



Humanitarian Situation Overview

Aweil East and Northern Bahr el Ghazal

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Increased displacement from Sudan, severe flooding, and economic turmoil have led to a growing number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, South Sudan. The drivers of acute needs seem unlikely to abate in 2025.

OVERVIEW

Since April 2023, South Sudan has received more than 800,000 people displaced by fighting in Sudan. Although the large majority - roughly 80% - have crossed the border through a single town in Upper Nile State, **intensified fighting in the neighboring Kordofan region of Sudan in 2024 has resulted in the emergence of another major entry area further west, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBeG).** The Majokynthio border crossing in Aweil East county is now **the second most trafficked point of entry from Sudan nationwide**, and NBeG one of the most common settlement areas for new arrivals. Aid organizations have recorded more than 50,000 people crossing the border into NBeG, while tens of thousands more have arrived from elsewhere in the country.

Official figures, however, are widely regarded as undercounts. The growing use of "informal" entry points has complicated efforts to track new arrivals, as established routes are increasingly deemed too unsafe for travel. Findings suggest that gaps in monitoring along the NBeG border **have left many South Sudanese "returnees" - who comprise the large majority of arrivals - without humanitarian assistance** since their initial displacement. **Returnees also commonly reported feeling marginalized by traditional authorities** in the distribution of aid, suggesting a broader pattern of social exclusion and vulnerability.

The economic impact of the conflict has placed immense strain on the ability of both returnees and resident households to meet their basic needs.

Prices of food and basic commodities, previously imported from Sudan, have risen by more than 200% in 2024, while households reliant on seasonal labour opportunities in Sudan have lost critical sources of income. Growing unaffordability of food was frequently cited as a primary source of hunger, **which recent IPC analysis indicates has reached catastrophic levels (IPC Phase-5) for some returnee households.**

Since June, severe flooding has exacerbated humanitarian challenges, inundating swathes of cropland, destroying critical infrastructure, and displacing tens of thousands of people. The flooding poses both immediate and long-term risks to public health and livelihoods. Poor agricultural production may trigger an atypically early onset of the 2025 lean season and **could worsen already critical rates of acute malnutrition**, which, according to available data, have reached their highest prevalence since the 2013-2018 crisis, in some areas, and are rising across the state.

The drivers of acute needs seem unlikely to abate in 2025. An escalation of the conflict or a collapse in local governance in Sudan would precipitate increased arrivals, while economic conditions in South Sudan are unlikely to quickly improve. Humanitarian assistance remains crucial to mitigating an ongoing public health crisis and facilitating the reintegration of new arrivals. **Priority should be given to food, shelter, and healthcare** which were consistently identified as urgent unmet needs.

CONTEXT & RATIONALE

In November 2023, the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) estimated that between April and July 2024, 65% of Aweil East's population would face severe acute food insecurity, including 5% of the population facing catastrophic hunger (IPC AFI Phase 5).¹ This comprised more than half of all households estimated to face catastrophic hunger nationwide, and marked the first time that the IPC classified areas in NBeG as facing catastrophic hunger since South Sudanese independence in 2011. These extreme food security outcomes were projected amid widespread population movement from Sudan, economic turmoil resulting in increasing food prices, and uncertainty surrounding the now-postponed national elections,² originally scheduled for December 2024. In the months after the analysis, fighting in West Kordofan drove a surge of new arrivals across the border into NBeG.³

This assessment was carried out with two primary objectives. The first was to identify contributing factors to acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition in Aweil East to support the county's classification at the September – October 2024 IPC workshop. Second, the assessment aimed to provide humanitarian actors with a stronger understanding of population movement dynamics into NBeG, and identify humanitarian assistance gaps in areas of settlement to enable more informed humanitarian planning and programming.

This brief covers four primary topics. The first is population movement into NBeG since the start of the ongoing conflict in Sudan in April 2023, with a focus on displacement trends in 2024. The second is the impact of severe flooding over the second half of 2024 on access to food and livelihoods. The third is market functionality and its impact on access to basic commodities and services. And the fourth is access to humanitarian assistance.

This situation overview discusses the humanitarian situation in NBeG, with a focus on Aweil East, the state's most populous county and the primary site of data collection.

METHODOLOGY

Primary data collection included eight focus group discussions (FGDs) held separately with returnees from Sudan and members of the host community, and eight key informant interviews (KIIs) with humanitarian service providers, local authorities, and traders. Interviews were conducted between 3 - 9 September, 2024, in Aweil Town – the administrative capital of NBeG state – and in Wanyjok, Malualkon, Warawar, and Dokul in Aweil East county. Towns in the north of the country along the border with Sudan were not visited due to access restrictions caused by flooding and poor road conditions at the time of data collection.


FGD participants were sampled semi-randomly in consultation with community leaders and the county-level Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) office. This situation overview also incorporates findings from ten FGDs conducted over the same period by Acted, REACH's sister organization, on population movement from Sudan to NBeG.

Findings in this brief are supplemented by a secondary data review conducted before and after data collection. The situation overview references data and analysis from the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC), the Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM), the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMIMI), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) database, the Food Security & Nutrition Monitoring Survey (FSNMS), and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). Additional context on Northern Bahr el Ghazal in relation to the Sudan conflict is drawn from a research paper written by Joseph Majok, published by the Rift Valley Institute in March 2024, which is cited frequently throughout this overview.

1. IPC. ["South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis, September 2023 - July 2024."](#) 6 November 2023. p. 4.

2. Ibid. p. 23.

3. IOM. ["Regional Sudan Response Situation Update."](#) 8 November 2023.



DISPLACEMENT AND VULNERABILITY

Nearly eighteen months since the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum in April 2023, the war in Sudan has displaced more than 800,000 people into South Sudan. Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBeG) state, which shares a 120-kilometre border with Sudan's East Darfur and West Kordofan states, has become one of the primary areas of settlement for both Sudanese and South Sudanese fleeing the violence.

In 2024, the number of people recorded crossing the border into NBeG increased following bouts of fighting in West Kordofan, including clashes and airstrikes near the town of Babanusa between November and January,⁴ and offensives on the towns of al-Meiram and El Fula - the state capital - in June and July.⁵ In total, aid agencies have recorded more than 50,000 people entering NBeG directly through the border towns of Majokynthia (Aweil East county) and Kiir Adem (Aweil North county), while tens of thousands more have travelled to NBeG via the more heavily trafficked Joda border crossing in Upper Nile State.⁶ Majokynthia is now the second most trafficked point of entry from Sudan nationwide.

Local authorities and humanitarian service providers in Aweil, however, say that this is a significant undercount. In addition to the two "formal" entry points at Majokynthia and Kiir Adem – both situated along established trade routes and monitored by humanitarian organizations – local authorities reported that three other "informal" entry points in Aweil East are widely used: Rumaker, Machar Akoon, and War Guet. Because aid organisations do not monitor these points of entry, those who cross through them are often omitted from official population counts. In addition, many of those who cross through monitored border points may also be missing from official counts; only a small number of FGD participants who reported crossing through monitored points of entry at Majokynthia, Kiir Adem, or Abyei said they were met by an aid worker after crossing the border. While the total number of new arrivals to NBeG is unknown, humanitarian key informants reported that estimates by local

authorities - ranging between 100,000 and 200,000 people - are plausible.

According to local authorities, the use of informal entry points has increased since November 2023. Since fighting began in April 2023, the accessibility and preference for routes into South Sudan have continuously shifted in response to evolving conflict dynamics. Between April and mid-July 2023, the Kiir Adem border point in Aweil North saw the highest number of arrivals directly into Greater Bahr El Ghazal.⁷ However, by the end of 2023, as fighting intensified in parts of Darfur and spread throughout Greater Kordofan, the number of arrivals declined at Kiir Adem and increased at Majokynthia and at informal entry points in Aweil East and Aweil North. According to local authorities and focus group discussion participants, by mid-2024 many deemed both "formal" routes too unsafe and began instead using "bush roads," which aim to bypass checkpoints and reduce the risk of encountering violence or extortion by armed groups.

Nevertheless, many FGD participants recounted harrowing journeys to the border. Recent arrivals commonly described experiences of sexual violence, killings, abductions, and airstrikes. Some gave accounts of consecutive and continuous displacement - being forced to move from one location, settling in another believed to be safe, only to be forced to move again due to fighting or in anticipation of fighting. Many described instances of robbery or extortion, completely depleting the household's asset base and rendering it unable to meet its basic needs upon arrival.

By August 2024, flooding had also affected the accessibility of routes into South Sudan, according to key informants in Aweil. The routes through Majokynthia and Kiir Adem are seasonal and become impassable during the rainy season.⁸ Some FGD participants reported that people are waiting in Sudan for floods to recede so they can cross the border. The recession of these floods in November – December 2024, combined with an anticipated escalation of fighting, could precipitate an increase in arrivals early in 2025.

4. UN-OCHA. "[Sudan Humanitarian Update](#)." January 25, 2024.

5. ACLED. "[Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan](#)." Situation Update. 12 July, 2024.

6. Government of South Sudan, UNHCR, IOM. "[Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan](#)." Dashboard. Accessed 16, September, 2024.

7. Ibid.

8. Majok, Joseph. "[Northern Bahr El-Ghazal During the Sudan Conflict](#)." March 2024. Rift Valley Institute, p. 16.

After crossing the border at Majokynthio, refugees and asylum seekers are provided humanitarian facilitated transport to Wedweil, Aweil West county, where a formal camp was established by South Sudanese authorities in June 2023.⁹ In contrast, South Sudanese nationals continue to their final destination, often unassisted and with few resources to facilitate their movement.¹⁰ Those with relatives in South Sudan are often hosted temporarily in their family homes, whereas those without relatives or social connections are more likely to settle near towns to search for cash-earning opportunities or humanitarian assistance, or remain near the border, in places like Majokynthio, waiting for a break in the conflict to return to Sudan.

Although severe humanitarian needs were reportedly widespread among all population groups, both returnees and host community members agreed that newly arrived households from Sudan were particularly vulnerable. Some returnees, though South Sudanese nationals, were displaced to Sudan as young children, were born there, or married into Sudanese families, leaving them with little or no social support in their settlement areas. Some do not speak local languages, and many lack the knowledge to forage for wild foods, fish, or the connections necessary to find casual work.

Returnees in several FGDs reported feeling marginalized by traditional leaders, who act as intermediaries in the allocation of humanitarian assistance (see below), possibly indicating a broader pattern of social exclusion. As one woman explained, "They [traditional leaders] say, 'We have stayed here and endured the suffering, while you were in Khartoum [...] so they include their own relatives, and the ones who have come from Sudan are left out.'" A 2024 national survey found that just 6% of returnee households in NBeG feel comfortable seeking support from local leaders, compared to 63% of host community residents.

Humanitarian service provider KIs also reported a significant presence of displaced persons from the Abyei Administrative Area – a disputed region between South Sudan and Sudan that borders Aweil East – most of whom have settled along the border with Twic county near the village of Akong. Episodes of fighting in 2022, 2023, and 2024¹¹ caused widespread displacement within Abyei and into neighbouring counties.¹² Several FGD participants in Aweil East who identified Abyei as their location of origin described being displaced from Sudan to Abyei in 2023, before being displaced again by fighting in early 2024.¹³ Ongoing population movement since then likely signals continued insecurity and/or severe living conditions at displacement sites in Twic. Information on living conditions for this population group remains a significant information gap.

Displacement into NBeG will likely continue, and possibly expand, in 2025. Should fighting spread into the relatively calm White Nile and Blue Nile States – a development that is widely expected to follow the coming dry season¹⁴ – the heavily trafficked route from Khartoum to Renk could be cut off, forcing civilians along alternative routes to South Sudan, including into NBeG. Already, Sudanese nationals interviewed in Aweil in September reported that safety concerns along the Khartoum-Renk road were forcing greater numbers of people to take routes leading further west.

MARKET FUNCTIONALITY

The war in Sudan has upended the local economy of NBeG, driving up prices, restricting income opportunities, and reducing access to food at markets. Both returnees and the host community frequently cited volatile prices and reduced income opportunities as major barriers to accessing food and basic commodities.

9. Radio Tamazuj. "[Aweil West: Host community welcomes new camp for Sudanese refugees.](#)" 6 June 2023.

10. Majok, Joseph. "[Northern Bahr El-Ghazal During the Sudan Conflict.](#)" March 2024. Rift Valley Institute, p. 6-7; Seventy-two percent (72%) of returnee households in NBeG reported receiving no support to return/relocate to South Sudan, according to the 2024 Inter-Sectoral Needs Assessment, a nationwide survey conducted by the UN International Office for Migration.


11. ISS. "[Abyei must ascent the PSC agenda.](#)" 24 April 2024.

12. REACH. "[Integrated Public Health Rapid Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Twic County.](#)" April 2024.

13. ACLED. "[Violence rises across South Sudan's disputed Abyei State.](#)" February 2024.

14. See for example: International Crisis Group. "[On the Horizon, 4th Edition, October 2024 – March 2025](#)" and Sudan War Monitor. "[Military outlook: What to expect from dry season fighting in Sudan.](#)" 25 September 2024.

Figure 1: Cost of a food minimum expenditure basket in South Sudanese Pounds at four markets in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (2022 to September 2024). Source: Joint Market Monitoring Initiative.



Historically, NBeG has relied on Sudanese farms to supply its local markets. Large deficits in crop production were offset by cereal imports, which were traded for livestock and raw materials.¹⁵ The relative stability of these supply lines had kept prices near or below the national median since the adoption of R-ARCSS in 2018.¹⁶ The collapse of Sudanese agriculture,¹⁷ however, has reversed this dynamic: instead of importing Sudanese cereals, food produced in Kenya and Uganda is being transported by traders into Sudan through South Sudan via Juba and Wau.¹⁸

The disruption of cheap imports from Sudan is one of several factors driving spikes in the price of staple foods. Food is now sourced from Juba, requiring weeks of transportation along routes rife with checkpoints, significantly increasing shipping costs, according to two traders in Aweil East. Between January and August 2024, the price of one kilogram of sorghum grain increased between 180 and 220% at markets in Aweil East.¹⁹ FGD participants from the host community described rampant inflation, with prices

occasionally increasing several times in a single day.

The conflict in Sudan has also eliminated vital income opportunities for South Sudanese communities living in border areas. Before the conflict, people from NBeG would migrate to the Darfur and Kordofan regions to work on farms during the rainy season, and migrate to Sudanese cities for other forms of manual labour during the dry season.²⁰ The ongoing conflict has completely eliminated these opportunities, stripping many households of critical income sources. A national survey conducted in 2024 found that over half of returnees and one-third of host community residents in NBeG reported having no source of income.

This 'levelling' of poverty, where an increasing proportion of the population is unable to meet their basic needs, has reduced the capacity of the host community to support newly arriving households. One recent arrival remarked during a focus group discussion, "You can go a full day without eating here, and no one will help you."

15. Majok, Joseph. ["Northern Bahr El-Ghazal During the Sudan Conflict."](#) March 2024. Rift Valley Institute, p. 16.

16. REACH analysis of Joint Market Monitoring Initiative data.

17. Radio Dabanga. ["Mounting warnings that agricultural season 'has failed' in Sudan."](#) 17 June 2024.

18. Majok, Joseph. ["Northern Bahr El-Ghazal During the Sudan Conflict."](#) March 2024. Rift Valley Institute, p. 16.

19. REACH analysis of Joint Market Monitoring Initiative data.

20. Majok, Joseph. ["Northern Bahr El-Ghazal During the Sudan Conflict."](#) March 2024. Rift Valley Institute, p. 4.

FLOODING AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Atypical flooding over the second half of 2024 has worsened already severe humanitarian conditions across much of the state. In Aweil East, seasonal flooding typically affects the county's "lowlands," which span the eastern and southern border along the Abyei Administrative Area, Twic, Gogrial West, and Aweil South counties. The 2024 floods, however, have been more severe and extensive than usual, impacting not only the "lowland" areas but also the "midland" and "highland" regions, according to local authorities in Aweil East and humanitarian service providers in Aweil Town. Satellite imagery from the 26 September to 5 October shows extensive flooding across Aweil East, Aweil South, and Aweil North counties.²¹

The UN's International Office of Migration (IOM) has verified the displacement of tens of thousands of people by flooding across the state, including more than 14,000 in Aweil East.²² An assessment conducted in August by locally based humanitarian agencies and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) estimated that 30,474 feddans²³ of crops had been destroyed and 928 livestock killed in the county²⁴ – figures that have likely since increased. In most FGDs, community members reported that heavy rains had destroyed a significant proportion of their crops, which are usually harvested between September and November.

Excluding 2023, which was a normal to dry year,²⁵ the region has experienced similarly erratic weather patterns each year since 2019, according to local authorities and humanitarian service providers. Key informants described a five-year period of irregular weather characterized by late rains, a shortened rainy season, above-average temperatures, and dry spells interspersed with short intervals of heavy rainfall. One senior humanitarian coordinator noted that the agricultural season has "shifted by approximately

50 days," a phenomenon supported by rainfall data.²⁶ Pluvial flooding has been reported to have been exacerbated by the degradation of riverbanks, which reduces the holding capacity of rivers and leads to more frequent overflows. One key informant attributed this degradation to a rising number of cattle grazing along primary waterways for extended periods each year.

In Aweil East, climate change impacts food security and livelihoods in several key ways. First, flooding (or drought) destroys crops and reduces the availability of harvested food stocks. Community members in FGDs predicted that their harvested stocks would exhaust between December and January, two to three months earlier than normal. Second, consecutive years of adverse weather have discouraged cultivation, particularly in lowland areas, further reducing agricultural productivity. This is reflected in data from the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS), which show a drop in the proportion of households that reported planting crops from 98% in 2018-2019 (round 23) to 65% in 2023 (round 29).²⁷

Third, flooding further reduces already scarce income opportunities. Community members FGD participants reported in September that flooding reduced demand for labour on local farms, and obstructed their ability to gather natural materials like firewood and grass, which can be sold for cash. This is likely to have had disproportionate impact on poor households, including returnees, who do not have access to their own land for cultivation and are more likely to depend on cash to purchase food for most of the year.

Fourth, the early-onset dry season has caused cattle to migrate earlier than usual from homesteads to access water and pasture in lowlands and along perennial waterways. This early migration shortens the duration of the year during which milk is

21. WFP. "South Sudan Floods Monitoring." Dashboard. Accessed. October 15, 2024.

22. IOM-DTM. "Event Tracking Report (Flood Displacements)." 1-30 September, 2024.

23. One feddan is the equivalent of 4,200 square meters, or 0.42 hectares.

24. Initial Rapid Needs Assessment Report. Aweil East County. 29 - 31 August, 2024. On file with REACH.

25. FEWS NET. "South Sudan: Over 1 in 2 people are expected to need urgent food assistance by early 2024." October 2023.

26. REACH. "County Profile. Aweil East: Socioeconomics, Climatic Hazards, and Community Infrastructure." March 2024.

27. FSNMS rounds 23 and 29. Summary analysis of datasets.

accessible to household members who do not migrate, including very young children. One key informant speculated that this could be contributing to the rising prevalence of acute malnutrition (see below).

Fifth, flooding destroys critical infrastructure like shelters, water points and health facilities. According to one needs assessment conducted in Aweil East in August, flooding in 2024 damaged more than 7,000 homes, submerged 47 boreholes, destroyed 56 latrines, and disrupted services at seven health facilities.²⁸ The destruction of basic infrastructure heightens the risk of disease and malnutrition, exacerbates time poverty, and increases dependency ratios, particularly in already vulnerable, single-adult households.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND NUTRITION


Available data reflects a deterioration in public health conditions between 2021 and 2022 – a period during which the region was severely impacted by flooding – and again since the conflict in Sudan began in 2023. A nutrition survey conducted in Aweil East in October 2023 estimated a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate (a measurement of the prevalence of

acute malnutrition in a population) of 20.5% (95% CI), and a severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rate of 5.3% (95% CI), both of which surpass the emergency thresholds set by the World Health Organization (WHO) of 15% and 2% respectively.²⁹

This GAM rate is the highest recorded since 2018, with an increase from 16.5% in the prior year and from 13.1% in 2021. Over the same period of time the estimated prevalence of acute food security has also risen, culminating in the IPC projecting that 5% of the population of Aweil East would face “catastrophic” food insecurity (IPC Phase-5, the highest phase of acute hunger) between April and July 2024, a first for any county in NBeG since independence in 2011.³⁰ Recent data from 2024 shows a deterioration in nutrition outcomes across other counties in NBeG, most notably in Aweil South and Aweil North, where the estimated GAM rate approaches the 30% ‘very critical’ threshold.

One healthcare service provider reported that admissions for moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were significantly higher in 2024 than in previous years, specifically following a sharp increase between April and June 2024. The same KI estimated that the total number of admissions was approximately

Figure 2: Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate in Aweil East (2015 to 2023)



28. Initial Rapid Needs Assessment Report. Aweil East County. 29 - 31 August, 2024. On file with REACH.

29. “Integrated Nutrition and Mortality SMART Survey, Final Report. Aweil East, Northern Bahr El Ghazel State, South Sudan.” 26 October, 2023. On file with REACH.

30. IPC. “South Sudan: IPC Analysis Portal.” Dashboard. Accessed 10 October, 2024.

20-25% higher than over the same period in 2023. Key informants identified food consumption gaps, inadequate access to safe water sources, high incidence of malaria, and the population influx from Sudan as primary drivers of acute malnutrition.

PRIORITY NEEDS & ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Both recent arrivals from Sudan and residents of the host community reported being highly reliant on humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs. This reliance is reflected in recent IPC analysis, which estimates that between September and November 2025 roughly one in two households will face acute food insecurity.³¹ Food and shelter were consistently identified as the two most pressing needs by both groups.

However, the majority of returnees that crossed directly into NBeG reported during focus group discussions that they had not received any humanitarian assistance since their initial displacement from Sudan (with the notable exception of accessing healthcare at NGO-operated facilities). This contrasts with returnees who entered through Upper Nile State, who commonly reported receiving food, cash, and humanitarian-facilitated transportation at various points along their journey.

FGDs revealed recurring challenges faced in accessing humanitarian assistance in areas of settlement, particularly for recent arrivals from Sudan. Participants in all five focus groups with returnees (conducted in Wanyjok, Maluakon, Warawar, and Dokul) cited discrimination by local chiefs as a key barrier to accessing humanitarian food assistance. Local chiefs from the host community were responsible providing household lists to aid organizations, which are used to identify and register beneficiaries, according to FGD participants and humanitarian service providers. But omitted many returnees in favour of households from the host community. Participants in separate groups reported being asked by chiefs to pay money in order to be registered.

The household's date of arrival to South Sudan was also commonly reported to have resulted in the household not receiving humanitarian food aid. Since beneficiaries for assistance were identified and biometrically registered in January 2024, households in Aweil East that arrived from Sudan after January were not registered and, therefore, did not receive GFD in 2024. Humanitarian service providers reported the number of people who had arrived since January was unknown, but likely substantial. A second registration was started between May and June and targeted an additional 11,000 returnee households for GFD, but was not completed due to operational delays with capturing biometric data. These households remain unregistered, and it is unclear when they will receive food assistance, according to service providers.

Nevertheless, humanitarian food assistance likely played a critical role in averting extremely severe acute food insecurity for many households in 2024. In Aweil East, general food distribution (GFD) targeted 26,078 households (roughly 130,000 individuals) with a 70% ration between January and September 2024. The targeted population included the host community, returnees and IDPs across all 6 payams. Additionally, a privately funded project provided three cycles of emergency food assistance to approximately 13,000 returnees between January and July.

In addition to food, shelter was the second most commonly reported priority need for returnees from Sudan. Several FGD participants reported sleeping out in the open, in damaged make-shift shelters, or in communal shelters exposed to the outdoors.

ABOUT REACH

REACH Initiative facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. The methodologies used by REACH include primary data collection and in-depth analysis, and all activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. REACH is a joint initiative of IMPACT Initiatives, ACTED and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research - Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT).

31. IPC. ["South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis, September 2025 - July 2025."](#) 6 November 2023.