

REACH Informing
more effective
humanitarian action

Loss and damage due to drought in Somalia

October 2026



About REACH

REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. The methodologies used by REACH include primary data collection and in-depth analysis, and all activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. REACH is a joint initiative of IMPACT Initiatives, Acted and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research - Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT). For more information please visit [our website](#). You can contact us directly at: geneva@reach-initiative.org and follow us on Twitter @REACH_info.

SUMMARY

Six months after the November 2025 drought declaration in Somalia, REACH conducted a needs assessment in April 2026 focused on loss and damage, with the aim of informing the humanitarian response to the needs of drought-affected populations and piloting a household-level tool to quantify losses and damages — including non-economic losses. Conducted across drought-affected, arrival, and mixed districts, the assessment provides one of the first granular, household-level perspectives on how prolonged drought reshapes livelihoods, wellbeing, and resilience.

Key Findings

- Loss and damage among the most vulnerable households cannot be meaningfully captured through economic losses alone. The assessment confirms that pre-existing vulnerability had already left households with little to lose economically: they entered the drought with fewer assets, lower incomes, and limited access to basic services such as water, sanitation, shelter, and healthcare. Measuring loss and damage through a non-economic lens is therefore essential, incorporating dimensions such as dignity, adequacy, stability, social networks, and safety.
- Livestock-owning, non-displaced households have a greater capacity to absorb and benefit from compensation than internally displaced persons (IDPs) or households without livestock. Retaining productive assets and remaining embedded in their livelihood systems, these households are positioned such that compensation can reinforce existing adaptive efforts and prevent further erosion. IDPs and households without livestock, however, present a different picture entirely. Having already lost the foundations needed to benefit from recovery-oriented support, they require immediate humanitarian assistance before any form of climate compensation can be meaningful.
- Displacement emerged as both a consequence of the drought and a driver of further vulnerability. IDPs consistently reported lower resilience, fewer coping options, and poorer access to services than their non-displaced counterparts. This gap was particularly stark in terms of perceived resilience, with displaced households far more likely to report feeling unprepared for a future drought.
- All major livelihood systems, spanning agriculture, livestock, and casual labour, were heavily affected by the drought. Despite this, households showed very limited ability to diversify, with most continuing to rely on the same livelihood source even after it had been compromised, suggesting deep structural constraints on adaptive capacity.

The table below summarises the main losses and damages experienced by drought-affected households and drought-affected IDPs as a result of the drought.

SOMALIA: POST-DROUGHT NEEDS ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON LOSS AND DAMAGE

Table 1: Household loss and damage (L&D) profiles

ECONOMIC LOSSES & DAMAGES (ELD)			NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES & DAMAGES (NELD)		
 LIVELIHOODS & INCOME			 LIFE & HEALTH		
	Non-displaced	IDP		Non-displaced	IDP
Income or livelihoods disappeared	67%	72%	Household members felt ill or unwell due to heat (sometimes/often)	75%	85%
Named by 69% of households overall as the single biggest impact of the drought			Children not attending school because of the drought	92%	97%
 AGRICULTURE & LIVESTOCK			More than half of households reported repeated heat-related illnesses, most commonly dehydration and heat exhaustion, particularly among children and older persons. At the same time, 67% reported greater difficulty accessing healthcare, 64% lacked a functional health facility within one hour walking distance, and 53% reported higher health-related spending. School absences and learning losses were also widespread.		
	Non-displaced	IDP	 HUMAN MOBILITY & TERRITORY		
Did not plant in the 2025 Deyr season	66%	74%		Non-displaced	IDP
Harvested less than half, or nothing, of a typical year	73%	89%	Displacement named among the drought's biggest impacts	20%	58%
Lost livestock	91%	98%	Village disappeared as a result of mass displacement	5%	13%
Herd sizes fell from an average of 33 to 8 animals per household in a single year, while selling prices fell too (goats \$60→\$50) households lost value and volume at the same time. Livestock revenue fell by \$42 per household over six months.			Displacement was perceived as the second-biggest loss overall, right after the collapse of income and livelihoods. At least 120,000 people were displaced nationally between September and December 2025 (OCHA).		
 FOOD SECURITY			 SENSE OF PLACE & SOCIAL COHESION		
	Non-displaced	IDP		Non-displaced	IDP
Households whose monthly (April 2026) food expenditure decreased (vs April 2025)	75%	63%	Family separation	17%	34%
Household food expenditure fell by approximately 20% compared to the previous year, suggesting that households are reducing both the quantity and quality of food consumed. Current food spending remains, on average, USD 63 per month below the minimum food basket (88 USD average in April 2026 ¹) vs 79 USD in April 2025. The decline was larger among IDPs households (USD 82 to USD 55) than among non-IDP (USD 75 to USD 69)..			Separation from neighbours and friends	15%	32%
 WATER			 CULTURAL HERITAGE & INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE		
	Non-displaced	IDP		Non-displaced	IDP
Not enough water for household needs	52%	65%	Stopped practicing traditions, or lost them altogether	3%	6%
Water simply not available	26%	30%	Livestock ownership in Somalia carries meaning well beyond its market price it is a marker of identity and status, so its loss is a cultural loss as much as an economic one.		
Water prices remained stable for non-displaced households and declined among IDPs, likely reflecting increased reliance on free or lower-quality water sources rather than improved access.			 BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM		
 SHELTER & HOUSING				Non-displaced	IDP
	Non-displaced	IDP	Loss of soil on household land	2%	2%
Shelter damage reported: roofs, walls	95%	99%	Reported by relatively few households, land degradation can have lasting effects by reducing agricultural productivity even after drought conditions have ended.		
Cannot afford to repair the damage	60%	75%			
Among IDPs, home ownership fell following displacement, with most households now living in hosted accommodation. Shelter losses were often absorbed through poorer living conditions and less secure tenure rather than repaired.					
 HEALTH					
	Non-displaced	IDP			
Health facilities reporting water shortages that disrupted operations	36%	47%			
More than half of all households reported increased health-related spending, though exact amounts were not captured in this pilot.					

¹ [Markets | FSNAU](#)

CONTENTS

SUMMARY	1
Key Findings	1
CONTENTS	3
List of Acronyms	4
Geographical Classifications	4
List of Figures, Tables and Maps	4
INTRODUCTION	7
METHODOLOGY	8
Geographical scope	8
Sampling strategy	8
Analysis	9
Challenges and limitations	9
Perceived resilience capacity	10
Perceived losses and damages	14
Human mobility and territory loss	16
Damage to economic activities: Livelihoods	17
(a) Agriculture	21
(b) Animal husbandry	29
(c) Casual labour and other non-rural activities:	33
Infrastructure damage: water and sanitation	33
Life and health losses: food security	38
Life and health losses: Education	40
Infrastructure damage: housing	42
Life and health losses: Health	45
Infrastructure damage: Health facilities	46
CONCLUSION	47

List of Acronyms

L&D: Loss and Damage

ELD: Economic Losses and Damages

NEL: Non-Economic Losses

NELD: Non-Economic Losses and Damages

DTM: Displacement Tracking Matrix

IDP: Internally Displaced Populations

ETT: Emergency Trend Tracker

CCCM Cluster: Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster

CDI: Combined Drought Index

SWALIM: Somalia Water and Land Information Management

NDC: Somalia's National Determined Contribution 3.0

NAP: National Adaptation Plan

Geographical Classifications

Region: Highest form of governance below the national level

State: Second form of governance below the Region

District: Third form of governance below the State, the lowest administrative boundary

Settlement: An informal area or neighbourhood not classified for administrative purposes, but used for sampling purposes

List of Figures, Tables and Maps

Figure 1: Drought-affected resilience cycle described by respondents.....	12
Figure 2: CDI in district of origin at the month of displacement and the district of arrival.....	16
Figure 3: Main assets left behind and considered unrecoverable.....	17
Figure 4: Five main origin districts.....	17
Figure 5: Main reasons to choose to come to the current location	17
Figure 6: Three main livelihood activities households reported during the six months before the onset of the November 2025 drought.....	17
Figure 7: Alternative livelihood activities reported by households whose primary activity was affected by the drought (stopped or supplemented).....	18
Figure 8: Other income sources (not employment-linked) during the last year	19
Figure 9: Impact of drought on household income sources	19
Figure 10: Market barriers faced by households when selling products in the six months following the drought declaration	20
Figure 11: Impact of the drought on household productivity	20
Figure 12: Type of ownership or land-use rights over the land for agriculture or animal husbandry.....	21
Figure 13: Purpose of the crops produced	21
Figure 14: Primary reasons households did not plant during the 2025 Deyr rainy season (September–October).....	23
Figure 15: Crops planted in 2025 Deyr rainy season (September–October) compared to a typical good year	23
Figure 16: Area under cultivation compared with a good typical year in the same season (September - October) (Deyr rains planting season)	23
Figure 17: Harvest yields in January 2026 from Deyr 2025 planting compared to a typical good year ..	24
Figure 18: Potential) Area under cultivation compared with a good typical year in the same season (March - April) Gu rains planting season 2026:	26

Figure 19: Primary reasons households did not plant or were not considering planting during the ongoing Gu season (March–April 2026):.....	26
Figure 20: Crops planted or to be planted during Gu season 2026 (March–April) compared to a typical good year.....	27
Figure 21: Change in market prices for crops sold by households in 2026 compared to the previous year, 2025.....	28
Figure 22: Measures invested in by households to restore soil productivity.....	29
Figure 23: Purpose of livestock raised by households.....	29
Figure 24: Type of livestock raised by households.....	29
Figure 25: Average revenue reported by households who raised livestock (October 2024 –April 2025 vs. October 2025 – April 2026).....	32
Figure 26: Changes in drinking water source classification before the drought onset and in the six months preceding data collection.....	34
Figure 27: Primary drinking water source before and after the drought,.....	35
Figure 28: Impact of the drought on primary drinking water sources in the six months following the drought declaration.....	38
Figure 29: Changes in sanitation facility type as a result of the drought.....	38
Figure 30: Adapted Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI).....	39
Figure 31: Adapted Household Hunger Scale.....	39
Figure 32: Changes in basic food commodity prices and average household food expenditure (April 2025 compared to April 2026).....	39
Figure 33: Changes in school attendance as a result of the drought.....	40
Figure 34: Reasons for school absence among children at any point in the six months following the drought declaration.....	41
Figure 35: Proportion of households reporting drought or extreme heat conditions affecting children's learning or wellbeing in the six months following the drought declaration.....	42
Figure 36: Average household expenditure on drought-related housing repairs and protective measures.....	45
Figure 37: Prevalence of drought-related illness or poor health among household members, reported symptoms, and associated experiences.....	45
Figure 38: Changes in household health expenditure in the six months following the drought declaration.....	46
Figure 39: Availability of a functional health facility within accessible distance (1 hour walking or 5 km) in the six months preceding data collection.....	46
Figure 40: Proportion of households reporting drought-related barriers to accessing healthcare facilities in the six months preceding data collection.....	46
Table 1: Household loss and damage (L&D) profiles.....	1
Table 2: Conducted surveys.....	9
Table 3: Resilience Capacity Score Statements – Overall, drought-affected populations (DAP), drought-affected IDPs (DA IDP).....	10
Table 4: Disagreement explanation by resilience capacity.....	13
Table 5: Perceptions of the biggest impact of the drought.....	15
Table 6 Coping strategies employed at least once by households to manage the impact of the drought on crops in the last six months (December 2025 to April 2026).....	28
Table 7: Changes in livestock numbers due to the drought.....	31
Table 8: Average reported number in April 2025 and April 2026 and the mean difference.....	31
Table 9: Median selling prices per livestock unit (January–March 2025 compared to January–March 2026).....	31
Table 10 : Coping strategies employed by pastoral households to manage the impact of the drought on livestock in the six months following the drought declaration.....	32

Table 11: Coping strategies employed by households engaged in casual labour and other non-rural activities to manage the impact of the drought on livelihoods in the six months following the drought declaration	33
Table 12: Households reporting a change in primary drinking water source in the six months following the drought declaration	34
Table 13: Water collection prevalence, collection time, cost of drinking water, and average price per litre	35
Table 14: Average water collection time and price per litre by state before and after the drought:.....	36
Table 15: Shelter situation by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas.....	42
Table 16: Shelter type by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas	42
Table 17: Shelter conditions by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas	43
Table 18: Shelter tenure security by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas	43
Table 19: Proportion of households paying rent and average amount paid (USD)	43
Table 20: Housing damage caused by the drought.....	44
Table 21: Protective actions taken by households	44
Table 22: Approaches to addressing housing damage	44
Table 23: Approaches to addressing housing damage and challenges encountered	44
Table 24: Ways in which healthcare facilities were affected by the drought	46
Map 1: Data collection coverage by type of district	8
Map 2: The majority of households reported planting or not in the Deyr season (September-October) 2025:.....	22
Map 3: Crops planted during Deyr 2025 season per district, according to what households reported:..	24
Map 4: Deyr 2025 season harvest outcome in comparison to a typical good year:.....	25
Map 5: Crops planted or to be planted during Gu 2026 season per district.....	27
Map 6: Location of the raised livestock	30
Map 7: Distance in meters from surveyed households to functional water sources (Source: SWALIM/FAO)	37

INTRODUCTION

In late November 2025, the Federal Government of Somalia formally declared a drought emergency and appealed for urgent international assistance. The most affected regions spanned the north, centre, and south of the country, with Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Sanaag, Bakool, Bay, Gedo, Juba, Shabelle, Mudug, and Nugaal among the hardest hit states ([FSNAU – SWALIM, 2025](#)). By December 2025, OCHA reported that 4.61 million people had been affected by the drought nationwide, with at least 120,000 people displaced from the most affected areas between September and December 2025, and at least 75,000 students forced to drop out of school ([OCHA, 2025](#)). As the assessment was conducted in April 2026, nearly six months after the drought onset, REACH drew on two iterations of the FAO Combined Drought Index ([CDI](#)): the November 2025 baseline and the February 2026 update, the most recent available at the time of research design, to define the scope of the affected population.

Somalia's Nationally Determined Contribution 3.0 (NDC) ([NDC, 2025](#)) and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) ([NAP, 2022 – 20230](#)) estimate past climate losses at 3.3% of GDP, while acknowledging that such aggregated figures often mask the devastating impact on pastoral and agropastoral households. The NAP further notes that recent droughts push households into negative coping mechanisms that entrench long-term poverty traps, and calls for these dynamics to be documented in order to measure the effectiveness of adaptation interventions. Yet granular, household-level data on both economic and non-economic losses and damages remains scarce. This gap undermines the ability to accurately inform social protection measures and adaptive interventions, ranging from insurance schemes and investment in resilient infrastructure to cash transfers for veterinary costs and livestock replacement.

Against this backdrop, REACH conducted a quantitative household-level needs assessment across drought-affected districts and Internal Displaced Population (IDP) arrival districts to better understand current needs and to quantify and document both the economic and non-economic losses and damages experienced as a result of the prolonged drought.

This report details the methodology employed and the rationale for its selection, before presenting the key assessment findings. The findings are organised into sections that reflect the types of loss and damage examined, in line with the definitions set out by the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency ([ICAT, 2023](#)):

- Perceived resilience capacity
- Main perceived losses and damages
- Human mobility and territory losses and damages
- Economic activities damage: livelihoods
- Infrastructure damage: water and sanitation
- Life and health losses: food security
- Life and health losses: education
- Infrastructure damage: housing
- Life and health losses: health
- Infrastructure damage: health facilities

Damages: residual climate change impacts that result in reparable negative shocks. Damages are categorised across infrastructure, including water and sanitation, power generation, transport, telecommunications, education, health, and housing, as well as economic activities, including agriculture, manufacturing, services, and tourism.

Losses: residual climate change impacts that result in irreversible and irreparable negative shocks. Losses are categorised across human mobility and territory, cultural heritage and traditional knowledge, life and health, biodiversity and ecosystem services, and sense of place and social cohesion.

Economic loss and damage (ELD): resources, goods, and services that are commonly traded in markets and can therefore be evaluated using market prices.

Non-economic loss and damage (NELD): Losses and damages that are not easily quantified in financial terms, making it difficult to produce consistent and accurate evaluations that fully reflect the many forms of harm experienced by affected populations, as well as their severity.

METHODOLOGY


Geographical scope

The geographical scope combined two key criteria: the most recently drought-affected districts where populations are actively coping with the impacts, and districts experiencing high influxes of drought-displaced populations (arrival districts). The scope was determined through a three-phase prioritisation process integrating current drought severity with displacement dynamics: 1) identifying the most severely affected districts using the CDI from February 2026 and December 2025; 2) drawing on data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Round 3 (2024), to identify districts receiving populations displaced from the most severely affected areas; and 3) confirming physical access with operations and security management.

This process resulted in the exclusion of some of the most critically affected northern coastal districts due to access constraints. Surveys were ultimately conducted across three district types: drought-affected districts; districts hosting drought-displaced populations (hereinafter referred to as arrival districts); and districts that were both drought-affected and served as arrival destinations (hereinafter referred to as mixed districts).

Within these district types, REACH interviewed two population groups: (1) drought-affected populations, defined as individuals who had resided in the assessed district for at least six months following the November 2025 drought declaration; and (2) drought-affected internally displaced persons (IDPs), defined as individuals displaced from drought-affected areas who had arrived in an arrival or mixed district within the same six-month period.

Map 1: Data collection coverage by type of district



Sampling strategy

The sampling strategy adopted a two-stage cluster sampling approach based on probability techniques. Ensuring representative for IDPs and the affected population at the district level, as well as for each population group within the district. This methodology is designed to generate disaggregated results by population groups, including affected population and IDPs, while maintaining a 90% confidence level and a 10% margin of error. In the field, these populations were identified as drought-affected population and drought-affected IDPs, based on the district type, time of displacement and reason of displacement.

In most of the scoped districts the proposed sample for all population was reached, while in Qoryooley, the sample is indicative and all results presented on this report exclude this district. On the dataset the information is available if needed.

The assessment employed mainly quantitative methods, including primary data collection and secondary data analysis and the utilisation of remote sensing tools (all quantitative information). First, quantitative data was collected via a structured household-level survey focusing on needs and drought loss and damage costing. The quantitative questionnaire piloted incorporating two open-ended questions with the objective of exploring the nuances of their perception of the losses and their resilience capacity. On the other hand, secondary quantitative

data, including statistical records and remote sensing imagery, provided information on the crops area loss in the prioritised districts. The Loss and Damage Household level component is embedded within the sectoral sections and captures information on damages and losses, expenses incurred by households, and coping strategies adopted in response to the drought. It also examines the impacts of drought on livelihoods, shelter, health, children's education, and water and sanitation facilities, etc. The tool applies a retrospective lens, asking respondents about expenses, income, and household conditions either one year prior or six months prior (when the drought was declared) in order to estimate household level economic losses and damages, as well as to capture non economic losses and damages. Data collection took place between April 12 to April 27, 2026, and reached 3,852 households. Find the summary of conducted surveys by type of districts and population on the table below.

Table 2: Conducted surveys

District	Drought-affected population	Drought-affected IDP	Total
Arrival district		680	680
Drought-affected district	851		851
Mix district that both hosted arrivals and was drought-affected	1,200	1,121	2,321
Total	2,051	1,801	3,852

Analysis

All results were calculated and disaggregated incorporating the weight of each survey in line with the sampling strategy. Where additional disaggregation is presented, such as by livelihood type or other response subsets, these should be treated as indicative rather than statistically representative, though they provide useful context for interpreting findings within the Loss and Damage framework.

The two open-ended questions were translated from Somali to English and analysed as qualitative data using a data saturation table, with responses organised into coding categories and the number of respondents referencing each identified topic quantified accordingly.

Challenges and limitations

Several severely drought-affected districts were excluded from the sample due to access restrictions on in-person data collection. This limits the scope of aggregated Loss and Damage conclusions, as some of the most affected areas are not represented. To mitigate this limitation, results should be examined at the district level where possible, and any aggregated findings should be interpreted with this constraint in mind.

This assessment was designed as a pilot for a Loss and Damage evaluation and did not incorporate a formal baseline against which to measure drought impact. To partially address this, the questionnaire included retrospective questions asking respondents to compare their current situation with conditions prior to the drought. The findings should therefore be read with this pilot purpose in mind, while the underlying data remains available for further analysis and future comparison against a formal baseline.

Perceived resilience capacity

This sub-section outlines assessment findings related to perceived resilience capacity, based on respondents' agreement or disagreement with nine statements about household resilience to future droughts, alongside the qualitative explanations provided by respondents.²

The WFP Resilience Capacity Score (RCS)³ uses nine statements and a Likert scale (ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree) to measure household capacity to cope with the impacts of a disaster or shock such as a drought. While the guidelines recommend using this tool as a baseline and endline measure within livelihoods programming, it was included in this assessment to capture households' perceived resilience following the drought, specifically how resilient respondents felt and their sense of capacity to recover from a future drought.

For this purpose, the statements were adapted to refer directly to respondents' experience during the most recent drought. Using the RCS in this way enabled enumerators to explore the reasons behind disagreement with any given statement, providing richer context about household circumstances and the factors that contributed to different losses and damages experienced.

Table 3: Resilience Capacity Score Statements – Overall, drought-affected populations (DAP), drought-affected IDPs (DA IDP)

	Strongly agree			Agree			Neutral			Disagree			Strongly disagree		
	Over all	DAP ⁴	DA IDP ⁵	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP
Anticipatory: If another drought happens, your household feels prepared for any other drought that may occur in your area	9%	11%	6%	17%	22%	10%	16%	21%	9%	54%	41%	71%	5%	4%	5%
Absorptive: If another drought happens, your household is able to bounce back from the impacts on your livelihoods and incomes	8%	11%	4%	15%	19%	9%	17%	22%	11%	56%	43%	72%	4%	5%	3%
Transformative: If another drought happens, your household can change or adapt its primary income or source of livelihood without major difficulties	8%	11%	4%	14%	18%	10%	21%	27%	13%	52%	40%	67%	5%	4%	7%
Adaptive: If droughts become more frequent and intense, your household would still find a way to get by	7%	10%	4%	14%	19%	9%	21%	25%	16%	53%	41%	68%	5%	5%	4%

² Please note that these quotes may have been subject to some degree of interpretation or rewording by enumerators as they entered the responses into the Kobo tool, or during translation.

³ [Resilience Capacity Score \(RCS\), WFP, 2025](#)

⁴ DAP: Drought-affected population DAP

⁵ DA IDP: Drought-affected IDPs

SOMALIA: POST-DROUGHT NEEDS ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON LOSS AND DAMAGE


	Strongly agree			Agree			Neutral			Disagree			Strongly disagree		
	Over all	DAP ⁴	DA IDP ⁵	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP	Over all	DAP	DA IDP
Financial: Your household has easy access to financial support that would be required if a drought causes hardship in your area	8%	11%	4%	13%	16%	10%	21%	25%	15%	53%	43%	65%	5%	4%	6%
Social: If another drought happens, your household can rely on the support of family and friends	8%	12%	4%	16%	19%	13%	23%	26%	19%	46%	38%	57%	6%	5%	8%
Institutional: If another drought happens, your household can rely on the support from public administrations / government or other institutions	8%	10%	5%	14%	17%	10%	22%	26%	16%	51%	41%	64%	5%	5%	5%
Human capital and lessons learned: Your household has learned important lessons from this drought that help you better prepare for similar threats in a near future	9%	12%	5%	31%	28%	35%	24%	23%	25%	33%	33%	33%	3%	4%	2%
Early warning: If another drought occurs and your household receives advance warning information about it, this will help you to prepare for and protect your household from the effects of the drought.	9%	12%	5%	23%	24%	21%	21%	21%	22%	44%	39%	50%	3%	4%	1%

The results show that slightly more than half of households disagreed with most statements associated with greater resilience following the recent drought or improved preparedness for a future one. Disagreement was strongest and most consistent around the first two statements, which relate to anticipatory and absorptive resilience capacities. This aligns with both the qualitative explanations provided by respondents and the broader findings across the assessment.

These two capacities, considered alongside households' weak financial and institutional capital and their recently eroded social capital, reflect the cycle experienced by assessed households in the aftermath of drought. Households consistently described how repeated droughts and the cumulative losses sustained, across both past and current events, have led to the collapse of their income sources. The issue is not that households are failing to recover; rather, many never fully recovered from previous shocks, including earlier droughts, displacement, and episodes of violence. Their resilience has been progressively worn down over time.

"Because I don't have basic education and skills to work, I only had one donkey cart to collect firewood, and that I sold when drought was appearing, to make the family survive"

Figure 1: Drought-affected resilience cycle described by respondents



When disaggregating by population group, the role of displacement becomes even more evident as a major aggravating factor shaping perceived resilience. On average, across all nine RCS statements, 65% of drought-affected IDPs disagreed with the statements, compared with 45% among drought-affected households who remained in their areas of origin. The differences between IDPs and non-displaced households are explored in greater detail in the sections that follow.

Two statements stand out as notable exceptions where disagreement falls below 55%. The first relates to having learned important lessons from the recent drought that would help households prepare for similar future threats, where 36% disagreed while 40% agreed. During discussions, households were able to clearly articulate the risks they faced, the impacts they experienced, and the lessons they drew from the event, citing strategies such as storing water, diversifying income sources, protecting livestock and crops, saving money, maintaining food reserves, and purchasing insurance.

Despite this awareness, however, pre-existing vulnerabilities, fragile livelihoods, limited income, and a lack of financial and physical capital prevent households from feeling more resilient in the face of a future drought. In practice, many are unable to implement the strategies they identified, lacking both the financial and physical resources and the institutional support needed to cover associated costs and strengthen their coping capacity.

The second exception relates to early warning systems, captured in the statement: "If another drought occurs and your household receives advance warning information about it, this will help you prepare for and protect your household from its effects." Here, 47% disagreed, still notably higher than the 34% who agreed.

As reflected in the qualitative findings above, respondents described three main issues with early warnings:

1. Even when early warnings are available, households lack the capacity to act on them, rendering the information practically unusable.
2. Early warnings are perceived as unreliable, meaning people do not trust or act upon them.
3. Early warnings are either absent or insufficiently inclusive, meaning not all households receive them.

The first point was the most frequently mentioned. Households repeatedly emphasised that information alone is insufficient: without the resources, alternatives, and support systems needed to take preventive action, early warning information remains practically unusable. As a result, households remain unprepared and do not feel more resilient, despite being aware of the risks.

The second issue concerns trust. Several respondents expressed distrust in government alerts and formal information channels more broadly, a distrust that is also shaped by cultural traditions and religious beliefs. Some participants stated that droughts cannot be predicted because “only God knows,” while others cited long-standing agricultural practices and planting traditions that they are reluctant to abandon regardless of early warning messages.

The third issue relates to access. Many respondents explained that alerts are not distributed through channels that people actually use or can access, particularly among the most vulnerable households, meaning a significant share of the population never receives the warnings at all.

Taken together, the quantitative responses and qualitative insights are summarised in Table 4, which outlines the nine failures cutting across the four resilience capacities defined by WFP, namely adaptive, transformative, anticipatory, and absorptive, and the five capitals that underpin them: financial, social, human, institutional, and informational.

Table 4: Disagreement explanation by resilience capacity

Resilience-related capacity	Summary of household explanations
Anticipatory	Households did not feel prepared for future droughts. Pre-existing vulnerabilities, limited income, fragile livelihoods, and a lack of skills, education, and support prevent them from anticipating, preparing for, or taking preventive action ahead of shocks.
Absorptive	Households reported being structurally unable to absorb or recover from shocks. Financial constraints mean they already face a recovery deficit and cannot bounce back from the current drought, let alone a future one.
Transformative	Respondents perceived no flexibility in their livelihoods that would allow them to shift from one activity to another in response to drought, feeling locked into livelihood systems that cannot be transformed under current conditions.
Adaptive	Households described repeated droughts that have progressively eroded their ability to cope, with many still recovering from previous events. They also emphasised that their livelihoods lack the flexibility needed to adjust meaningfully to shocks.
Financial capital	Households entered the drought with very few assets and extremely low incomes, limiting their ability to save or access financial mechanisms such as loans. Their most valuable productive assets, livestock and crops, were heavily lost to the drought, further weakening their financial base.
Social capital	While family and community networks have provided support in the past, the current drought has affected these networks equally, reducing or eliminating their capacity to offer assistance. Respondents also described widespread displacement and depopulated villages, reflecting a broader erosion of community-level support systems.
Institutional capital	Households did not perceive sufficient government support, and where assistance does exist, they felt it reached only certain groups. Respondents also highlighted reductions in humanitarian assistance and the resulting increase in vulnerability.
Human capital and lessons learned	Respondents identified important lessons from the drought but, due to financial constraints and limited external support, did not feel able to apply them in a future event. Many also noted a lack of skills to adapt their livelihoods and shift to alternative activities.
Early warning (informational capital)	1) Early warnings are either absent or not inclusive enough to reach all households. 2) Early warnings are perceived as unreliable and are not trusted. 3) Even when early warnings are received, households lack the capacity and resources to prepare and act.

Perceived losses and damages

To explore non-economic losses (NEL), the questionnaire included a final question presenting respondents with a list of potential NEL categories. While livelihoods, housing, and land/soil would typically be classified as economic losses and damages under the ICAT (UNEP) framework described earlier, they were included here as NEL for the following reasons.

Livelihoods were included because they function not only as an economic resource but as a core dimension of identity and survival. For the assessed households, livelihoods were largely destroyed by the drought through the loss of productive assets, severely limiting their capacity to recover or rebuild, and generating a sense of permanent and irreparable loss. Soil was included as a proxy for biodiversity and ecosystem loss. Housing was included on the basis that it carries sense of place and cultural meaning that cannot be fully monetised and may therefore constitute a non-economic loss.

The quantitative responses to this question are presented in Table 5, while an accompanying open-ended question invited respondents to elaborate further on their perceived losses.

“Overall, the drought caused loss of livestock (xoolo lumay), water shortage (biyo yari), food insecurity (cunto la’aan), and increased burden on women (culays ku kordhay haweenka), which greatly affected our family’s wellbeing and resilience (adkeysiga qoyska)” (female, drought-affected IDP)

The main results presented in the Table 5 can be grouped into three overarching categories of loss: livelihoods loss, human mobility and territory, and sense of place and social cohesion, the latter covering the separation of family, friends, and neighbours, as well as the loss of community members who passed away. Within this framing, displacement emerges as a profound loss and a turning point in people’s lives after the drought. It is perceived as the second most significant loss, following the collapse of income and livelihoods, and is closely linked to the breakdown of family and social networks. Respondents qualitatively also described the loss of their homes and, in some cases, the disappearance of entire villages. These experiences reinforce the findings from the resilience analysis: both financial and social capital have been severely eroded, leaving households with limited networks or resources to draw on.

“After his death, the drought worsened, water became scarce, and everyone focused on helping their own families – while I lost the support I depended on” (Male, drought-affected population)

The qualitative responses further illustrate how economic losses and damages have translated directly into heightened humanitarian vulnerability. Approximately 20% of open-ended responses referenced livestock loss, followed by mentions of water shortages (for drinking, cooking, cleaning, crops, and livestock), income loss, food insecurity, and agricultural losses. Given that households rely on livestock and crops both for income and for food, these losses strike at the core of their basic needs. Water scarcity, ranked as the second most significant loss, is understood as a critical environmental constraint: without water, livestock and crops cannot survive, and households see this as the primary driver of their livelihood collapse.

“My family has suffered losses, including the destruction of our assets, widespread food shortages, and limited access to water, such as insufficient wells, The population here is about 1,500 households” (Male, 40, drought-affected population)

Less frequently, though still consistently across the qualitative responses, respondents mentioned impacts aligned with human capital losses, reinforcing the perceptions captured in the resilience questions. These included school dropouts, prolonged absences due to school closures, illness, and other health-related impacts that directly undermine people's capabilities and carry long-term intergenerational consequences.

"My children also stopped going to school during this period, which affected their education and future" (Female, 54, drought-affected population)

Table 5: Perceptions of the biggest impact of the drought

Losses & damages	Overall	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs	L&D category
Disappearance of income or livelihoods	69%	67%	72%	Damage: Life & health loss; economic activities
Displacement to this area	37%	20%	58%	Loss: Human mobility and territory
Family separation	24%	17%	34%	Loss: Sense of place and social cohesion
Separation from neighbours and friends	23%	15%	32%	Loss: Sense of place and social cohesion
Loss of relatives and friends (due to deaths)	21%	21%	21%	Loss: Life & health
Children dropping out school	11%	7%	16%	Loss: Life & health
Disappearance of village as a result of mass displacement	9%	5%	13%	Loss: Human mobility and territory
Children skipping school	5%	4%	6%	Loss: Life & health
Loss of traditions / cessation of practicing traditions	4%	3%	6%	Loss: Cultural Heritage and indigenous knowledge
Loss of tranquillity	4%	5%	4%	Loss: Life & health
Severe illness among households	4%	3%	6%	Loss: Life & health
Loss of houses/shelters	2%	1%	3%	Damage: Infrastructure; Loss: life & health
Loss of soil on households' land	2%	2%	2%	Damage: Economic activities; Loss: biodiversity/ecosystem
Loss of the right to occupy and use land	1%	1%	2%	Loss: Human mobility and territory
Loss of the ability to live in the area households come from / prefer to live	1%	1%	2%	Loss: Human mobility and territory

Human mobility and territory loss

"As the situation worsened, we were forced into displacement, leaving our home in search of water, food, and humanitarian support" (female, 45, Drought-affected IDP)

For people affected by climate change, displacement represents both a form of non-economic loss and a driver of further losses. While it can be a life-saving measure that protects physical integrity in the face of sudden and slow-onset hazards, it simultaneously amplifies, prolongs, and extends the harmful consequences of these events ([UNFCCC, 2023](#)). Across the assessment, the lower perceived resilience of IDPs is consistently reflected in their limited ability to address damages and their more acute challenges in accessing adequate services, compared with households who remained in drought-affected areas. At the same time, IDPs occasionally reported relatively improved shelter or water conditions compared to their areas of origin. In most cases, however, this does not reflect genuinely better living conditions, but rather the fact that many IDPs arrived in camps or locations where humanitarian assistance provided temporary access to water, shelter, and basic services. These improvements do not translate into long-term security or stability.



This dynamic highlights a central paradox: while displacement may temporarily place IDPs in environments with better service access, it simultaneously reflects a deep loss of assets, place, and social networks, and does not guarantee sustainable recovery. Their perceived lack of resilience is therefore shaped both by the severity of the losses that triggered displacement and by the precariousness of their current living conditions, where assistance may be present but future prospects remain uncertain.


Figure 2: CDI in district of origin at the month of displacement and the district of arrival

Displacement Flow by Classification and Destination District

Classification values are on the left; destination districts are on the right. All origin districts have been aggregated out.


CLASSIFICATION

DESTINATION DISTRICT




1,888 valid records | 5 classifications | 18 destination districts | 69 non-zero classification-destination flows

Figure 3: Main assets left behind and considered unrecoverable




When asked about the assets they left behind and do not expect to recover, respondents most frequently mentioned their house and land, followed by non-food items (NFIs). Livestock was mentioned less often in this context, which reflects the nature of livestock as an asset rather than an omission. Livestock is not typically considered "left behind" for several reasons: in many cases, a family member remained in the area to care for the animals; livestock is regularly moved seasonally across districts; and crucially, an asset "left behind" implies loss of access rather than loss of ownership or the asset itself. This distinction helps explain why livestock does not feature prominently among the assets IDPs consider permanently lost, even though livestock losses were widely reported elsewhere in the assessment.

Figure 4: Five main origin districts



As no single district accounts for the majority of IDP origins, the diagram (figure 2) maps CDI levels in districts of origin against the month of displacement as reported by respondents, providing context for displacement decisions relative to the drought severity experienced at origin at that time. Most districts recorded a CDI between 0.4 and 0.6, classified as Severe, at the time households reported being displaced. Consistent with the losses they experienced, displaced households cited improved access to food, livelihoods, and water as their primary reasons for selecting their arrival locations.


Figure 5: Main reasons to choose to come to the current location



Damage to economic activities: Livelihoods

This sub-section outlines assessment findings related to changes in households' economic activities, examining which livelihoods household members were engaged in during the six months before the drought onset and how these activities were subsequently affected. The analysis focuses on the three most commonly reported activities, namely casual labour, animal husbandry, and agriculture, with some results also presented on fishing. As households may have been involved in

Figure 6: Three main livelihood activities households reported during the six months before the onset of the November 2025 drought



multiple livelihoods, the question allowed for multiple responses; collectively, these three activities were reported by 84% of surveyed households.


Households widely reported that their main livelihood activities were severely affected by the drought, with 73% of agricultural households, 72% of livestock-owning households, and 70% of those relying on casual labour reporting severe impacts. A further 25%, 27%, and 28% respectively described their activities as partially impacted.

In terms of how each livelihood was affected, agricultural households most frequently reported crop destruction, affecting both cash crops (28%) and food crops (25%), with many explaining that they were forced to stop their activity entirely or supplement it with other income sources. Livestock-owning households identified livestock loss (56%) as the primary way the drought affected their income. Among those relying on casual labour, the most frequently cited impact was the high price of water (45%), followed by being forced to stop their activity (23%), increased fuel prices (20%), and reduced access to markets or trading opportunities (18%).

Examining the activities households engaged in during the six months following the drought declaration reveals the rigidity of their livelihood systems. Across all three groups, the most commonly continued activity was the same one practiced before the drought: agriculture (67%), animal husbandry (58%), and casual labour (85%). Casual labour emerged as a secondary option for those previously engaged in agriculture or livestock, while households already relying on casual labour had very limited alternatives. Some reported small-scale activities such as cooking or selling food, but these remained marginal.


Taken together, the evidence consistently shows that households struggle to adapt their livelihoods in response to drought. Income sources are highly rigid, and even when forced to seek alternatives, most households remain dependent on the same activities that were already compromised by the drought.

Figure 7: Alternative livelihood activities reported by households whose primary activity was affected by the drought (stopped or supplemented)⁶



⁶ This was a multiple-choice question. Participants reported their activity within the provided options by the questionnaire.


Figure 8: Other income sources (not employment-linked) during the last year



Households also described the erosion of income sources beyond direct employment. As noted earlier, support from family and friends had previously served as one of their main financial buffers. However, as social networks were equally affected by the drought, these support systems have largely collapsed. This explains why, when asked how the drought affected non-labour income sources, the most frequent response was that family and friends were no longer able to provide assistance.

"We cannot always rely on support from relatives or friends, because we may all end up in the same situation. We have also not received any aid from organizations for nearly a year." (female, 51, Drought-Affected person)


Figure 9: Impact of drought on household income sources



A second major factor was the end or scale-down of humanitarian projects, which many households had relied on as a complementary source of income or essential goods. Qualitative responses frequently referenced funding cuts and reductions in humanitarian distributions, highlighting how the withdrawal of aid has further deepened household vulnerability. While

the perceived reduction in humanitarian assistance is not itself a consequence of the drought, it is identified as an aggravating factor that has intensified the drought's impacts and compounded existing vulnerabilities.

Figure 10: Market barriers faced by households when selling products in the six months following the drought declaration



"We face lack of markets and absence of trade; everything that generated income has decreased" (female, 33, drought-affected population)

The following section presents a more detailed analysis of how production was affected by the drought. The data on perceived productivity impacts suggest that climatic conditions limited households' ability to work and, by extension, their income, output, and food availability.

Figure 11: Impact of the drought on household productivity





Figure 12: Type of ownership or land-use rights over the land for agriculture or animal husbandry



(a) Agriculture

Figure 13: Purpose of the crops produced



The reported purpose of crops was predominantly food production, which helps explain the severity of the drought's impact on household vulnerability. The loss of crops simultaneously undermined both a primary livelihood source and a direct means of subsistence, compounding food insecurity and economic fragility in equal measure.

Deyr rainy season⁷ (September – October) – 2025

70% of the farmers households reported they didn't plant during the Deyr rainy season (September–October) 2025, the failed rainy season just before the drought declaration.

⁷ Deyr is Somalia's secondary rainy season (October–December), with planting often beginning in September–October and harvesting in January–February, typically contributing a 40% of annual cereal production, and is essential for livestock grazing ([FAO-GIEWS](#))

Map 2: The majority of households reported planting or not in the Deyr season (September-October) 2025:




Figure 14: Primary reasons households did not plant during the 2025 Deyr rainy season (September–October)




Figure 15: Crops planted in 2025 Deyr rainy season (September–October) compared to a typical good year





Figure 16: Area under cultivation compared with a good typical year in the same season (September - October) (Deyr rains planting season)



Respondents reported an increase in maize planting compared to previous years (in 7 out of 12 regions and in all the drought-affected districts), while overall crop selection remained broadly similar to a typical Deyr season. What changed, however, was the size of the cultivated area: compared with a typical good year, approximately half of farmers reported planting a slightly or considerably larger area. This warrants further investigation. One possible explanation is that it reflects a risk-mitigation strategy informed by past drought experiences, whereby farmers expand their cultivated area in an attempt to offset potential losses, knowing that smaller plantings yield smaller harvests. Another possible factor is access to larger land areas as a result of displacement or deteriorating land quality. Regardless of the motivation, outcomes were poor: 81% of respondents reported harvesting less than

half, much less than half, or nothing at all of what they had planted, relative to a typical good year. This aligns with national-level production estimates:

“Deyr season crop production (maize and sorghum) is estimated at about 15,600 tonnes, the lowest output on historical record and approximately 75 percent below the already low average of the previous five years, which includes three seasons with a reduced output.” [\(FAO, 2026\)](#)

Map 3: Crops planted during Deyr 2025 season per district, according to what households reported:






Figure 17: Harvest yields in January 2026 from Deyr 2025 planting compared to a typical good year



"With reduced agricultural output, we could no longer depend on our own food production and had to purchase more from the market, often at higher prices due to the widespread effects of the drought" (Male, 42, drought-affected population)

Map 4: Deyr 2025 season harvest outcome in comparison to a typical good year:



Gu rainy season⁸ (March- April) - 2026

For the Gu season, respondents reported a similar pattern. As data collection took place before the end of the planting season, harvest outcomes are not yet available. Notably, the seasonal Gu rainfall performance was

⁸ Gu is Somalia's principal rainy season (April–June), with planting often beginning in March–April and harvesting in July–August. It accounts for the majority of annual cereal production, and is the most important season for replenishing pasture and water resources that sustain livestock livelihoods ([FAO-GIEWS](#))

spatially uneven, with stronger cumulative totals in parts of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Sool, Gedo, Bay, Middle Juba and Middle Shabelle, while deficits persisted in parts of Puntland and localised southern and central areas⁹.

74% of the farmers households reported they didn't plant or planned to plant during the Gu rainy season (March-April) 2026.

Figure 18: Potential) Area under cultivation compared with a good typical year in the same season (March - April) Gu rains planting season 2026:






Figure 19: Primary reasons households did not plant or were not considering planting during the ongoing Gu season (March–April 2026):



⁹ [SWALIM – FAO \(2026\) Somalia Rainfall Forecast May 2026f](#)

Figure 20: Crops planted or to be planted during Gu season 2026 (March-April) compared to a typical good year



Map 5: Crops planted or to be planted during Gu 2026 season per district





Figure 21: Change in market prices for crops sold by households in 2026 compared to the previous year, 2025



Responses regarding crop prices were mixed, with no clear consensus. Slightly more than half of respondents reported an increase in prices, while over one third reported a decrease. As discussed in the section on market barriers, agropastoralists cited the lower cost of imported goods as a barrier to selling their own products, which may partly explain why some farmers perceived their prices as having risen relative to competing imported items.

More broadly, both food and non-food items were widely reported as more expensive than the previous year, a trend driven not only by the drought but also by the knock-on effects of the Middle East crisis, rising fuel prices, and general inflation, as discussed further in the food security section.


Table 6 Coping strategies employed at least once by households to manage the impact of the drought on crops in the last six months (December 2025 to April 2026)

	Overall	Drought-affected	Drought-affected IDP
Borrowed money	22%	27%	17%
Improved the irrigation system (drip irrigation, only nighttime irrigation, etc.)	21%	13%	29%
Didn't do anything	20%	11%	28%
Relied on help from friends or family	14%	13%	15%
Water trucking to keep crops irrigated	11%	12%	10%
Borehole construction	10%	12%	8%
Invested in soil productivity	9%	13%	6%
Water pump	9%	9%	9%
Used drought-resistant seeds	5%	5%	4%
Spent savings	4%	5%	4%
Sold other productive assets (machines, livestock, agricultural inputs, etc.)	4%	5%	3%
Don't know	4%	5%	3%
Replaced usual crops with more drought-resistant ones	4%	6%	1%
Received a crop loss insurance payout	3%	4%	2%
Gave up the rented land where crops were planted	3%	2%	3%
Sold the land	3%	2%	3%
Received assistance from the government or a humanitarian actor	1%	1%	1%
Harvested underripe or green crops	1%	1%	1%
Sold non-productive assets (jewelry, furniture, etc.)	1%	1%	0%
Sold the house	1%	0%	1%

The drought had lasted considerably longer than a month, and its impacts, as well as households' window to cope or adapt, extended well beyond a single month. To better capture the range of actions households considered or invested in, the assessment included both negative and positive coping strategies, with questions tailored by livelihood type. This approach aimed to identify the coping strategies available to each livelihood group.


For agricultural households, the three most frequently reported coping strategies were borrowing money, improving irrigation systems, and taking no action at all. Reliance on borrowing is further constrained by the earlier finding that support from family and friends has diminished, as social networks were equally affected by the drought, limiting even this option in practice. Overall, no single coping strategy emerged as widely or consistently used, underscoring the restricted options available to farmers and the structural barriers they face in responding to drought impacts. IDPs reported a notably higher prevalence of taking no action, consistent with their more limited coping capacity and the additional constraints imposed by displacement. This is particularly evident in agriculture, a livelihood that is highly place-anchored and difficult to maintain or adapt once households have been displaced from their land.

Figure 22: Measures invested in by households to restore soil productivity




(b) Animal husbandry

Figure 23: Purpose of livestock raised by households




As with crops, and to an even greater degree, livestock represents far more than a productive asset. It serves simultaneously as a source of income, food, and savings and, particularly in the Somali context, as a core dimension of cultural identity.

Figure 24: Type of livestock raised by households



Map 6: Location of the raised livestock



Forty-five percent (45%) of households reported that their livestock was located somewhere other than their own place of residence at the time of data collection. More in detail, a more than three quarters of the drought-affected populations lived in the same area their livestock was raised, in contrast to the IDPs who only 16% reported living in the same area.

Across all livestock types, the majority of respondents reported that their herd size had decreased due to the drought. As noted earlier, 56% of livestock-owning households identified livestock loss as the main way the drought affected their livelihood. On average, households reported losing 25 animals over the past year. They indicated owning 33 animals in April of the previous year, but by the time of data collection (April 2026), they reported owning an average of eight animals. The table below provides further detail on these figures, disaggregated by livestock type.

Table 7: Changes in livestock numbers due to the drought					Table 8: Average reported number in April 2025 and April 2026 and the mean difference			
Livestock	Decreased	Increased	Remained the same	Don't know	Livestock ¹⁰	Number April 2025	Number April 2026	Average difference
Camels	90%	6%	4%	0%	Camels	-	-	-
Cattle	97%	2%	1%	1%	Cattle	-	-	-
Donkeys	89%	6%	5%	0%	Donkeys	-	-	-
Goats	96%	3%	1%	0%	Goats	30	10	-32
Poultry	89%	7%	2%	2%	Poultry	11	5	-9
Sheep	95%	3%	1%	0%	Sheep	25	7	-28

Among households that reported selling livestock, respondents were asked to compare the prices obtained between January and March 2026 with those from the equivalent period in the previous year (January–March 2025). Across all livestock types, the data show a consistent decline in selling prices compared with the prior year. This fall in livestock prices, combined with the substantial reduction in herd sizes, further illustrates the compounding economic pressures faced by agropastoral households during the drought.

Table 9: Median selling prices per livestock unit (January–March 2025 compared to January–March 2026)

Livestock ¹¹	Selling Price January to March 2025	Selling Price January to March 2026	Average difference
Goats	\$60	\$50	\$- 4
Poultry	\$14	\$10	\$ - 2
Sheep	\$62	\$60	\$- 4

Households were also asked a broader question about total revenue from livestock-related activities, including eggs, meat, and milk, covering the period October 2025 to April 2026 and compared with the equivalent period the previous year (October 2024 to April 2025). The data show a significant mean difference of -42 USD¹² in revenue between the two periods.

¹⁰ Camels, cattle and donkeys are excluded from this comparison, as there were a few households who reported raising these animals.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ttest details: mean = -42.89, t = -5.86, p value = ~0.0000000065, confidence interval (95%) = -57.3 to -28.52

Figure 25: Average revenue reported by households who raised livestock (October 2024 -April 2025 vs. October 2025 - April 2026)




Table 10 : Coping strategies employed by pastoral households to manage the impact of the drought on livestock in the six months following the drought declaration

Coping strategies	Overall	Drought-affected	Drought-affected IDPs
Borrowed money	36%	31%	41%
Water trucking to keep livestock alive	30%	36%	25%
Increasing expenditure on animal feeding	23%	33%	14%
Relied on help from friends or family	22%	8%	35%
Didn't try to cope with the consequences of the drought	17%	7%	27%
Emergency veterinary care or disease prevention for animals	13%	16%	10%
Sold other productive assets (forage, milk bottles/tanks, etc.)	10%	13%	7%
Stopped sending children to school to engage them in productive household activities	6%	7%	5%
Sold the land	6%	7%	5%
Received assistance from the government or a humanitarian actor	5%	2%	8%
Sold non-productive assets (jewelry, furniture, etc.)	5%	6%	3%
Spent savings	4%	4%	4%
Don't know	3%	6%	0%
Gave up the rented land where livestock was kept	3%	2%	3%
Sold the house	1%	1%	0%

Drought-affected IDP households relied most heavily on borrowing money (41%) and help from family or friends (35%). Both are classified as stress strategies within the Livelihood Coping Strategies Indicator (LCSI) framework, reflecting the depletion of household resources and the erosion of resilience. Their reliance on these strategies indicates that other options were largely unavailable: having left their areas of origin, IDPs lack access to land, assets, and the financial resources required for more resource-intensive strategies such as water trucking or animal feeding.

In contrast, non-displaced drought-affected households displayed a more diversified coping profile, relying relatively evenly on water trucking (36%), animal feeding (33%), and borrowing money (31%). This suggests that non-displaced households actively attempted to protect their livestock and adapt to drought impacts, drawing on a broader set of strategies that require stability, access to markets, and a degree of financial capacity.

This divergence is further reflected in the proportion of households that took no action: only 7% among non-displaced households, compared with 27% among IDPs, underscoring the severely constrained coping space of the latter.

For compensation and recovery programming, livestock-owning households that remained in drought-affected areas therefore represent a relevant target group. Their coping strategies

demonstrate that, despite severe losses, they continue to invest in keeping their livestock alive, indicating that viable livelihood systems remain in place and can be reinforced. Supporting these households through compensation schemes would strengthen existing adaptive efforts and help prevent further erosion of productive assets.

(c) Casual labour and other non-rural activities:

Table 11: Coping strategies employed by households engaged in casual labour and other non-rural activities to manage the impact of the drought on livelihoods in the six months following the drought declaration

	Overall	Drought-affected	Drought-affected IDPs
Borrowed money	61%	59%	64%
Relied on help from friends or family	42%	28%	60%
Spent savings	15%	18%	11%
Stopped sending children to school to engage them in productive household activities	11%	10%	13%
Didn't try to cope with the consequences of the drought	11%	12%	10%
Sold non-productive assets (e.g., jewelry, furniture, etc.)	11%	11%	10%
Received assistance from the government or a humanitarian actor	8%	4%	12%
Sold other productive assets (fabric, stove, henna, items to sell, etc.)	6%	7%	4%
Sold the house	5%	4%	6%
Don't know	2%	3%	1%

Similar to the previous livelihood groups, households engaged in casual labour or other non-rural activities relied on borrowing money and support from friends or family. However, they showed a slightly higher reliance on more negative coping mechanisms, such as spending their savings or withdrawing children from school, while less frequently reporting that they were unable to cope with the impacts of the drought. As noted at the beginning of this section, households involved in casual labour continued to engage in such activities after the drought, either in the same or in different forms, indicating a degree of adaptation capacity and, potentially, a lower economic impact compared to other groups. They continued engaging in the same activities, but did not face losses of the same magnitude, making it easier to sustain them. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, households with fewer assets had less to lose and fewer options for coping: strategies such as selling a house or other productive assets were often not viable, as these households were unlikely to own such assets in the first place, which is reflected in their responses.


Infrastructure damage: water and sanitation

Regardless of whether households remained in drought-affected areas or were displaced, less than half (36%) reported changing or diversifying their drinking water source in the six months following the drought declaration. Among those who did change their source, most (81%) shifted to or maintained an improved water source. However, households that had relied on an unimproved water source before the drought after the drought, 80% used improved water source and 19% still rely on unimproved sources.


"In the village the drought caused critical water sources such as berkad and shallow well to dry up, forcing households to depend on costly water trucking" (male, 46, drought-affected population)

Table 12: Households reporting a change in primary drinking water source in the six months following the drought declaration

	Overall	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs
Completely changed their source of drinking water	20%	17%	24%
Partially diversified their sources of drinking water	16%	14%	18%
Didn't change their source of drinking water	64%	68%	58%

Figure 26: Changes in drinking water source classification before the drought onset and in the six months preceding data collection¹³

¹³ Ribbon thickness represents occurrence count; colours represent the source classification. Seven "Undefined" records were omitted to match the three-category reference. Should be ratified upon document review.

Figure 27: Primary drinking water source before and after the drought^{14, 15}

The tables and map underneath present differences in water collection prevalence, collection time, and the cost of drinking water sources. Table 13 provides overall results, including all households that reported their drinking water source in the six months prior to data collection, as well as those that reported changes or diversification in water sources due to the drought. These figures offer a general comparison of averages and percentages that doesn't allow to conclude there were consistent increases or decreases in water prices or the time required to access water across the population. When focusing specifically on households that reported changing or diversifying their drinking water source, the differences are not statistically significant when comparing mean prices¹⁶. The average cost of water was \$0.09 before the drought and \$0.08 in the six months following its onset. Similarly, the average time required to collect water decreased slightly from 26 minutes to 24 minutes. Table 14 further shows that, at the state level, there is generally no increase in the cost of water per litre, except in Bari, Mudug, and Woqooyi Galbeed. Even in these states, changes in cost are not proportional to the time spent collecting water.

However, these quantitative findings are not fully consistent with the qualitative information gathered. In open-ended responses, households frequently reported a general increase in water costs and significant financial barriers to accessing water. This perception is partially reflected in Figure 28, where 22% of respondents reported increased costs.

Table 13: Water collection prevalence, collection time, cost of drinking water, and average price per litre

	Overall		Drought-affected populations		Drought-affected IDPs	
	Before the drought ¹⁷	In the last 6 months	Before the drought ¹⁷	In the last 6 months	Before the drought ¹⁷	In the last 6 months
Households collecting water	63%	48%	59%	38%	68%	61%
Average collection time (minutes)	24	20	25	26	23	16
Water available for free	54%	37%	46%	30%	61%	46%

¹⁴ Percentages refer to the 36% of households that reported having changed or diversified their drinking water source as a result of the drought.

¹⁵ Berkad: water reservoir

¹⁶ The weighted average difference between the current water price and before drought water price is ~0.0064 USD. $t = 0.4318$, $p\text{-value} = 0.666$, $\text{mean} = 0.0064$, $\text{CI } 95\%: -0.0227 \text{ to } 0.0354$. Then, no significant.

¹⁷ Percentages refer to the 36% of households that reported having changed or diversified their drinking water source as a result of the drought.

SOMALIA: POST-DROUGHT NEEDS ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON LOSS AND DAMAGE


Average price per litre ¹⁸	\$ 0.02 USD	\$ 0.10 USD	\$ 0.06 USD	\$ 0.06 USD	\$ 0.17 USD	\$ 0.13 USD
---------------------------------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

Table 14: Average water collection time and price per litre by state before and after the drought:

State	Districts	Minutes before the drought	Minutes in the last 6 months	Price per litre (in USD) before the drought	Price per litre (in USD) in the last 6 months
Bakool	Waajid Ceel Barde	21	21	\$0.53	\$0.50
Banadir	Daynile Kahda	21	12	\$0.19	\$0.17
Bari	Bossaso Caluula	35	29	\$0.03	\$0.04 ↑
Bay	Diinsoor Buur Hakaba Baydhaba Qansax Dheere	28	33 ↑	\$0.06	\$0.05
Gedo	Baardheere Ceel Waaq Garbahaarey Belet Xaawo Luqq	41	39	\$0.10	\$0.09
Hiraan	Belet Weyne	21	13	\$0.02	\$0.02
Lower Juba	Afmadow	13	21	\$0.05	\$0.05
Lower Shabelle	Qoryooley Afgooye Wanla Weyn Marka Baraawe	34	14	\$0.09	\$0.08
Middle Shabelle	Balcad Jowhar	16	18	\$0.06	\$0.06
Mudug	Hobyo	30	21	\$0.01	\$0.02 ↑
Nugaal	Eyl Burtinle Garoowe	12	12	\$0.03	\$0.02
Woqooyi Galbeed	Berbera	17	21 ↑	\$0.01	\$0.04 ↑

¹⁸ The prices from the last six months prior to data collection are reported by 62% of the households who reported the water wasn't free. Prices reported for the time before the drought are reported only by the 46% of the 36% of households who reported the water source before the drought onset wasn't free.

Map 7: Distance in meters from surveyed households to functional water sources (Source: SWALIM-FAO)




Map 7 combines survey data (grey points are households), with [SWALIM-FAO](#) data on the functional water points to calculate the distance in meters from each household to the nearest water source. The darkest districts on the map overlap with those with lowest CDI in November, December 2025 and February 2026, identified as drought-affected districts during the scoping process. In most assessed districts, water points are within 3 km.

Table 13 shows that, in most of the states it the round trip to collect water was under 30 minutes, about 2km approximately, which counts as basic service and in Gedo, Bay and almost in Bari it exceeded the 30 minutes (over 2km), counting as limited service ([UNICEF](#)). In these same places

households reported that it took too long to travel to the nearest water point more than in other states, 12%, 19% and 15%, respectively.

Specifically, in Eyl the main water sources reported was water trucking (52%), and it is the only district where this is the case. This is why the reported travel times do not correspond to how further is the water source identified.


Figure 28: Impact of the drought on primary drinking water sources in the six months following the drought declaration



Across states, households reported multiple dimensions of water scarcity and poor water quality. Bakool recorded the highest proportion of households reporting insufficient water (79%), followed by Lower Juba (66%) and Banadir (65%). In Hiraan, a large majority (80%) reported that water smelled, tasted, or appeared contaminated, indicating widespread water quality concerns. Water unavailability was also frequently reported in Nugaal (53%), Bakool (43%), and Bari (43%).

Notably, Hiraan, Banadir, Bakool, and specific districts in Nugaal (Garowe) and Bari (Bossaso) are arrival locations for displaced households. In principle, these areas might be expected to have relatively fewer water access challenges, given that they are often selected for their comparatively better services or humanitarian presence.

Figure 29: Changes in sanitation facility type as a result of the drought



Changes in sanitation facilities were primarily characterised by a shift from water-dependent latrines to dry latrines.

Life and health losses: food security

Given the assessment's objective of understanding the effects of the drought on households over the six months following the drought declaration, the recall period for selected food security indicators was extended to cover the full six-month reference period. This adaptation was intended to identify whether households had experienced specific food security conditions or resorted to particular coping strategies at any point during this period,

including those that may have occurred several months before the assessment. As a result, these indicators should not be interpreted in the same way as standard reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) or Household Hunger Scale (HHS) measures, which reflect more recent conditions. Instead, the findings are analyzed as retrospective measures of households' experience of drought-related food insecurity and coping over the six-month period and are considered alongside current food consumption outcomes and reported contributing factors to assess how drought-related impacts have affected household food security.

Figure 30: Adapted Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI)




Figure 31: Adapted Household Hunger Scale





Figure 32: Changes in basic food commodity prices and average household food expenditure (April 2025 compared to April 2026)



Average food expenditure reported (April 2026): 63 USD

Average food expenditure reported (April 2025): 79 USD


Among states, price increases were most widely reported in Lower Juba, where 61% of respondents considered prices to have increased drastically, and Hiraan, where 77% considered prices to have increased slightly. According to the most recent IPC update (April–June 2026), the failed 2025 Deyr harvest, limited carry-over stock from previous seasons, and rising fuel, transport, and imported food prices linked to the 2026 Middle East conflict have contributed to sharper than anticipated increases in food prices across Somalia, undermining the purchasing power of poor households ([IPC, 2026](#)). According to WFP, overall prices had increased by 20% since the escalation of the Middle East conflict began, in the period immediately preceding data collection ([WFP, 2026](#)).

A closer look at the frequency of consumption-based coping strategies and hunger experiences shows that households primarily relied on purchasing less expensive food, while the most frequently reported hunger experience was having no food at home due to a lack of resources. This aligns with earlier findings: households that previously produced their own food lost both their food sources and their livelihoods, leaving them with fewer options to meet basic needs. Meanwhile, average monthly food expenditure fell by approximately 20% compared to the previous year.

From a Loss and Damage perspective, the household monthly food expenditure appears lower than before the drought, but this reduction represents a significant non-economic loss: households are eating less and consuming cheaper. Comparing current expenditure against the food Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), valued at USD 72 in 2024 and adjusted for Somalia's annual food inflation for 2025 and 2026 ([WFP, 2026](#)), yields an equivalent value of approximately USD 81. Average food expenditure in April 2026 falls short of this benchmark by around USD 18, highlighting a substantial gap between what households are spending and the minimum required to meet basic food security needs.

Life and health losses: Education

Figure 33: Changes in school attendance as a result of the drought




The impact of the drought on education was explored through school attendance and children's wellbeing at school. In the six months following the drought declaration, 42% of households reported that their children had missed school at some point, 40% among drought-affected households and 45% among drought-affected IDPs. The main reasons cited were school closures, whether official or unofficial, due to the drought, and households lacking sufficient income to cover school-related costs.

Figure 30 presents data for the subset of households whose children were attending school before the drought onset and who subsequently reported missing school at any point during the six months following the drought declaration, disaggregated by population group. Overall, 54% of children who had been attending school before the drought missed school at some point afterwards, compared with 36% among those who had not been attending before. Previously enrolled children therefore show an 18% higher rate of school absence following the drought.¹⁹

¹⁹ Based on a t-test with $t = 10.28$ and $p\text{-value} = 0.0000$.


These findings are consistent with field reports indicating that schools frequently close when families are displaced from drought-affected areas and enrolment falls, making it financially unsustainable for schools to remain open ([Radio Ergo, 2026](#)). At the same time, households' reduced capacity to pay school fees further contributes to closures, creating a reinforcing cycle in which both the supply of and demand for education deteriorate under prolonged drought conditions.

Figure 34: Reasons for school absence among children at any point in the six months following the drought declaration



The loss of education time constitutes a non-economic loss, as that time cannot be recovered and the long-term consequences risk deepening the poverty trap these households are already caught in. Beyond physical and financial access to school, children who did attend were exposed to conditions that undermined their learning and wellbeing, preventing them from fully benefiting from education. Household heads reported that children experienced hunger, poor sleep, low energy, and difficulty concentrating as a result of the drought.

Figure 35: Proportion of households reporting drought or extreme heat conditions affecting children's learning or wellbeing in the six months following the drought declaration



Infrastructure damage: housing

Housing situation

Shelter vulnerability among the assessed population is largely determined by the displacement triggered by the drought. As shown in the tables below, the shelter situation of households that remained in drought-affected areas is not, in itself, characterised by heightened risk or inadequacy. The drought may have caused damage to roofs or walls, but these households retained their housing. The situation for drought-affected IDPs, however, is markedly different. Displacement forced them to leave their areas of origin, and their shelter situation changed considerably, in most cases for the worse.

Slightly fewer than half of drought-affected IDPs had been living in adequate shelter in their areas of origin (49%). By the time of data collection, this had changed drastically, with only 1% reporting that they were living in a solid or finished structure.

Table 15: Shelter situation by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas

Shelter situation	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)	Drought-affected IDPs (in the arrival area)
Individual shelter (for this household only)	73%	78%	47%
Hosted by friends/relatives	12%	9%	36%
Hosting at least one other	8%	4%	6%

Table 16: Shelter type by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas

Shelter type	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)	Drought-affected IDPs (in the arrival area)
Solid / finished house	43%	48%	1%
Unfinished / non-enclosed building	24%	20%	5%
Makeshift shelter	16%	10%	22%

household in own home						
Collective centre	7%	9%	10%	Solid / finished apartment	7%	1% 0%
No shelter (sleeping in the open)	1%	1%	1%	Emergency shelter	5%	3% 54%
				Tent	4%	17% 19%

Table 17: Shelter conditions by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas

Shelter issues	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)	Drought-affected IDPs (in the arrival area)
One to three issues	74%	%75	78%
Four to seven issues	8%	%10	14%
Eight to 11 issues	0%	%0	0%
No issues	17%	%15	7%

Table 18: Shelter tenure security by population group in arrival and drought-affected areas

Tenure security	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)	Drought-affected IDPs (in the arrival area)
High risk	9%	31%	7%
Medium risk	28%	65%	85%
Low risk	63%	3%	7%
Undefined	0%	0%	0%

Very few households reported paying rent, either in April 2025 or April 2026. More than half of households owned their home in 2025, rising to 68% among drought-affected households and 75% among drought-affected IDPs. By April 2026, the proportion of IDPs living in owner-occupied shelter had fallen sharply to just 7%, with the majority having shifted to being hosted for free (77%). As only a small number of respondents reported the monetary value of their rent, differences over time are not statistically significant, though slight reductions appear across both population groups (see Table 18). Taken together, the decline in households paying rent and the shift toward less adequate but cost-free living arrangements suggest that households are not incurring economic losses through higher expenditure; rather, they are experiencing non-economic losses through deteriorating housing quality, adequacy, and tenure security.

Table 19: Proportion of households paying rent and average amount paid (USD)

Population	Overall		Drought-affected populations		Drought-affected IDPs	
Year	April 2025	April 2026	April 2025	April 2026	April 2025	April 2026
% paying rent	9%	9%	11%	10%	7%	8%
Average rent paid (USD)	\$32	\$26	\$37	\$35	\$22	\$12

Table 20: Housing damage caused by the drought

Damages	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)
Roof damage	40%	55%
Wall damage	34%	57%
Damage to the fence around the parcel	17%	33%
Flooding inside the house	6%	3%
Damage to doors/windows	9%	15%
Damage to furniture or household items	3%	5%
Loss of personal documents	1%	2%
House is completely destroyed/collapsed	3%	4%
There has been no damage to the house in the last 6 months	20%	10%

Table 21: Protective actions taken by households

Actions to protect house	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs (in the drought-affected area)
Modified the roof to reduce heat	42%	49%
Repaired or reinforced walls damaged by heat or dryness	43%	37%
Adjusted doors or windows to improve airflow or shading	14%	17%
Covered the roof with a tarp or plastic	18%	10%
Built external shade around the house	7%	23%
Improved ventilation	10%	6%

The majority of households reported roof and wall damage to their current home or, in the case of IDPs, to their home in the drought-affected area of origin.

Table 22: Approaches to addressing housing damage

How damage was addressed	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs
Fixed it ourselves using our own resources	28%	16%
Fixed it with help from the community	26%	14%
Got help from aid organizations	6%	3%
Sleeping outside	8%	3%
Did not make any repairs or changes	32%	64%

Table 23: Approaches to addressing housing damage and challenges encountered

Challenges to protect the house	Drought-affected populations	Drought-affected IDPs
Not enough materials or supplies are available	31%	45%
We don't know how to do the repairs or don't have the skills	25%	37%
We don't have enough money to pay for all the repairs	60%	75%
We have physical difficulties	10%	8%
We can't find skilled workers to hire to do the repairs	9%	5%
We did the repairs, but they were expensive	7%	6%
There have been no challenges	12%	4%

SOMALIA: POST-DROUGHT NEEDS ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON LOSS AND DAMAGE

Figure 36: Average household expenditure on drought-related housing repairs and protective measures




As with rent, reported expenditure on repairing or addressing housing damage was very low. Household responses indicate that most were unable to undertake repairs, primarily due to financial constraints, with the

majority reporting no changes or improvements to their shelter. The expenditure captured in the dataset therefore reflects only those households with access to external support or sufficient financial capacity to address damage. Consistent with the broader displacement dynamics observed across the assessment, drought-affected IDPs reported even lower levels of expenditure, as they were no longer living in their original homes and were simultaneously managing the additional pressures of displacement.

Life and health losses: Health

Figure 37: Prevalence of drought-related illness or poor health among household members, reported symptoms, and associated experiences




20% of households reported the death of at least one household member due to illness potentially linked to the drought

Beyond the listed symptoms, several households referenced perceived malnutrition caused by the drought in the qualitative responses, with elders, children, and pregnant women identified as the most affected groups.

"The biggest loss was the nutritional well-being of our youngest children, who now suffer from persistent health issues because we couldn't afford a balanced diet or clean water" (male, 68, drought-affected IDP)

Figure 38: Changes in household health expenditure in the six months following the drought declaration



sometimes, or frequently, the majority reported increased health spending. In contrast, among households where no member had felt ill, only 38% reported an increase in spending.

Infrastructure damage: Health facilities

Figure 39: Availability of a functional health facility within accessible distance (1 hour walking or 5 km) in the six months preceding data collection




Figure 40: Proportion of households reporting drought-related barriers to accessing healthcare facilities in the six months preceding data collection




Table 24: Ways in which healthcare facilities were affected by the drought

	Drought-affected IDPs (back in the drought area)	Drought-affected populations
Health facility overwhelmed by health issues related to the drought	36%	36%
Staff shortage due to migration	36%	29%
Water shortages affecting facility operation	47%	36%
Supply/availability reduction of medicines	29%	27%

Population not able to access/arrive to health facility	16%	16%
Staff not able to access/arrive to health facility	14%	14%
The clinic is only open for a short time during extreme weather	14%	12%
The clinic is closed because of limited access to water	8%	6%
The clinic is closed because of the heat	11%	6%
The clinic staff are too tired from the heat to work properly	10%	7%
The power goes out, so the clinic can't operate properly	3%	6%

By state, water shortages in health facilities were most frequently reported in Banadir (56%) and Nugaal (43%) among drought-affected IDPs, and in Nugaal (48%) and Bari (47%) among drought-affected households.

CONCLUSION

The findings illustrate how households perceive and describe the multidimensional losses and damages triggered by the drought. Households reported the collapse of income sources, widespread livestock mortality, crop failure, and severe water scarcity. These economic losses and damages were accompanied by profound non-economic losses, including displacement, family separation, loss of education time, deteriorating health, and the erosion of social networks. Displacement emerged as both a consequence of the drought and a driver of further vulnerability, with IDPs consistently reporting lower resilience, fewer coping options, and poorer access to services.

Across all sectors, the assessment reveals a progressive erosion of resilience. Households did not solely struggle to recover from this drought; they also carry the cumulative weight of repeated shocks, limited financial and institutional support, and rigid livelihood systems that offer little room for adaptation. Even where households have drawn lessons from past droughts, they lack the resources to act on them. Early warning systems, while valued in principle, remain ineffective without the means to prepare.

The findings underscore the importance of integrating loss and damage considerations into humanitarian and climate adaptation planning. The assessment highlights critical damage to financial and human capital, to social networks, and to water, sanitation, and housing infrastructure. It points to the need for interventions that address both economic losses, such as livestock replacement and livelihood recovery, and non-economic losses, including the impacts of displacement, loss of education time, psychosocial wellbeing, and the erosion of social cohesion.

By documenting these household-level impacts, the assessment provides a foundation for more targeted, evidence-based programming and contributes to the broader national effort to quantify climate-related Loss and Damage. Future work should build on this pilot by establishing formal baselines, expanding geographic coverage to currently inaccessible high-severity areas, and deepening analysis of long-term recovery trajectories.