The following camps, with populations originally from Al-Siniya, were closed in 2020: Laylan IDP closed on 30 November and Al-Karama camp closed on 6 December - CCCM Cluster, Camp profiling dataset, December 2020 (Not published)
15. For further details on the methodology, please see the Terms of Reference (ToR).
16. Community leaders are members of the host community represented by five tribal leaders, four sheikhs, two local authority representatives, one mukhtar, one religious leader and one retired official. A mukhtar can be defined as the head of a village or neighbourhood in some Arab countries. A sheikh can be defined as an elder male in a particular Arab tribe, family, or village who is respected and consulted.
17. SMEs are members of the community with a high level of expertise in different sectors or topics. These were represented by: two public education senior employees, two university professors, one Beygee refinery senior employee, one member of the electoral commission in Beygee, one public employee in the agricultural sector, one public employee in the electricity sector, one public employee in the water sector, one healthcare senior employee, and one youth non-governmental organisation (NGO) volunteer.
18. IDPs (displaced from the area) refer to households from Al-Siniya displaced during the events of 2014 to areas different than their AoO, specifically in Al-Alam Sub-district (Salah al-Din Governorate), Markaz Kirkuk Sub-district (Kirkuk Governorate), Markaz Erbil Sub-district (Erbil Governorate), Markaz Chamchamal Sub-district and Markaz Derbendikhan Sub-district (Al-Suleimaniyah Governorate),
19. There were 45 individuals aged between 24 and 73 years old interviewed for the Al-Siniya assessment. The majority were male (36 KIs). The lack of gender balance among the KIs is a limitation to the assessment. Integration of vulnerable age groups was considered, 12 KIs were over the age of 65 representing elderly, and one KI was considered in the youth group (between 18 and 24).
20. New York Times, Iraqi Forces and Shiite Militias Retake Oil Refinery From ISIS, 16 October 2015
21. Business Standard, Iraq reopens oil refinery in Salahudin after rehabilitation, 24 November 2017
22. It should be noted that gender indicators can be subject to potential under-reporting due to the limited number of female KIs interviewed. In addition, there might be a stigma as well around reporting on safety for men and boys.
23. Sum of answers may exceed the 100% due to KIs being able to select multiple response options.
24. This question excluded IDP KIs from the community displaced elsewhere (6 KIs), therefore the total number of KIs for this question was 39 KIs out of 45.
25. This question was asked only to returnee and SME KIs (25 KIs).
26. "Security clearance is the first step that is taken into consideration for any return movement across the country. IDPs need to obtain approvals from local authorities and security forces in the AoOs to be able to return. The procedures to obtain security clearance vary, depending on the political and security dynamics at the AoO, number of security forces present, time of application, type of IDPs (in-camp or out of camp), and so on. Security clearance may typically be issued in a period ranging from one day to two weeks and may be denied in some cases." – RWG, Return and Security Clearance Process, Focus on returns to Sinjar from Dohuk and Ninewa, June 2020
27. The severity of blocked returns to Al-Siniya was classified as medium in five locations and high in two (out of seven assessed locations), due to concerns around the number of households which have applied for security clearance to return but have had it denied by operations command based on outstanding inter-communal conflicts.: IOM DTM, Return Index Round 12, March and April 2021
28. During this assessment, host community were defined by KIs as those households who returned to their AoO more than one year prior to data collection.
29. "Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.": International Labour Organisation (ILO), Decent Work Definition
30. Findings were indicative of each population group and not representative.
31. This question was asked only to returnee KIs (14 KIs).
32. Vulnerable groups included, in this assessment, were female heads of households, elderly, people with disabilities, UASC and minor heads of households.
33. This question was asked only to returnee KIs and IDP KIs from the community (20 KIs).
34. For the purpose of this research, large households refer to household who have over seven members including parents and children, which is the average size for a household in Iraq - United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, Household Size and Composition, 2019
35. This question was asked only to returnee KIs and IDP KIs from the community who reported challenges to access housing rehabilitation (out of 20 KIs).
36. This question was asked only to returnee KIs who reported challenges (out of 14 KIs).
37. When comparing responses disaggregated per gender, the low number of respondents, in general, and of female respondents in particular, should be considered.
38. This question was asked only to community leader and SME KIs (25 KIs).
39. The findings of this section represent the perceptions of a relatively small group of respondents, and therefore are not representative and may differ from other reporting on these topics. Additionally, differences in reporting compared to other metrics could also be due to the methodology, with people being less open to sharing sensitive information over the phone.
40. For the purpose of this assessment, common business operation refers to the action of operating an income generating business in partnership involving members of different population groups.